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Pierre Jacob - What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World

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What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World: summary, description and annotation

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Some of a persons mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or nonsemantic basis for the representational powers of a persons mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the persons behavior. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology.

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title What Minds Can Do Intentionality in a Non-intentional World - photo 1

title:What Minds Can Do : Intentionality in a Non-intentional World Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
author:Jacob, Pierre.
publisher:Cambridge University Press
isbn10 | asin:
print isbn13:9780521574013
ebook isbn13:9780511002717
language:English
subjectIntentionality (Philosophy) , Philosophy of mind.
publication date:1997
lcc:B105.I56J33 1997eb
ddc:128/.2
subject:Intentionality (Philosophy) , Philosophy of mind.
What Minds Can Do
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Page i
Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What minds can do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or no[a-z]-[a-z]emantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behavior. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and language, cognitive science, and psychology.
Page iv
CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
General editor ERNEST SOSA
Advisory editors
JONATHAN DANCY University of Keele
GILBERT HARMAN Princeton University
FRANK JACKSON Australian National University
WILLIAM G. LYCAN University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
SYDNEY SHOEMAKER Cornell University
JUDITH J. THOMSON Massachusetts Institute of Technology
RECENT TITLES
WILLIAM G. LYCAN Judgement and justification
GERALD DWORKIN The theory and practice of autonomy
MICHAEL TYE The metaphysics of mind
DAVID O. BRINK Moral realism and the foundations of ethics
W. D. HART Engines of the soul
PAUL K. MOSER Knowledge and evidence
D. M. ARMSTRONG A combinatorial theory of possibility
JOHN BISHOP Natural agency
CHRISTOPHER J. MALONEY The mundane matter of the mental
language
MARK RICHARD Propositional attitudes
GERALD E. GAUS Value and justification
MARK HELLER The ontology of physical objects
JOHN BIGELOW AND ROBERT PAR GETTER Science and necessity
FRANCIS SNARE Morals, motivation and convention
CHRISTOPHER S. HILL Sensations
JOHN HEIL The nature of true minds
CARL GINET On action
CONRAD JOHNSON Moral legislation
DAVID OWENS Causes and coincidences
ANDREW NEWMAN The physical basis of predication
MICHAEL JUBIEN Ontology, modality and the fallacy of reference
WARREN QUINN Morality and action
JOHN W. CARROLL Laws of nature
M. J. CRESSWELL Language in the world
JOSHUA HOFFMAN & GARY S. ROSENKRANTZ Substance among
other categories
PAUL HELM Belief policies
NOAH LEMOS Intrinsic value
HENRY S. RICHARDSON Practical reasoning about final ends
ROBERT A. WILSON Cartesian psychology and physical minds
BARRY MAUND Colours
MICHAEL DEVITT Coming to our senses
ARDA DENKEL Object and property
E. J. LOWE Subjects of experience
NORTON NELKIN Consciousness and the origins of thought
Page v
What Minds Can Do
Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World
Pierre Jacob
Institute of Cognitive Science CNRS, Lyon
Page vi PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS VIRTUAL PUBLISHING FOR - photo 2
Page vi
PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (VIRTUAL PUBLISHING) FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 100114211, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia
Cambridge University Press 1997
This edition Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing) 2001
First published 1997
Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress cataloguing in publication data
Jacob, Pierre, 1949
What minds can do: intentionality in a non-intentional world /
Pierre Jacob.
p. cm. (Cambridge studies in philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 521 57401 3 (hardback) ISBN 0 521 47436 6 (paperback)
1. Intentionality (Philosophy) 2. Philosophy of mind. I. Title.
II. Series.
B105.I56J33 1997
128'.2dc20 96-14157 CIP
ISBN 0 521 57401 3 hardback
ISBN 0 521 57436 6 paperback
eISBN 0-511-00271-8 virtual (netLibrary Edition)
Page vii
TO MARIENOLLE
Page ix
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
xi
Introduction
1
Part I: The Naturalization of Intentionality
1
What Is Intentional Realism?
9
2
Introduction to Informational Semantics
43
3
Three Problems for Informational Semantics
78
4
Information and Teleology
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