John H. Maurer - At the Crossroads Between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference in 1930

This book has been brought to publication with the

generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

2014 by John H. Maurer and Christopher M. Bell

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

At the crossroads between peace and war [electronic resource] : the London naval conference of 1930 / edited by John Maurer, Christopher M. Bell.

1 online resource.

Summary: This volume provides fresh perspectives on the international strategic environment between the two world wars. At London in 1930, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan concluded an important arms control agreement to manage the international competition in naval armaments. In particular, the major naval powers reached agreement about how many heavy cruisers they could possess. Hailed at the time as a signal achievement in international cooperation, the success at London proved short-lived. France and Italy refused to participate in the treaty. Even worse followed, as within a few years growing antagonisms among the great powers manifested itself in the complete breakdown of the interwar arms control regime negotiated at London. The resulting naval arms race would set Japan and the United States on a collision course toward Pearl Harbor. Provided by publisher.

Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed.

ISBN 978-1-61251-331-7 (epub) 1. London Naval Treaty (1930) 2. DisarmamentHistory20th century. 3. Sea-powerHistory20th century. I. Maurer, John H., editor of compilation. II. Bell, Christopher M., editor of compilation. III. Title: London naval conference of 1930.

JZ5615

327.1743dc23

2013045644

CONTENTS

John T. Kuehn

Christopher M. Bell

Sadao Asada

Paul G. Halpern

John R. Ferris

Norman Friedman

John H. Maurer

Figure

Tables

John H. Maurer and Christopher M. Bell

T he London Naval Conference opened on 21 January 1930 in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords in Westminster. The fog that morning was the worst London had seen all winter. Visibility was so poor that traffic flares had to be lit outside the Parliament buildings, and the car bringing King George V to deliver the opening speech was forced to travel at a walking pace so that it could be guided by policemen carrying lanterns. According to one press account, the fog caused the Royal Gallery to be filled with a strange honey-coloured light. But there is no indication that the assembled delegates regarded any of this as a bad omen. The king, himself a former naval officer, expressed the hope shared by many that the conference would lead to immediate alleviation of the heavy burden of armaments now weighing upon the peoples of the world and help pave the way for further disarmament efforts. His words found a receptive audience. Leaders espousing a liberal world order had come together in London to fashion in solemn treaty obligations their goal of curtailing the international competition in naval armaments and promoting mutual security among the great powers.

The statesmen who assembled in London believed they were avoiding the mistakes of the recent past, the rivalries in armaments that had contributed to the seeming inevitability of war between the great powers. They consciously set out to build on the naval arms agreement concluded in Washington in 1922 by the worlds five greatest naval powersthe United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. The Washington Treaty had prevented a new naval arms race from erupting after the First World War, but it had not eliminated naval rivalry among the great powers. Competition had soon spilled over into areas not covered by the earlier agreement; and some powers had begun to bristle at the limitations they had willingly accepted. The delegates who gathered in London in early 1930 believed they could create a more comprehensive and durable framework for naval arms limitation. Their efforts were crowned three months later by an arms control agreement, signed by the United States, Britain, and Japan, that was lauded at the time as a major step toward constructing an international architecture for peace, an approach using arms control to reduce spending on weaponry, increase international transparency, and thereby build confidence among world leaders.