Bouwel Jeroen van - Scientific explanation
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When scientist investigate why things happen, they aim at giving an explanation. But what does a scientific explanation look like? In the first chapter (Theories of Scientific Explanation) of this book, the milestones in the debate on how to characterize scientific explanations are exposed. The second chapter (How to Study Scientific Explanation?) scrutinizes the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation, Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon and shows what went wrong. Next, it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation and clarify briefly what this approach consists in. The third chapter (A Toolbox for Describing and Evaluating Explanatory Practices) elaborates the pragmatic approach by presenting a toolbox for analysing scientific explanation. In the last chapter (Examples of Descriptions and Evaluations of Explanatory Practices) the approach is illustrated with real-life examples of scientists aiming at explaining. This book can be used as a textbook for intermediate philosophy of science courses and is also valuable as suggested reading for introductory courses in philosophy of science. The way the book is set up makes it an excellent study and research guide for advanced (MA and PhD) students that work on the topic of scientific explanation. Finally, it is a handy source and reference book for senior researchers in the field of scientific explanations and - more generally - for all philosophers of science. Read more...
Abstract: When scientist investigate why things happen, they aim at giving an explanation. But what does a scientific explanation look like? In the first chapter (Theories of Scientific Explanation) of this book, the milestones in the debate on how to characterize scientific explanations are exposed. The second chapter (How to Study Scientific Explanation?) scrutinizes the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation, Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon and shows what went wrong. Next, it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation and clarify briefly what this approach consists in. The third chapter (A Toolbox for Describing and Evaluating Explanatory Practices) elaborates the pragmatic approach by presenting a toolbox for analysing scientific explanation. In the last chapter (Examples of Descriptions and Evaluations of Explanatory Practices) the approach is illustrated with real-life examples of scientists aiming at explaining. This book can be used as a textbook for intermediate philosophy of science courses and is also valuable as suggested reading for introductory courses in philosophy of science. The way the book is set up makes it an excellent study and research guide for advanced (MA and PhD) students that work on the topic of scientific explanation. Finally, it is a handy source and reference book for senior researchers in the field of scientific explanations and - more generally - for all philosophers of science
Abstract: When scientist investigate why things happen, they aim at giving an explanation. But what does a scientific explanation look like? In the first chapter (Theories of Scientific Explanation) of this book, the milestones in the debate on how to characterize scientific explanations are exposed. The second chapter (How to Study Scientific Explanation?) scrutinizes the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation, Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon and shows what went wrong. Next, it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation and clarify briefly what this approach consists in. The third chapter (A Toolbox for Describing and Evaluating Explanatory Practices) elaborates the pragmatic approach by presenting a toolbox for analysing scientific explanation. In the last chapter (Examples of Descriptions and Evaluations of Explanatory Practices) the approach is illustrated with real-life examples of scientists aiming at explaining. This book can be used as a textbook for intermediate philosophy of science courses and is also valuable as suggested reading for introductory courses in philosophy of science. The way the book is set up makes it an excellent study and research guide for advanced (MA and PhD) students that work on the topic of scientific explanation. Finally, it is a handy source and reference book for senior researchers in the field of scientific explanations and - more generally - for all philosophers of science
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Erik Weber , Jeroen Van Bouwel and Leen De Vreese SpringerBriefs in Philosophy Scientific Explanation 2013 10.1007/978-94-007-6446-0_1 The Author(s) 2013
1. Theories of Scientific Explanation
Erik Weber 1
(1)
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University (UGent), Blandijnberg 2, Ghent, B-9000, Belgium
Erik Weber (Corresponding author)
Email:
Jeroen Van Bouwel
Email:
Leen De Vreese
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Abstract
In this chapter we first summarize the ideas of Carl Hempel, the godfather of this subdomain of the philosophy of science (Sect. 1.2). Then we present the problems that other philosophers have raised in connection with Hempels theory of explanation (Sect. 1.3). Subsequently, we clarify how the major research traditions in the field that have emerged after Hempel, can be seen as different reactions to these problems (Sect. 1.4). Finally, we discuss two of these reactions in more detail: Philip Kitchers unification account in Sect. 1.5 and Wesley Salmons causal-mechanical account in Sect. 1.6.
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter we first summarize the ideas of Carl Hempel, the godfather of this subdomain of the philosophy of science (.
This chapter gives the reader insights into some of the most important steps in the development of the domain till 1990. More recent developments (e.g. the work of James Woodward, Michael Strevens and the mechanistic approach) are treated in .
