LitArk » Books » Romance novel

Lorenzo Magnani - Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies

Here you can read online Lorenzo Magnani - Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies full text of the book (entire story) in english for free. Download pdf and epub, get meaning, cover and reviews about this ebook. City: S.l, year: 2015, publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham, genre: Romance novel. Description of the work, (preface) as well as reviews are available. Best literature library LitArk.com created for fans of good reading and offers a wide selection of genres:

Romance novel Science fiction Adventure Detective Science History Home and family Prose Art Politics Computer Non-fiction Religion Business Children Humor

Choose a favorite category and find really read worthwhile books. Enjoy immersion in the world of imagination, feel the emotions of the characters or learn something new for yourself, make an fascinating discovery.

Book:
Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies
Author:
Lorenzo Magnani / Ping Li / Woosuk Park
Publisher:
Springer International Publishing, Cham
Genre:
Books / Romance novel
Year:
2015
City:
S.l
Rating:
3 / 5
Favourites:
Add to favourites
Your mark:
- 60
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

Description
Author's other books
Similar books

Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies: summary, description and annotation

We offer to read an annotation, description, summary or preface (depends on what the author of the book "Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies" wrote himself). If you haven't found the necessary information about the book — write in the comments, we will try to find it.

The book shows how eastern and western perspectives and conceptions can be used to addresses recent topics laying at the crossroad between philosophy and cognitive science. It reports on new points of view and conceptions discussed during the International Conference on Philosophy and Cognitive Science (PCS2013), held at the Sun Yat-sen University, in Guangzhou, China, and the 2013 Workshop on Abductive Visual Cognition, which took place at KAIST, in Deajeon, South Korea.

The book emphasizes an ever-growing cultural exchange between academics and intellectuals coming from different fields. It juxtaposes research works investigating new facets on key issues between philosophy and cognitive science, such as the role of models and causal representations in science; the status of theoretical concepts and quantum principles; abductive cognition, vision, and visualization in science from an eco-cognitive perspective. Further topics are: ignorance immunization in reasoning; moral cognition, violence, and epistemology; and models and biomorphism. The book, which presents a unique and timely account of the current state-of-the art on various aspects in philosophy and cognitive science, is expected to inspire philosophers, cognitive scientists and social scientists, and to generate fruitful exchanges and collaboration among them.

Lorenzo Magnani: author's other books

Who wrote Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies? Find out the surname, the name of the author of the book and a list of all author's works by series.

Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies — read online for free the complete book (whole text) full work

Below is the text of the book, divided by pages. System saving the place of the last page read, allows you to conveniently read the book "Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies" online for free, without having to search again every time where you left off. Put a bookmark, and you can go to the page where you finished reading at any time.

Light

Font size:

↓

↑

Reset

Interval:

↓

↑

Bookmark:

Make

Part I
International Conference Philosophy and Cognitive Science (PCS2013)

Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Lorenzo Magnani , Ping Li and Woosuk Park (eds.) Philosophy and Cognitive Science II Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics 10.1007/978-3-319-18479-1_1

Reframing the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability

Athanassios Raftopoulos 1

(1)

Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus, P.O. Box 20537, 1678 Nicosia, Cyprus

Athanassios Raftopoulos

Email:

Abstract

I propose a reframing of the problem of cognitive penetrability (CP) that adds to the discussion on whether some cognitive effects on perceptual processing constitute cases of CP a dimension that was initially the main motive for introducing the notion of CP and was later almost abandoned, namely, whether the cognitive effects undermine the epistemological role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic cognitive effects on perception and argue that intrinsic cognitive effects on perception entail CP, while extrinsic effects entail CP only if they undermine the evidential role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs. I also explain why the effects of two sorts of body of knowledge that are embedded in the visual circuits and guide perceptual processing from within are not cases of CP.

Introduction

Under the influence of the work of Hanson (), however, under some, independent assumptions, the equivalence holds true.)

Seeking to undermine the view that perception is CP, Fodor () argued that perception consists in a series of interconnected modules that are cognitively impenetrable (CI); Fodor posited informational encapsulation as the main characteristic of the perceptual modules. However, not all cases of informational non-encapsulation are cases of CP. The kind of informational exchange that would signify the CP of perception is the flow of conceptual information from cognitive states to perception, and the use of this conceptual information by the perceptual processes. If some low-level, non-cognitive states affect visual processing by transmitting to it information, visual perception is not informationally encapsulated but is CI. For this reason, I prefer talking of conceptual modulation as the main trait of CP.

The notion of CP was not thoroughly analyzed. With the reinvigorated interest in the nature of perception, the notion of CP became the focus of analysis. Several definitions have been proposed in the literature (Macpherson ). All definitions share a common thread; they exclude from instances of CP cases in which the percept is determined through the focus of spatial attention (I discuss only cases of cognitively-driven, endogenous attention), or, in general, cases in which concepts determine indirectly the percept. It is not adequately explained, however, why the indirect effects do not entail CP.

