Nichols - Bound : essays on free will and responsibility

This book has been in progress for over a decade, and Ive accumulated a lot of intellectual debt over the years. For helpful comments on various chapters, Id like to thank Matt Bedke, James Beebee, Mike Bishop, Gunnar Bjornsson, Bruce Bowers, Pascal Boyer, David Brink, Susan Brower-Toland, Sarah Buss, Joe Campbell, Gregg Caruso, Randy Clarke, Juan Comesaa, Jonathan Dancy, Colin Dawson, Oisin Deery, Alison Denham, Steve Downes, Julia Driver, Ian Evans, Brian Fiala, Trisha Folds-Bennett, Jerry Gaus, Michael Gill, Todd Grantham, John Greco, Josh Greene, John Heil, Ted Honderich, Rachana Kamtekar, Josh Knobe, Benji Kozuch, Larry Krasnoff, Uriah Kriegel, Victor Kumar, Trevor Kvaran, Heidi Maibom, Bertram Malle, Ron Mallon, Eric Mandelbaum, Kelby Mason, Michael McKenna, Al Mele, John Mikhail, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, Dana Nelkin, Lex Newman, Tim OConnor, ngel Pinillos, Jesse Prinz, Peter Railton, Henry Richardson, Philip Robbins, David Rose, Adina Roskies, Eric Schwitzgebel, Oliver Sensen, David Shoemaker, Paulo Sousa, Dan Sperber, Steve Stich, Folke Tersman, Hannah Tierney, Mike Valdman, Jonathan Weinberg, and David Yokum.

A few more specific acknowledgments are due. Im indebted to Michael McKenna for several discussions on the contemporary literature on free will. Im positive that Ive failed to respect the subtleties of that complex literature, but thanks to Michael, there are fewer egregious oversights and errors. Josh Knobe has been a wonderful conversant and occasional co-conspirator on these topics for nearly a decade. Josh has been willing to discuss every idea Ive concoctedno matter how outlandishand provided excellent philosophical advice on each occasion. Terry Horgan, Neil Levy, Dominic Murphy, Carolina Sartorio, and Mark Timmons all kindly read the entire manuscript and provided valuable comments.

Im grateful to Peter Momtchiloff both for his patience with the book and for his selection of refereesDerk Pereboom and Tamler Sommers. I couldnt have asked for a better pair of referees. Tamlers relentless focus on big philosophical questions and his attention to writerly issues led to a number of changes. And Derks Living without Free Will is one of my favorite books on free will, so I was delighted to get his advice on the manuscript.

My greatest debts are to John Doris and Manuel Vargas. Manuel read multiple drafts of the manuscript and provided copious helpful comments each time. My own view on free will is close to Manuels view, so it was enormously helpful to get this feedback. John also read and commented on multiple drafts of the manuscript. In addition, John endured hours on the phone discussing everything from the naturalistic fallacy to hierarchical theories of agency. These invigorating discussions led to numerous improvements in the book.

Some portions of the book are drawn from previously published work. I am grateful to the publishers for permission to use material from the following articles:

Folk Intuitions about Free Will, Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6 (2006), 5786.

After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes, Philosophical Perspectives, 21 (2007), 40528.

How Can Psychology Contribute to the Free Will Debate? In J. Baer, J. Kaufman, and R. Baumeister (eds), Are We Free? New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

The Indeterminist Intuition: Source and Status, The Monist, 95 (2012), 290307.

Brute Retributivism. In T. Nadelhoffer (ed.), The Future of Punishment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Free Will and Error. In G. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013.

Process Debunking and Ethics, Ethics, 124 (2014), 72749.