Luhmann - Theory of Society

theory of society, volume 1

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

English translation 2012 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.

Theory of Society, Volume 1 was originally published in German under the title Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Band Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main 1997.

The translation of this work has been published with the assistance of the Volkswagen Foundation.

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press.

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Luhmann, Niklas, 19271998, author.
[Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. English]
Theory of society / Niklas Luhmann ; translated by Rhodes Barrett.
2 volumes cm.--(Cultural memory in the present)
Originally published in German under the title Die Gesellschaft der
Gesellschaft.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8047-3949-8 (cloth : alk. paper)--ISBN 978-0-8047-3950-4 (pbk. :
alk. paper)
1. Sociology. 2. Social systems. 3. Communication. I. Title. II. Series: Cultural
memory in the present.
HM590.L84513 2012
301--dc23

2012021883

Typeset by Bruce Lundquist in 11/13.5 Adobe Garamond

Since the early 1980s, it has become increasingly clear how important the comparability of functional systems is for the theory of society. This had already been a basic consideration in Talcott Parsonss theory construction. The theoretical importance of comparability is even greater if we concede that society cannot be deduced from a principle or a basic norm, be it the customary justice, solidarity, or reasoned consensus. For even those who do not recognize or who violate such principles contribute to societal operations, and society itself must take account of this possibility. On the other hand, it is not by chance that widely differing functional areas such as science and law, economics and politics, the mass media, and intimate relations can be shown to have comparable structuresnot least because their differentiation requires systems to be formed. But can this be shown? Parsons attempted to guarantee it through the analytic of the action concept. If the thought is not convincingly elaborated, we can do no more than formulate theories for individual functional systems and test whether, despite all differences between fields, we can work with the same conceptual apparatusincluding autopoiesis and operational closure, first- and second-order observation, self-description, medium and form, coding and, in orthogonal relation thereto, the distinction between self-reference and other-reference as internal structure.

As a result, I gave priority to theories for individual functional systems. The following have already been published: Die Wirtschaft der Gesell schaft (The Economy as a Social System) (1988), Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (Science as a Social System) (1990), Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Law as a Social System) (1993),2 and Die Kunst der Gesellschaft (Art as a Social System) (1995).3 Further texts of this type are to follow. Meanwhile, however, work on the theory of the societal system had also progressed. I had produced several thousand pages of manuscript, partly to accompany lectures, without having put the material in publishable form. My then secretary retired and the position was frozen for many months. In this situation, the University in Lecce offered me an opportunity to work. So I fled to Italy with the project and the manuscripts. There I wrote a short version of the theory of society, which, translated into Italian, revised several times and adapted for use at an Italian university, has since been published.4 The manuscript then produced became the basis for a more extensive German edition, on which, once again provided with a secretary, I was able to work in Bielefeld. The present text is the result of this eventful history.

The system under consideration is that of society itself, as opposed to all social systems that develop within society in the performance of societal operations: the functional systems of society, as well as interaction systems, organizational systems, and social movements, all of which presuppose that a system of society has already been constituted. The key issue is therefore what operation produces and reproduces this system whenever it occurs. The answer, discussed in Chapter 2, is communication. It is a circular relationship: society cannot be conceived of without communication, nor can communication be conceived of without society. Questions of genesis and morphogenesis cannot be answered by any hypothesis of origin and are obscured rather than resolved by the thesis that the human being is genuinely social in nature. Chapter 3 entrusts these questions to an appropriate evolution theory.

The thesis of self-production by communication postulates clear boundaries between system and environment. The reproduction of communications from communications takes place in society. All further physical, chemical, organic, neurophysiological, and mental conditions are environmental conditions. Society can substitute for them within the limits of its own operational capabilities. No human being is indispensable to society. This naturally does not mean that communication is possible without consciousness, without brains well supplied with blood, without life, without a moderate climate.