Erskine Childers - War and the Arme Blanche

I have read with the greatest interest Mr. Childerss illuminating book War and the Arme Blanche. My opinion of the subject with which it deals is already so well known throughout the army that I need not labour to say how entirely I agree with the authors main thesis; indeed, anyone who will take the trouble to read Cavalry Training (1904), will see that I anticipated the arguments which he has so ably developed. This being so, it is not surprising that I should view the regulations laid down in Cavalry Training (1907), with some concern.

Let us consider briefly what the history of this questionthe comparative value of steel weapons and firearms for Cavalry in waris. Until within the last few years our Lancer regiments depended entirely on the lance and sword, while other Cavalry regiments depended almost entirely on the sword. With such an equipment and such traditions it was perhaps but natural that the training of Cavalry should have been almost exclusively devoted to shock tactics and the use of the arme blanche .

But why now, with a different equipment, should Cavalry still be trained on the old tradition, and their rifles reside in buckets attached to the horse, only to be used on certain exceptional occasions to supplement the sword or lance? (Cavalry Training, sec. 142.)

The late Colonel Henderson, in his essay on the tactical employment of Cavalry, Science of War, chapter iii., page 51, pointed out that, notwithstanding the introduction of gunpowder, the Cavalry was the arm that had undergone the least change. He went on to say that shock-tactics, the charge, and the hand-to-hand encounter are still the one ideal of Cavalry action; and the power of manuvring in great masses, maintaining an absolute uniformity of pace and formation, and moving at the highest speed with accurately dressed ranks, is the criterion of excellence. He added: to such an extent has this teaching been carried out, that the efficiency of the individual, especially in those duties which are performed by single men or small parties, cannot fairly be said to have received due attention.

After explaining how Cromwells troopers were taught the value of co-operation, and how Cromwell built up his Cavalry on a foundation of high individual efficiency, he goes on to show that, as time went on and armies became larger, and skill at arms, as a national characteristic, rarer, drill, discipline, manuvre in mass, and a high degree of mobility came to outweigh all other considerations; and when the necessity of arming the nations brought about short service, the training of the individual, in any other branch of his business than that of riding boot-to-boot and of rendering instant obedience to the word or signal of his superior, fell more and more into abeyance. Shock-tactics filled the entire bill, and the Cavalry of Europe, admirably trained to manuvre and attack, whether by the squadron of 150 sabres, or the division of 3,000 or 4,000, was practically unfitted for any other duty. The climax of incompetency may be said to have been reached during the cycle of European warfare, which began with the Crimea, and ended with the Russo-Turkish conflict of 187778. The old spirit of dash and daring under fire was still conspicuous, discipline and mobility were never higher. The regiments manuvred with admirable precision at the highest speed, and never had great masses of horsemen been more easily controlled. And yet, in the whole history of war, it may be doubted whether the record of the Cavalry was ever more meagre.

Referring specially to the German Cavalry during the war of 187071, Henderson says: The troopers knew nothing whatever of fighting on foottheir movements were impeded by their equipment--and a few Francs-tireurs , armed with the chassepot, were enough to paralyze a whole brigade.... In fact, to the student who follows out the operations of the Cavalry of 187071 step by step, and who bears in mind its deficiencies in armament and training, it will appear very doubtful whether a strong body of mounted riflemen of the same type as the Boers, or better still, of Sheridans or Stuarts Cavalry in the last years of the War of Secession, would not have held the German horsemen at bay from the first moment they crossed the frontier.

Had the successes gained by shock-tactics been very numerous, it might possibly be argued that the sacrifice of efficiency in detached and dismounted duties, as well as the training of the individual, was fully justified. What are the facts? After enumerating the successes gained by shock-tactics from the days of the Crimea onwards, when anything larger than a regiment was engaged, Henderson adds: Such is the record: one great tactical success gained at Custozza: a retreating army saved from annihilation at Kniggrtz,

Since Colonel Henderson, no one has dealt so exhaustively and so logically with this aspect of Cavalry in war as Mr. Childers. He has gone thoroughly into the achievements of our Cavalry in South Africa. It has been said that this war was abnormal, but are not all wars abnormal? As, however, it was the first war in which magazine rifles were made use of, and as the weapon used in future wars is certain to be even more effective, on account of the lower trajectory and automatic mechanism about to be introduced, shall we not be very unwise if we do not profit by the lessons we were taught at such a heavy cost during that war?