Soviet General Staff - The Berlin Operation 1945

The Berlin Operation 1945 tells the story of the Red Armys penultimate offensive operation in the war in Europe. Here the forces of three fronts (Second and First Belorussian and First Ukrainian) forced the Oder River and surrounded the defenders of the German capital, reduced the city and drove westward to link up with the Western allies in central Germany.

This is another in a series of studies compiled by the Soviet Army General Staff, which during the postwar years set itself the task of gathering and generalizing the experience of the war for the purpose of training the armed forces higher staffs in the conduct of large-scale offensive operations. The study is divided into three parts. The first contains a brief strategic overview of the situation, as it existed by the spring of 1945, with special emphasis on German preparations to meet the inevitable Soviet attack. This section also includes an examination of the decisions by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command on the conduct of the operation. As usual, the fronts materiel-technical and other preparations for the offensive are covered in great detail. These include plans for artillery, artillery and engineer support, as well as the work of the rear services and political organs and the strengths, capabilities and tasks of the individual armies. Part two deals with the Red Armys breakthrough of the Germans Oder defensive position up to the encirclement of the Berlin garrison. This covers the First Belorussian Fronts difficulty in overcoming the defensive along the Seelow Heights along the direct path to Berlin, as well as the First Ukrainian Fronts easier passage over the Oder and its secondary attack along the Dresden axis. The Second Belorussian Fronts breakthrough and its sweep through the Baltic littoral is also covered. Part three covers the intense fighting to reduce the citys defenders from late April until the garrisons surrender on 2 May, as well as operations in the area up to the formal German capitulation. This section contains a number of detailed descriptions of urban fighting at the battalion and regimental level. It closes with conclusions about the role of the various combat arms in the operation.

Richard W. Harrison earned his undergraduate and masters degrees from Georgetown University, where he specialized in Russian area studies. In 1994 he earned his doctorate in War Studies from Kings College London. He also was an exchange student in the former Soviet Union and spent several years living and working in post-communist Russia.

Dr. Harrison has worked for the US Department of Defense as an investigator in Russia, dealing with cases involving POWs and MIAs. He has also taught Russian history and military history at college and university level, most recently at the US Military Academy at West Point.

Harrison is the author of two books dealing with the Red Armys theoretical development during the interwar period: The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 19041940 (2001), and Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson (2010). He has also authored a number of articles on topics in Soviet military history. He is currently working on a history of the Red Armys high commands during World War II and afterwards.

Dr. Harrison currently lives with his family near Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

THE BERLIN OPERATION, 1945

Soviet General Staff

Edited and translated by Richard W. Harrison

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Published by Helion & Company 2016, in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army

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Text and maps Association of the United States Army. English edition translated and edited by Richard W. Harrison. Maps drawn by David Rennie.

ISBN 978-1-910777-66-4

eISBN 978-1-912174-62-1

Mobi ISBN 978-1-912174-62-1

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The Disposition of the German-Fascist Forces by the Beginning of the Berlin Operation, 16 April 1945.

The General Plan of the Berlin Operation.

Combat Activities During the Berlin Operation.

1.1 The Disposition of the German Armed Forces along the Fronts as of 1 April 1945

1.2 The German Forces Combat and Numerical Composition Opposite the Second Belorussian Front (120 km) on 20 April

1.3 The German Forces Combat and Numerical Composition Against the Second Belorussian Fronts Main Shock Group Along the Front NeuwarpSchwedt (90 km) on 20 April

1.4 The German Forces Combat and Numerical Composition Opposite the First Belorussian Front (175 km) on 14 April

1.5 The German Forces Combat and Numerical Composition Opposite the First Belorussian Fronts Main Shock Group Along the Kstrin Bridgehead (GustebieserWuden Sector, 44 km) on 14 April

1.6 The German Forces Combat and Numerical Composition Against the First Ukrainian Front (390 km) on 16 April

1.7 The German Forces Combat and Numerical Composition Along the First Ukrainian Fronts Attack Zone excluding Forstexcluding Penzig (70 km) on 16 April

3.1 The Second Belorussian Fronts Regrouping of Forces

3.2 Length of Front for the First Belorussian Fronts Armies

3.3 Distances Covered by the First Belorussian Fronts Armies During the Regrouping

3.4 Distances Covered by the First Ukrainian Fronts Armies During the Regrouping

3.5 Length of the First Ukrainian Fronts Armies Fronts

4.1 The Artillery Distribution by Armies of the Second Belorussian Fronts Shock Group

4.2 The Artillery Distribution by the First Belorussian Fronts Armies

4.3 The Artillery Distribution by Armies in the First Ukrainian Fronts Offensive Sector

4.4 Anti-Aircraft Artillery by Front

4.5 The Grouping and Density of Anti-Aircraft Artillery in the Fronts Main Shock Group Sectors

5.1 Correlation of Air Strengths in the Second Belorussian Fronts Offensive Zone

5.2 The Growth in the First Belorussian Fronts Air Activity During the Winter Operations of 1945

5.3 Correlation of Air Strengths in the First Belorussian Fronts Offensive Zone

5.4 The Organization of Cooperation Between the Formations and Units of the 16th Air Army

5.5 Correlation of Air Strengths in the First Ukrainian Fronts Offensive Zone

5.6 The Plan for Employing the First Ukrainian Fronts 2nd Air Army in the Berlin Operation

6.1 The Distribution of Engineer Forces and Equipment Among the Armies of the Second Belorussian Front as of 20 April