Olson, Eric T. Lecturer in Philosophy and Fellow, Churchill College, Cambridge --> Personal Identity Without Psychology Publication date 1999 (this edition) Print ISBN-10: 0-19-513423-0 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-513423-0 doi:10.1093/0195134230.001.0001 Abstract: This book argues that our identity over time involves no psychological facts. Psychological accounts of personal identity lead to grave metaphysical problems, and the arguments for them are inconclusive. The book argues that we are animals, and thus have the purely biological identity conditions of animals. Keywords: animalism,animals,death,metaphysics,personal identity,psychological continuity,self
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Philosophy Of Mind Series Series Editor: Owen Flanagan, Duke University SELF EXPRESSIONS Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life Owen Flanagan THE CONSCIOUS MIND In Search of a Fundamental Theory David J. Chalmers DECONSTRUCTING THE MIND Stephen P. Stich THE HUMAN ANIMAL Personal Identity without Psychology Eric T. Olson MINDS AND BODIES Philosophers and Their Ideas Colin McGinn
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The Human Animal Personal Identity Without Psychology New York Oxford end p.iii |
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198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi So Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press http://www.oup-usa.org The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published in 1997 by Oxford University Press, Inc. First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1999 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Olson, Eric. 1963 The human animal : personal identity without psychology / Eric T. Olson p. cm. (Philosophy of mind series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-510506-0 ISBN 0-19-513423-0 (pbk.) 1. Man. 2. Identity. 3. Philosophy of mind. I. Title. II. Series. BD450.046 1997 128dc20 96-7018
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To the unemployed philosophers end p.v |
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Acknowledgments Many people helped me with this project. Without the advice and encouragement of Jos Benardete, Jonathan Bennett, and Peter van Inwagen, the book would never have been written. Jonathan Bennett and Derek Parfit made extensive comments on earlier drafts of the book, many of which led to what I hope are significant improvements. Paul Bloomfield, Rocco Gennaro, Marc Hight, Chris Knight, Neil Manson, Carol Rovane, and an anonymous referee also provided valuable criticisms. Peter Unger helped me get the book published, and provided much-needed encouragement in hard times. My warmest thanks to all of them. I also thank Suzanne Bertrand of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for permission to reprint a few bits from my article "Was I Ever a Fetus?" end p.vii |
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Contents Introduction | | Psychology and Personal Identity I. | Human Vegetables and Cerebrum Transplants | II. | The Psychological Approach | III. | The Biological Approach |
| | Persistence I. | Criteria of Personal Identity | II. | Substance Concepts | III. | Movers and Thinkers | IV. | "Person P1 at Time t1" |
| | Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach I. | The Transplant Intuition | II. | Whole-Brain Transplants | III. | Fission and Hemispherectomy | IV. | Prudential Concern | V. | Moral Responsibility | VI. | The Treatment Argument | VII. | Same Person | VIII. | Practical Consequences of the Biological Approach |
| | Was I Ever a Fetus? I. | The Fetus Problem | II. | Playing the Problem Down |
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III. | Future-Directed Identity and Disjunctive Criteria | IV. | Second-Order Capacities | V. | When Did I Begin? |
| | Are People Animals? I. | Human People or Human Animals? | II. | Appearances | III. | Coincidence | IV. | Personhood | V. | Why We Are Animals | VI. | Psychological Persistence Conditions for Animals? |
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