Neil Joeck
Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia
First published September 1997 by Oxford University Press for
The International Institute for Strategic Studies
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The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997
Director John Chipman
Deputy Director Rose Gottemoeller
Editor Gerald Segal
Assistant Editor Matthew Foley
Design and Production Mark Taylor
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
ISBN 0-19-829406-9
ISSN 0567-932X
Map 1
South Asia
Map 2
Kashmir and the Line of Control
Map 3
Bangladesh
Map 4
The Sutlej River and the Indo-Pakistani Border
CSBM Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DAE Department of Atomic Energy (India)
DGMO Director-General of Military Operations
FMCC Fissile Material Cut-off Convention
GSQR General Staff Quality Review
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IHE Insensitive High Explosive
IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWFP North-west Frontier Province (Pakistan)
PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PAL Permissive Action Link
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SRBM Short-Range Ballistic Missile
UNCIP UN Commission in India and Pakistan
Fifty years after their violent formation, India and Pakistan continue to face each other across a hostile and in places heavily armed border. Their conflict is marked by limited dialogue and intractable domestic and international disputes. Nuclear weapons now shadow their relations, and both sides may soon develop and deploy ballistic missiles.
Proponents of an explicit nuclear-weapon capability in South Asia argue that these conditions have made war unlikely given that both players' nuclear capabilities make a disabling first strike impossible.
Nuclear proponents maintain that, because past Indo-Pakistani conflicts were limited, future wars would in any case not involve the use of nuclear weapons. The two countries' three major wars were indeed limited in the sense that civilian and battlefield casualties were light, and the last two, in 1965 and 1971, were concluded within about two weeks. Internal strife in both countries, especially in Pakistan during the civil war preceding the creation of Bangladesh, has resulted in greater loss of life.
This paper takes a less optimistic view. It begins with two assumptions. First, India and Pakistan are unlikely to reverse their nuclear programmes in the next five to ten years. Both countries consider their national security to be threatened and believe that a nuclear capability is critical to the safety of the nation. Furthermore, they attained their nuclear status despite enormous outside pressure over two decades. This pressure, combined with sometimes exaggeratedly defiant internal rhetoric, has elevated the issue symbolically, making reversal politically hazardous.
The second assumption is that both sides may soon develop and deploy short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Although SRBMs may not be intended as nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles, both countries might assume that they could be configured to carry such weapons. This would dramatically change both sides' ability to manage escalation and to calculate behaviour in a crisis. The short flight times of SRBMs, the inability to recall them once launched and the requirement to delegate command compound those problems.
This paper argues that India and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities have not created strategic stability, do not reduce or eliminate factors that contributed to past conflicts, and therefore neither explain the absence of war over the past decade nor why war is currently unlikely. The influence of non-state actors (Kashmiri insurgents and unofficial government representatives), domestic disturbances (for example, in East Bengal and Punjab), and shortcomings in decision-making (concentration of power in the executive branch, limited intelligence) all contribute to instability.
The view that nuclear capability creates deterrence assumes that the shadow it casts makes conflicts less likely, more manageable, or even avoidable. However, this view ignores the important strategic and tactical implications of acquiring a nuclear capability. Far from creating stability, these basic nuclear capabilities have led to an incomplete sense of where security lies. Limited nuclear capabilities increase the potential costs of conflict, but do little to reduce the risk of it breaking out. Nuclear weapons may make decision-makers in New Delhi and Islamabad more cautious, but sources of conflict immune to the nuclear threat remain.
The development of command-and-control mechanisms would enhance stability in a crisis and improve the ability to avoid nuclear use in the event of war. Operational considerations nuclear doctrine, weapons' safety, alternative response options, intelligence and early warning would help to reinforce deterrence at ground level and ensure that both sides are not left with a choice between suicide and surrender.
A set of diplomatic steps must also be considered. In the absence of a defence against nuclear attack, bilateral confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) might reduce the likelihood of war and limit its consequences should war break out. Two dangerous but important areas needing attention are missile deployment and conventional force reductions. Agreements on issues such as trade, energy, military hotlines, security pledges and fissile-material control would not compromise security, but could capitalise on the positive diplomatic relations created in early 1997. It is time to think again about ways to reduce nuclear risks.