Moreover, philosophers usually discuss the CP of perception as if perception were a unified stage. Perception, however, is not a homogeneous, undifferentiated process. (Among philosophers, Raftopoulos () are sensitive to this distinction.) It consists of two main stages, namely early vision and late vision that are differently affected by cognition through attention. Therefore, discussions on CP/CI should specify the scope of the claim that perception is CP or CI. Moreover, a definition of CP/CI should be able to account for differences (if any) in the CP/CI character of each stage owing to the differences between the ways cognition affects the two visual stages.

In this paper, continuing earlier work (Raftopoulos ), I propose a reframing of the problem of cognitive penetrability (CP) that adds to the discussion on whether some cognitive effects on perceptual processing constitute cases of CP a dimension that was initially the main motive for introducing the notion of CP, namely, whether the cognitive effects undermine the epistemological, evidential role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs.

In the first section, I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic cognitive effects on perception (a cognitive effect on perception is extrinsic if it can be mitigated), and claim that intrinsic cognitive effects on perception entail directly the CP of perception. Then, I argue that extrinsic cognitive effects should entail the CP of perception only to the extent that they undermine the evidential role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs. The motive behind this claim is that the original considerations that gave rise to the discussion concerning the CP of perception were motivated by the view that perception is conceptually modulated and theory-laden. This vitiated the evidential role of perception in evidencing perceptual beliefs. Therefore, if some extrinsic cognitive effects undermine the evidential role of perception, they should be treated as cases of CP, their extrinsic character notwithstanding. In view of these, since late vision is intrinsically affected by cognition, late vision is necessarily CP. Thus, early vision should be the focus of the contemporary discussion about the CP of perception.

In the second section, I examine the sorts of cognitive effects on early vision to determine whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic. I have argued (Raftopoulos ) that the available empirical evidence unequivocally suggests that there are no intrinsic cognitive effects on early vision. There are, however, two special sorts of effects on early vision that may be taken as evidence that early vision is intrinsically affected by cognition and is, thus, CP. These are two sorts of bodies of knowledge that are embedded in the visual circuits and guide perceptual processing very early and, consequently, they function within the time scale of early vision. Moreover, they seem to affect early vision intrinsically. The first is the set of general principles that perception employs to solve various underdetermination problems. The second is information that results from perceptual learning and is encoded in the early visual circuits. I examine these two cases and conclude that they are not in effect instances of CP because although some mechanisms causally and intrinsically affect early vision, there is nothing cognitive in these effects and no concepts are involved in the content of early vision states.

There are, however, extrinsic cognitive effects on early vision, such as the effects of spatial attention and the effects of pre-cueing. Following the suggestion that in such cases to determine whether the extrinsic effects constitute cases of CP one should examine whether these effects undermine the evidential role of early vision in grounding perceptual beliefs, I argue that these effects do not undermine the evidential role of early vision and, thus, they do not entail the CP of early vision. This justifies the standard claim to the effect that spatial attention and pre-cueing, which are typical cases of cognitive extrinsic effects on perception, do not constitute cases of CP.

In this paper, I assume that perception consists of a preattentional stage (early vision), and of late vision that is directly modulated by cognitive states through attention.

Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Cognitive Effects on Perception, the Evidential Role of Perception, and Cognitive Penetrability

Before one endeavors to define CP/CI, they should have determined first a set of adequacy conditions that a good definition of CP should fulfill. There are several ways one could go about in this task but I think it promising to start with factors that underlie most discussions of CP/CI. The first is that talk about the CP of perception is a talk about cognitive influences on perception. The second is that CP is inextricable related to discussions concerning the theory ladenness of perception and the evidential role of perception. I start by discussing the first factor.

Light

Font size:

↓

↑

Reset

Interval:

↓

↑

Bookmark:

Make

Similar books «Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies»

Look at similar books to Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies. We have selected literature similar in name and meaning in the hope of providing readers with more options to find new, interesting, not yet read works.

Maggie L Popkin

Future Thinking in Roman Culture: New Approaches to History, Memory, and Cognition

Lorenzo Magnani

Eco-Cognitive Computationalism: Cognitive Domestication of Ignorant Entities

Sobel Carolyn P.

The cognitive sciences: an interdisciplinary approach

Cain

The Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Daniel A. Wilkenfeld

Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Science

Lena Kästner

Philosophy of Cognitive Neuroscience

Anthony Chemero

Radical Embodied Cognitive Science

Magnani

Model-based reasoning in science and technology : theoretical and cognitive issues

Daniel N. Osherson

An Invitation to Cognitive Science: Thinking

Edwin Hutchins

Cognition in the Wild

Lila R. Gleitman

An Invitation to Cognitive Science: Visual Cognition

Neil A. Stillings

Cognitive science: an introduction

Reviews about «Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies»

Discussion, reviews of the book Philosophy and Cognitive Science II: Western & Eastern Studies and just readers' own opinions. Leave your comments, write what you think about the work, its meaning or the main characters. Specify what exactly you liked and what you didn't like, and why you think so.