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Maxwell Bennett - Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language

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Maxwell Bennett Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language

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Introduction and conclusion by Daniel N. Robinson

In Neuroscience and Philosophy three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hackers Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond.

Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness.

In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University) explains why this confrontation is so crucial to the understanding of neuroscientific research. The project of cognitive neuroscience, he asserts, depends on the incorporation of human nature into the framework of science itself. In Robinsons estimation, Dennett and Searle fail to support this undertaking; Bennett and Hacker suggest that the project itself might be based on a conceptual mistake. Exciting and challenging, Neuroscience and Philosophy is an exceptional introduction to the philosophical problems raised by cognitive neuroscience.

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N EUROSCIENCE AND P HILOSOPHY
N EUROSCIENCE AND P HILOSOPHY
Brain, Mind, and Language
MAXWELL BENNETT, DANIEL DENNETT,
PETER HACKER, JOHN SEARLE
With an Introduction and Conclusion by Daniel Robinson
Picture 1
Columbia University Press New York
Columbia University Press
Publishers Since 1893
New York, Chichester, West Sussex
cup.columbia.edu
Excerpts from Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience by M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker
copyright 2003 Maxwell R. Bennett and Peter M. S. Hacker
Philosophy as Naive Anthropology: Comment on Bennett and Hacker by Daniel Dennett copyright 2007 Daniel Dennett
Putting Consciousness Back in the Brain: Reply to Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience by John Searle
copyright 2007 John Searle
The Conceptual Presuppositions of Cognitive Neuroscience:
A Reply to Critics by Maxwell R. Bennett and Peter Hacker
copyright 2007 Maxwell R. Bennett and Peter M. S. Hacker
Epilogue by Maxwell R. Bennett
copyright 2007 Maxwell R. Bennett
Introduction and Still Looking: Science and Philosophy in Pursuit of Prince Reason by Daniel Robinson
copyright 2007 Columbia University Press
All rights reserved
E-ISBN 978-0-231-51194-0
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Neuroscience and philosophy : brain, mind, and language / Maxwell Bennett [et al.].
p. ; cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN-13: 9780231140447 (cloth ; alk. paper)
1. Cognitive neurosciencePhilosophy.
2. Bennett, M. R. Philosophical foundations of neuroscience.
I. Bennett, M. R.
[DNLM: 1. Cognitive Science. 2. Neuropsychology.
3. Philosophy. WL 103.5 N4948 2007]
QP360.5.N4975 2007
612.8'2dc22 2006036008
A Columbia University Press E-book.
CUP would be pleased to hear about your reading experience with this e-book at .
CONTENTS








Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, by Max Bennett and Peter Hacker, was published by Blackwell in 2003. It attracted attention straightaway because it was the first systematic evaluation of the conceptual foundations of neuroscience, as these foundations had been laid by scientists and philosophers. What added to the attraction of the work were two appendixes devoted specifically and critically to the influential writings of John Searle and Daniel Dennett. Max Bennett, an accomplished neuroscientist, correctly identified Searle and Dennett as the philosophers most widely read within the neuroscience community and was eager to make clear to readers why he and Hacker disagreed with their views.
In the fall of 2004 Bennett and Hacker were invited by the program committee of the American Philosophical Association to participate in an Authors and Critics session at the 2005 meeting of the association in New York. The choice of critics could not have been better: Daniel Dennett and John Searle had agreed to write replies to the criticisms levied against their work by Bennett and Hacker. The contents of this present volume are based on that three-hour APA session. The session was chaired by Owen Flanagan and was marked by an unusually animated exchange among the participants. Dennett and Searle had provided written versions of their rebuttals prior to the session, to which Bennett and Hacker then replied.
Fully aware of the importance of the philosophical issues, Wendy Lochner, the philosophy editor for Columbia University Press, urged the participants to consider having the proceedings published in book form. In the ordinary course of events, the written version of a spirited colloquium generally imposes a rather gray cast over what was originally colorful and affecting. The imagination of the reader is summoned to the task of re-creating a real event out of the shards and apparatus of published prose. I think it is fair to say that this customary limitation is not suffered by the present volume. Reader will recognize in these essays and exchanges the motivating power of intellectual passion. The participants are serious about their subject. Their notable contributions over a course of decades give them the right to be taken seriously. Moreover, the stakes are uncommonly high. After all, the project of cognitive neuroscience is nothing less than the incorporation of what we are pleased to call human nature into the framework of science itself. Dennett and Searle, with a confidence that may appear as eagerness, are inclined to believe that the process of incorporation is well on its way. Bennett and Hacker, with a cautiousness that may appear as skepticism, raise the possibility that the project itself is based on a mistake.
I was honored to be asked to write a closing chapter for the intended volume. Such settled views as I might have on this subject are summarized in that chapter as I weigh the agile thrusts and parries by the central figures in the debate. Readers will note, I hope with compassion, that very little is settled in my own mind. I recognize the definite commitment Searle and Dennett have to providing a workable and credible model of just how our mental life is realized by events under the skin. Norbert Wiener, one of the truly wise men of science, noted that the best material model of a cat is a catpreferably the same cat. Nonetheless, without modelseven those laced with anthropomorphic seasoningthe very clutter of the real world must thwart scientific progress in any field. There is no calculus or equation establishing the boundaries within which the imagination of the model builder must confine itself.
In the end, matters of this sort rise to the level of aesthetics. By this I do not suggest that there is less room for analytical rigor; philosophical analysis at its best is an aesthetic undertaking. This surely is what attracts the physicist and the mathematician to what is elegant. Is it not aesthetics that establishes Occams razor as the tool of choice for refinement, measure, proportionality, coherence? In just these respects, I am sure readers will find in the Bennett-Hacker critiquechiefly in Peter Hackers philosophically rich and informed critiquenot a tilt toward skepticism but a careful and, yes, elegant application of the better tools philosophers have fashioned.
This much said, it is important to go further and to acknowledge that our actually lived life is unlikely to disclose its full, shifting, often fickle and wondrously interior reality either to the truth table, the Turing machine or the anatomical blowpipe. It should never come as a surprise that the philosopher who often gave us the first words on an important subject may well also have the last words to say on it. I refer, of course, to Aristotle. We ought to seek precision in those things that admit of it. We are to choose tools suitable to the task at hand. In the end, our explanations must make intelligible contact with that which we seek to explain. The demographer who tells us with commendable accuracy that the average family contains 2.53 members feels no obligation to remind us that there is no 0.53 person. Such data do not presume to describe the nature of the items counted; their result is just that number. The point, of course, is that scientific precision or, for that matter, arithmetic precision, may tell us next to nothing about just what has been assayed with such precision. Here as elsewhere, the ruling maxim is caveat emptor.
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