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THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL MILITARY RELATIONS ON THE USE OF GERMAN MILITARY POWER DURING OPERATION BARBAROSSA
By
LCDR Richard Carnicky, USN.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
ABSTRACT
The German General Staff launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 assuming the eastern campaign would last only three months. However, within six months after the initiation of hostilities the Red Army blunted the Wehrmachts attack outside the gates of Moscow, Operation Barbarossa had failed. Although a long standing and professional organization the German General Staff failed to achieve strategic success, despite significant success during the early stages of the campaign. Adolf Hitlers national goal of Russian extermination exceeded the German Armys capabilities. The war lasted nearly four years and resulted in the devastation of western Russia, millions dead and the destruction of Germany. This thesis examines how the divergence between the Wehrmachts capabilities and Hitlers ideological national objectives affected Operation Barbarossa.
Through examination of the historical role the German General Staff held during military operations, this study addresses the linkage between German political and military relations during war. It begins with an analysis of the Prussian General Staff system under Moltke the elder. It follows the staffs development through the wars of German unification, prelude to World War I and, the interwar period leading up to Hitlers rise to power. It concludes with an analysis of Operation Barbarossa and the German General Staffs efforts to achieve strategic victory on the eastern front. Finally, it concludes with lessons modern military leaders should learn from the General Staffs mistakes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There are numerous people who made this thesis possible. First and foremost I would like to thank my wife Nicole who always encouraged and supported my research even during the most trying and difficult time of our lives. The time and effort required to complete this project meant there were many long weekends spent buried in books instead of enjoying time with her. Her love and support kept me going and I would not have finished this if it were not for that support.
To my family, mom, Andy, Mr. and Mrs. Stoehr, thank you for taking the time to help us when we needed it the most. Your frequent visits were both a pleasant break and helpful in keeping Nicole and I from becoming overwhelmed with events. You put your lives on hold at times so that I could complete the CGSC program and for that I am grateful.
Aunt Phoebe your help and assistance with my thesis made all of the difference. You kept me on track and focused, challenged me to improve my writing and, always provided a critical eye to my work. I cannot thank you enough for your help; it made all the difference in the world.
Thanks to my thesis committee chair, John Suprin and readers Dr. Sean Kalic and Marlyn Pierce. My thesis topic has come a long way since our first meeting and is a better product from what I had originally planned. Your knowledge, assistance, and expertise helped steer me in the right direction and allowed me to write my thesis. Thank you for taking time to help me get through this undertaking.
ACRONYMS
AOR Area of Responsibility
COG Center of Gravity
COCOM Combatant Commander
CS-INC Commander in Chief
DIME Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
LOO Lines of Operations
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
OKL Oberkommando der Luftwaffe
OKM Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine
OKH/ OBDH Oberkommando des Heeres
OKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Bock said that it was clear to him how to force the Red Army to give battle and defeat it but how, asked the field marshal, can the Russians be forced to make peace? {1} Oscar Pinkus , The War Aims and Strategies of Adolf Hitler
Field Marshal Von Bock of Army Group Center asked Hitler this question six months prior to Operation Barbarossa. Army Group Center had the responsibility as the main effort in Hitlers war against the Soviet Union. Bocks question illustrates a fundamental divergence between Hitler and his generals concerning their views on war on the eastern front. The nature of war and the militarys role in shaping a political outcome is at the heart of Bocks question. Why did Germanys strategic leadership begin an ideological war against the Soviet Union when their militarys tactical doctrine predicated short decisive campaigns? At the center of this question lie the differences between the theories of limited and total warfare and the role of the military in achieving national objectives. This thesis focuses on these different theories to answer the following question: How did the divergence between the Wehrmachts capabilities and Hitlers desire for ideological campaign objectives impact the Armys effect against the Soviet Union at the strategic level?
Several writers, such as David Glantz, Matthew Cooper, and Albert Seaton to name a few, have attempted to analyze the German-Russian war in order to determine the cause of the German defeat. Numerous theories and suppositions on the causes of Barbarossas operational failure have been suggested. However, there are two factors consistently cited in most analysis of the war. The first identifies Germanys poor logistical planning and inability to sustain forces over great distances. {2} The second factor recognizes Hitlers micromanagement of the war effort and his failure to define adequately his strategic objectives. {3}
Logistically, the German Army could not provide the required supplies, ammunition, and spare parts needed by the panzer forces to achieve their operational encirclements. The Soviet Union consisted of 850,000 miles of road networks, only about 150,000 were suitable roads with an additional 40,000 classified as all weather, hard surfaces. {4} The poor transportation infrastructure took a heavy toll on the Germans logistics. After action reports between November 1941 and March 1942 indicate Germans losses in transportation vehicles at 75,000 with only 7,500 replacements. {5} Maintenance losses and the fact that logistical transportation competed with the motorized infantry divisions requirements for mobility meant the German supply train suffered severe shortages in vehicles as the war moved further into the Soviet Union.
