INTUITIONS
OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES ONLINE RESEARCH GUIDE
Ernest Sosa
Rutgers University
2011 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
ISBN: 9780199808885
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES ONLINE RESEARCH GUIDE
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OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES ONLINE | Philosophy
Authority and Innovation for Scholarly Research Written by a leading international authority and bearing the Oxford University Press stamp of excellence, this article is a definitive guide to the most important resources on the topic. The article combines annotated citations, expert recommendations, and narrative pathways through the most important scholarly sources in both print and online formats. All materials recommended in this article were reviewed by the author, and the article has been organized in tiers ranging from general to highly specialized, saving valuable time by allowing researchers to easily narrow or broaden their focus among only the most trusted scholarly sources. This is just one of many articles within the subject area of Atlantic History, which is itself just one of the many subjects covered by Oxford Bibliographies Onlinea revolutionary resource designed to cut through academic information overload by guiding researchers to exactly the right book chapter, journal article, website, archive, or data set they need.
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INTRODUCTION
Philosophy often proceeds via appeals to intuition. In a prototypical instance, a theory is rejected on the basis of its counterintuitive verdict about a real or hypothetical case. A famous example is Edmund Gettiers rejection of the justified true belief theory of knowledge; the dominant view was that knowledge was equivalent to justified true belief, but Gettier provided thought experiments involving subjects with beliefs derived from justified falsehoods, which happened by luck to be truethese thought experiments generally gave rise to intuitions to the effect that they described cases of justified true belief without knowledge. And on this basis, 20th-century epistemologists generally rejected the justified true belief theory. In recent decades, significant metaphilosophical attention has turned to such uses of intuitions in philosophy. What are intuitions? In what sense do arguments such as Gettiers rely on the use of intuitions? Why should we trust them? What can they show us? This entry focuses on contemporary work on these and related topics.
GENERAL OVERVIEWS
There are relatively few nonpartisan introductions to the topic of intuitions in philosophy, although Nagel 2007 is a concise and helpful exception; it focuses on epistemic intuitions in particular, but much of its content will be general information. Nichols and Knobe 2008 introduces the experimental philosophy movement in both its positive and negative forms (see Experimental Philosophy). Pust 2000 is a book-length presentation of a traditional approach to intuitions in philosophy, while Williamson 2004 gives a much more deflationary treatment of philosophical intuitions. Grundmann 2007 is also listed, as it contains discussion and criticism of a wide variety of approaches.
Grundmann, Thomas. The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74.1: (2007): 6987.
Offers a traditional picture of rational intuition. Intuitions are evidential sources based in understanding. Responds to explanationist skepticism. Also contains good overview of recent approaches to intuition.
Knobe, Joshua, and Shaun Nichols. An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto. In Experimental Philosophy . Edited by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, 314. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
An articulation and defense of the relevance of experimental work to philosophy. Emphasizes the philosophical interest of psychological facts and the role of experimental data as a supplement to traditional philosophical theorizing.
Nagel, Jennifer. Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2.6 (2007): 792819.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00104.x
An excellent comprehensive primer on intuition. Focuses on intuitions in epistemology but largely applicable to all philosophical intuitions. Emphasis on intuitions in the history of philosophy and on recent psychological data about intuitions.
Pust, Joel. Intuitions as Evidence . New York: Garland, 2000.
A monograph treatment of the use of intuitions in philosophy. Defends a psychologistic, seeming -based account of intuition and defends the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy from skeptical arguments.
Williamson, Timothy. Philosophical Intuitions and Scepticism about Judgment. Dialectica 58 (2004): 109153.
Defends a reductivist view according to which intuitions are judgments or inclinations to judge. There are general reasons to think judgments generally reliable, so there is no particular reason for skepticism about the use of intuitions in philosophy. Substantially overlaps chapters 78 of Williamson 2007 (cited under Defenses), although the latter is more eliminativist than reductivist.
ANTHOLOGIES
As philosophical attention to philosophical methods has increased, many collections have been published in recent years. Beyer and Burri 2007 and Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 are both special issues focusing on intuitions and philosophical methodology, containing diverse contemporary discussions of value for researchers in the area. Knobe and Nichols 2008 is a good introduction to experimental philosophy, suitable for an advanced undergraduate or graduate course. Gendler and Hawthorne 2002 is not devoted specifically to methodology, but many of the discussions of modal epistemology are of methodological significance; so likewise with Boghossian and Peacockes contribution on the a priori (Boghossian and Peacocke 2000). Because scrutiny in metaphilosophy has developed so quickly and recently, much of DePaul and Ramsey 1998 is already somewhat dated.
Beyer, Christian, and Alex Burri, eds. Special Issue: Philosophical Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (2007).
Proceedings of a conference on philosophical methodology.
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