Daniel Kahneman (editor) - Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

Judgment under uncertainty:
Heuristics and biases

Edited by

Daniel Kahneman

University of British Columbia

Paul Slovic

Decision Research
A Branch of Perceptronics, Inc.
Eugene, Oregon

Amos Tversky

Stanford University

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521240642

Cambridge University Press 1982

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1982
24th printing 2008

Printed in the United States of America

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

ISBN 978-0-521-28414-1 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or thirdparty internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky

Maya Bar-Hillel

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman

Richard E. Nisbett, Eugene Borgida, Rick Crandall, and Harvey Reed

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman

Lee Ross and Craig A. Anderson

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman

Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly

Shelley E. Taylor

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky

Dennis L. Jennings, Teresa M. Amabile, and Lee Ross

Ellen J. Langer

Loren J. Chapman and Jean Chapman

David M. Eddy

Hillel J. Einhorn

Stuart Oskamp

Marc Alpert and Howard Raiffa

Sarah Lichtenstein, Baruch Fischhoff, and Lawrence D. Phillips

Baruch Fischhoff

John Cohen, E. J. Chesnick, and D. Haran

Ward Edwards

Charles F. Gettys, Clinton Kelly III, and Cameron R. Peterson

Yaacov Trope

Robyn M. Dawes

Max Singer

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky

Baruch Fischhoff

Richard E. Nisbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson, and Geoffrey T. Fong

Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky

Marc AlpertGraduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University

Teresa M. AmabileDepartment of Psychology, Brandeis University

Craig A. AndersonDepartment of Psychology, Stanford University

Maya Bar-HillelDepartment of Psychology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Eugene BorgidaDepartment of Psychology, University of Minnesota

Jean ChapmanDepartment of Psychology, University of Wisconsin

Loren J. ChapmanDepartment of Psychology, University of Wisconsin

E. I. ChesnickDepartment of Psychology, University of Manchester, England

John CohenDepartment of Psychology, University of Manchester, England

Rick CrandallUniversity of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana

Robyn M. DawesDepartment of Psychology, University of Oregon

David M. EddyCenter for the Study of Health and Clinical Policy, Duke University

Ward EdwardsSocial Science Research Institute, University of Southern California

Hillel J. EinhornCenter for Decision Research, University of Chicago

Baruch FischhoffDecision Research, A Branch of Perceptronics, Inc., Eugene, Oregon

Geoffrey T. FongInstitute for Social Research, University of Michigan

Charles F. GettysDepartment of Psychology, University of Oklahoma

D. HaranDepartment of Psychology, University of Manchester, England

Dennis L. JenningsDepartment of Psychology, New York University

Christopher JepsonInstitute for Social Research, University of Michigan

Daniel KahnemanDepartment of Psychology, University of British Columbia

Clinton Kelly IIIAdvanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia

David H. KrantzBell Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey

Ellen J. LangerDepartment of Psychology, Harvard University

Sarah LichtensteinDecision Research, A Branch of Per Centronics, Inc., Eugene, Oregon

Richard E. NisbettInstitute for Social Research, University of Michigan

Stuart OskampDepartment of Psychology, Claremont Graduate School

Cameron R. PetersonDecisions & Designs, Inc., McLean, Virginia

Lawrence D. PhillipsDecision Analysis Unit, Brunel University

Howard RaiffaGraduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University

Harvey ReedDepartment of Psychology, University of Michigan at Dearborn

Lee RossDepartment of Psychology, Stanford University

Michael RossDepartment of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Ontario

Fiore SicolyDepartment of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Ontario

Max SingerHudson Institute, Arlington, Virginia

Paul SlovicDecision Research, A Branch of Perceptronics, Inc., Eugene, Oregon

Shelley E. TaylorDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles

Yaacov TropeDepartment of Psychology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Amos TverskyDepartment of Psychology, Stanford University

_____________

Asterisk indicates affiliation when article was originally published.

The approach to the study of judgment that this book represents had origins in three lines of research that developed in the 1950s and 1960s: the comparison of clinical and statistical prediction, initiated by Paul Meehl; the study of subjective probability in the Bayesian paradigm, introduced to psychology by Ward Edwards; and the investigation of heuristics and strategies of reasoning, for which Herbert Simon offered a program and Jerome Bruner an example. Our collection also represents the recent convergence of the study of judgment with another strand of psychological research: the study of causal attribution and lay psychological interpretation, pioneered by Fritz Heider.

Meehls classic book, published in 1954, summarized evidence for the conclusion that simple linear combinations of cues outdo the intuitive judgments of experts in predicting significant behavioral criteria. The lasting intellectual legacy of this work, and of the furious controversy that followed it, was probably not the demonstration that clinicians performed poorly in tasks that, as Meehl noted, they should not have undertaken. Rather, it was the demonstration of a substantial discrepancy between the objective record of peoples success in prediction tasks and the sincere beliefs of these people about the quality of their performance. This conclusion was not restricted to clinicians or to clinical prediction: Peoples impressions of how they reason, and of how well they reason, could not be taken at face value. Perhaps because students of clinical judgment often used themselves and their friends as subjects, the interpretation of errors and biases tended to be cognitive, rather than psychodynamic: Illusions, not delusions, were the model.