1.2 Hempels Models
1.2.1 The DN Model
We start with some definitions and terminology. According to Hempel, an explanation consists of an explanandum E (a description of the phenomenon to be explained) and an explanans (the statements that do the explaining). He distinguishes between true explanations and explanations that are well-confirmed (see e.g. Hempel , part 3):
(DN)
The ordered couple (L, C) constitutes a potential explanans for the singular sentence E if and only if
(1)
L is a purely universal sentence and C is a singular sentence,
(2)
E is deductively derivable from the conjunction L&C, and
(3)
E is not deductively derivable from C alone.
A purely universal sentence consists of one or more universal quantifiers, followed by an expression which contains no quantifiers and no individual constants. (L, C) is a true explanans for E if and only if (L, C) is a potential explanans for E and both L and C are true. (L, C) is a well-confirmed explanans for E if and only if (L, C) is a potential explanans for E and both L and C are well-confirmed.
Let us consider an example. In volume I of The Feynman Lectures on Physics Chapter 26 deals with elementary optics. There we find a simple law about mirrors:
The simplest object is a mirror, and the law for a mirror is that when the light hits the mirror, it does not continue in a straight line, but bounces off the mirror into a new straight line[.] The light striking a mirror travels in such a way that the two angles, between each beam and the mirror, are equal. (Feynman et al , pp. 262)
Suppose that we have the following explanandum:
E
This reflected beam of light a has an angle of 45 relative to the mirror from which it bounced
According to definition (DN), the following construction is a potential explanans for this phenomenon:
C
The angle of incidence of a relative to the mirror was 45
L
For all beams reflecting on mirrors: if the angle of incidence relative to the mirror is 45, then the reflected beam also has an angle of 45 relative to the mirror
If all these claims are true, we have a true explanans.
This example illustrates a general property of DN explanations. The first two conditions in (DN) imply that explanations have the form of a deductive argument. The simplest format is this:
L
(x)(Px Qx)
C
Pa
_____________
E
Qa
The mirror example fits this simple format.
In more complex explanations, C is a conjunction of atomic singular sentences C1, C2, . The scheme is then:
L
(x)[(P1x P2x Pnx) Qx]
C1
P1a
C2
P2a
Cn
Pna
_____________
E
Qa
As an example we consider a case of thermal expansion. The expansion of aluminium rods is governed by the law d L = 0.0000222 L o dt, where d L is the expansion (in metre), L o the initial length (in metre) of the rod and dt the temperature difference (in C). 0.0000222 is the coefficient of linear thermal expansion of aluminium. With this background knowledge we can construct the following example:
C1
This aluminium rod was heated from 50 to 250 C
C2
This aluminium rod has an initial length (at 50 C) of 1 m
L
For all aluminium rods: if they are heated from 50 to 250 C and their initial length is 1 m, then they are 4.44 mm longer at 250 C
_____________
E
This aluminium rod is 4.44 mm longer than it was before it was heated
The third condition in (DN) excludes circular arguments as explanations. The following deductive arguments are no explanations, though they satisfy the two first conditions:
L
(x)(PxQx Rx)
C
PaQa
_____________
E
Qa
L
(x)(Px Px)
C
Pa
__________
E
Pa
In both cases, E is derivable from C alone, so the argument is circular. Such circular arguments, though deductive, are not DN explanations.
1.2.2 The Value of Explanations
For Hempel, explanations are the instruments by which understanding of the world is achieved. So understanding the world is the intellectual benefit we expect to acquire by constructing explanations. What does this understanding of the world consist in? Hempels answer is this:
Thus a D-N Explanation answers the question Why did the explanandum-phenomenon occur? by showing that the phenomenon resulted from certain particular circumstances, specified in C 1, C 2,, C k, in accordance with the laws L 1, L 2,, L r. By pointing this out, the argument shows that, given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected ; and it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred (Hempel , p. 337; italics in original).
In other words: understanding must be identified with expectability , and expectability is the one and only intellectual benefit we can acquire by constructing explanations. This idea motivates the two first conditions in (DN).
1.2.3 The IS Model
Where the DN model is meant to capture the structure of deterministic explanations, the IS model intends to cover probabilistic explanations. Let us begin with a characterization given by Hempel:
Explanations of particular facts or events by means of statistical laws thus present themselves as arguments that are inductive or probabilistic in the sense that the explanans confers upon the explanandum a more or less high degree of inductive support or of logical (inductive) probability; they will therefore be called inductive-statistical explanations; or IS explanations (Hempel , pp. 385386).
Explanation is still linked with expectability, but in this case expectability comes in degrees. The idea of lawlike sentences thus has to be extended to account for statistical laws that have the conditional form Prob (G|F) = r , where r denotes the probability that an object of the set F is also a member of the set G. The set F is called the reference class of this statistical law.
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