Solomon Robert Charles - Passion, death, and spirituality : the philosophy of Robert C. Solomon

Jesse J. Prinz 1

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Abstract

Robert Solomon is responsible for developing one of the most influential and sophisticated cognitive theories of emotion in recent philosophy. In his own work, and in commentaries, this theory is often contrasted with the non-cognitive theory of William James. For James, emotions are felt sensations of changes in the body. For Solomon, emotions are judgments that have intentional objects and can occur without feelings. Solomon also says that emotions, unlike usual sensations, are strategic choices rather than automatics responses. This chapter argues that, despite this apparent contrast, the Jamesian view can be adapted to satisfy the basic tenets of Solomons theory, and the resulting hybrid may have been anticipated in Solomon, despite his reservations about James.

No one contributed more to contemporary philosophical discussions of emotion that Bob Solomon. His seminal work in the 1970s helped set the agenda for decades to come, and the arguments he offered in those early works remain as relevant today as they were when they were originally penned. Those of us who came to this discussion in recent years revere Solomon as an intellectual hero. But many of us have also used him as a foil. As so often happens in academe, newcomers try to kill the father, and often then resurrect the grandfather as an alternative. In this case, the grandfather is William James. The last two decades have witnessed a Jamesian turn in emotion theory, and Solomons views are often seen as the polar opposite. Solomon authored some of the most penetrating critiques of the Jamesian approach, and his positive theory of the emotions often looks like a systematic inversion of Jamess core tenets. As a Jamesian, this is how Id seen things, and despite receiving unbelievably gracious support and encouragement from Solomon during my early forays, Id thought of his work as more of a foil than a foundation. I realize now that this was a mistake. Many of Solomons most controversial views strike me as plausible now, not because James was wrong, but because there is room for a reconciliation. Solomon was a leading force in bringing together different disciplines (psychology, anthropology, and philosophy), different generations (historical and contemporary sources of influence), and different philosophical traditions (analytic and continental). It turns out that he was also prescient in seeing how the most ostensibly antithetical theories of emotion might find some common ground. This is the most important of many philosophical lessons I learned from him, not only because it is crucial for understanding emotions, but because it serves as a reminder, in this polarizing field, that the best solution to many of our debates is collaboration.

In what follows, I begin by presenting some of the central themes in Solomons theory of the emotions, focusing on his groundbreaking 1973 paper, but updating where appropriate. I indicate how these themes depart from the position advanced by James. Then, in the second part, I argue that the Jamesian should not reject Solomons arguments, but rather accommodate them, and I will suggest that his considered view can be regarded as integrative as well.