Roy W. Perrett - Logic and Language

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Despite large and obvious differences, the history of Indian Logic runs curiously parallel with that of the Logic of Europe, at least in its classical and medieval periods; so much so that one is tempted to see the two as advancing side by side, rather than separately. So far as the classical period is concerned we may, in fact, have tended to underestimate the extent of the contact between India and Greece; for though no one now maintains, as some historians have argued, that Indian Logic was directly inspired by Aristotle, or even that influences in either direction can be definitely traced, it is known that there was considerable commerce between the two regions. Aristotles most famous pupil Alexander had, after all, penetrated to India in the course of his military ventures, though it is doubtful that he found time to lecture the inhabitants on Logic. There were subsequently Greek settlements on the north-west frontier, and it would be surprising if there were not some interpenetration of ideas. Later, with the rise of Mohammedanism, these ties were broken, and India and Europe were held apart by a civilization largely hostile to both. The Arabs, it is true, helped to preserve the European tradition to some extent by taking over Aristotles works in translation; but they did not themselves discover the Indian Logic and, in fact, the Moslem invasion of India nearly caused its extinction. Many of our modern Sanskrit texts are re-translations from versions that survived in Tibet. We can also study such doctrines as went with Buddhism to China.

The actual authors of the earliest Indian treatises are dim,

Before considering what Gautama and Vtsyyana say about Fallacies it is necessary to sketch their theory of inference. This betrays a dialectical origin almost as strongly as Aristotles Topics . A single pattern of inference is given, without moods or figures. An inference has five members. Illustrated by the stock example of later writers, they are:

(1) (Thesis): The hill is fiery.

(2) (Reason): Because it has smoke.

(3) (Example): Whatever is smoky is fiery, like a kitchen.

(4) (Application): And this hill is smoky.

(5) (Conclusion): Therefore it is fiery.

Since Gautama calls (3) just Example, it seems likely that, in the illustration, the statement of a general rule, Whatever is smoky is fiery, is a later importation: the original idea is simply that an example of the operation of the (unstated) connection between the major term fire and middle term smoke should be given. If this seems strange, comparison with Aristotle Rhetoric (1393a 221394a 18) might be helpful. In general the aim of this theory of inference is much closer to Aristotles aim in his Rhetoric than it is to what we are used to and which derives from the Prior Analytics. Gautama defines an example as a case in which the

The apparently useless repetitive character of (4) and (5) led to their being dropped by some later writers. Their presence is less surprising, however, if the whole inference scheme is seen as a pro forma for the setting-out of inferences in practice, with an aim of securing comprehension in an audience or persuasion of an opponent. Here it is interesting that we are told by Vtsyyana in his commentary that others raised the number of members of the syllogism to ten, by adding the desire to know, doubt, belief in possibility of solution, purpose in view in attaining the conclusion and removal of doubt. If these are interleaved with the other five we have the pattern of a veritable dialogue, in which the added members represent the reactions or contributions of a second participant. We could dramatize the situation something as follows:

The scheme is artificial at some points, as witness the vapidity of the remarks I have had to write in for the second speaker. However, there can now be little doubt that Gautamas scheme is aimed at representing the presentation of an argument to others ; that is, at Rhetoric or Dialectic, not pure Logic.