Bruno Snell - The Discovery of the Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature

For the qualifying use of metaphor, cf. J. Koenig, Sein und Denken (Halle 1937) esp. 222.

Cf. ch. 9 below.

We take it for granted that if they were cognizant of a thing they said so. This may not be convincing in all casescf. ch. 1 note 5 belowbut for our present purposes it must suffice.

The word remains in use in Arcadia: occurs as a gloss in the excerpt from Diogenianus ( , line 26) cited by Latte, Philologus 80 (1924) 136 ff. Latte also, p. 145, refers to examples from Tegea (IG V.2.16.10, cf. XVI.25). We might also mention o and = , but these words are so rare that very little can be said about their exact meaning; cf. Bechtel, Lexicologus 27 and 74.

Lehrs, Aristarch 3 86.160.

Lehrs, op . cit. 86 f. ; Plutarch, poes. Hom. ch. 124.

Aristarchus believed that were the arms and legs: Lehrs, op. cit . 119.

Apparently even the ancients were aware of this interpretation. When Pindar was a schoolboy he seems to have learnt that was in many places identical with . Pyth . 1.55 he says of Philoctetes: , he came with skin infirm; although he is acquainted with the concept of the living body, and probably even with the word in this sense, he avoids itnot only in this passage but throughoutbecause it lacks the ring of poetic diction. The later commentators of Homer, by their assertion that is always skin, never body (Lehrs, Quaest. ep . (1837) 193) imply that others had explained it as body. That Pindar had a concept of the body is further proved by Nem . 7.73 where he uses in the singular; this also is a poetic substitute for ..

This has been shown by Gerhard Krahmer, Figur und Raum in der aegyptischen und griechisch-archaischen Kunst (Halle 1931). Cf. also below ch. 4.

To be precise, Homer does not even have any words for the arms and the legs; he speaks of hands, lower arms, upper arms, feet, calves, and thighs. Nor is there a comprehensive term for the trunk.

These words have received an excellent and detailed treatment in a Goettingen dissertation by Jacob Boehme, Die Seele und das Ich bei Homer (1929). Boehme justly emphasizes that Homer has no term for the whole of a mans mental equipment, for the mind or soul in our sense. The course of ideas followed above was first sketched by me in a discussion of Boehmes book in Gnomon 7 (1931) 74 ff. Regarding and , cf. K. von Fritz, CP 38 (1943) 79 ff., and 40 (1945) 223 ff.

Apollonius 138.17: ) ; schol. Il . 22.68: , .

The scholion cited in note 9 continues: ( ), .

Cf. Sappho fr. 33.3 Diehl (all lyric poets will be quoted from this edition, unless otherwise stated); must have had the same meaning as Theocritus