Hans P.M. Adriaansens - Talcott Parsons and the Conceptual Dilemma (RLE Social Theory)

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: SOCIAL THEORY

Volume 84

TALCOTT PARSONS AND THE CONCEPTUAL DILEMMA

TALCOTT PARSONS AND THE CONCEPTUAL DILEMMA

HANS P. M. ADRIAANSENS

First published in English in 1980

This edition first published in 2015
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1980 Hans P. M. Adriaansens

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ISBN: 978-1-138-78261-7 (Volume 84)
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Talcott Parsons and the
conceptual dilemma

Hans P. M. Adriaansens

Routledge & Kegan Paul

London, Boston and Henley

This publication is an attempt to interpret the prolific works of Talcott Parsons. Such an interpretation is necessary because of the mystification to which Parsonss work and the man himself have been subjected in sociological literature; the mention of his name and a number of his publications in the bibliography of a book is a guaranteed mark of distinction in the business of sociological dissertations. However, the reference is generally of a negative nature: in company with a distinguished predecessor whose views one whole-heartedly shares, one is surprised at the ambiguity of Parsonss language, the conservative one-sidedness of his premises, his theoretical metamorphoses and much more in this vein. At the same time, there is an impression that the interpretation of Parsonss work has become a process of reality-construction whereby the work itself plays a negligible part. Thus it would seem to be more important to know what others have said about Parsons than what Parsons himself has said and written.

That this publication makes no appeal to secondary literature may appear to be both pretentious and disrespectful since the views of so many eminent sociologists are thus ignored. Nevertheless, I feel it to be the best course in this publication at least to leave the flood of secondary literature for what it is. Only in this way is it possible to examine Parsonss work not piecemeal but in its original entirety. It gives the reader freedom to discover perhaps after a deeper study of the original texts that an unreasoning attachment to the opinions and interpretations of so-called great sociologists may well offer repose, peace and standing, but gives no scientific satisfaction.

Any interpretation of an authors work must of necessity be carried out according to a particular plan. Our plan of interpretation consists of a simple differentiation of the concept of theory. The most immediate meaning of the concept of theory and in our plan it is the first aspect of theory is in complete accordance with the aims of Parsonss scientific work and the instruments he regards as necessary aids to the achievement of those aims. It is the ultimate purpose of scientific work to gather dynamic knowledge i.e. knowledge of the relationships that exist simultaneously between a multiplicity of events. Such dynamic knowledge must be the final result of the scientific procedure. In our plan of interpretation we call this result the substantive aspect of the concept of theory. However, the nucleus of Parsonss work lies not on this level of theory but on one which we call the level of conceptual theory. Parsons is trying to find a way to formulate a theory of action i.e. a coherent system of concepts by which the analysis of action can be systematized. During the half-century occupied by Parsonss work this aspect of the concept of theory has been the central theme; therefore it is this conceptual aspect with which this book is mainly concerned. The formulation of a conceptual system is not, however, a thing apart; it implies certain starting-points. These starting-points are of a methodological nature in the widest sense of the word. They are centred on questions about the ways in which human action should be approached and the factors that play a part in determining such action. We put these questions too, under the heading of the concept of theory and refer to them as its methodological aspect.

Finally we distinguish a fourth aspect of the concept of theory, the epistemological aspect. Whereas the methodological aspect was concerned with questions about the approach to action and the patterns of thought that are important to it, the epistemological aspect draws our attention to questions about the concept of theory itself: what is, for instance, the relationship between theory and reality, what is the logical status of concepts, etc?

In fact, this differentiation of the concept of theory reflects the plan of this publication. Since the nucleus of Parsonss work lies on the level of conceptual theory and this process of conceptualization rests on a basis of very specific epistemological and methodological premises, it is obvious that these premises must first be examined.

Therefore the consists of a discussion of Parsonss central epistemological premise, namely that of the general and analytical character of the concept of theory. As far as is possible these two aspects will be discussed separately. As we explain in section 3 the significance of the general aspect of Parsonss epistemological premises lies in the dimension of individualizing versus generalizing conceptualization. What is meant by regarding a concept or theory as general or generalizing? What does a typical Parsonian expression like general(ized) theory of action mean?