William G. Lycan - On Evidence in Philosophy

Much of the material here has previously appeared in print, but this book is not a collection of papers. The papers that are largely reprinted from earlier venues () were written to become part of the book.

For helpful comments and exchanges, warm thanks to: David Armstrong, Annette Baier, Heather Battaly, George Bealer, David Christensen, Earl Conee, Tim Crane, Chris Daly, Michael Devitt, Nick Georgalis, Alvin Goldman, Gary Gutting, Gil Harman, Frank Jackson, Michael Lynch, Ausonio Marras, Andrew Melnyk, Charles Pigden, Jim Pryor, Bill Robinson, Bill Roche, Jay Rosenberg, Bruce Russell, Ernie Sosa, Kim Sterelny, Steve Stich, Casey Swank, Jim Tomberlin, Peter van Inwagen, Fritz Warfield, James Willoughby, and certainly others whose communications I have neglected to record.

I am also grateful to each of three OUP reviewers, whose reports on an early draft have greatly increased the coherence of my presentation. One remains anonymous, one is Anthony Booth, and the third is David Henderson, whose extensive comments on two drafts have led to important corrections and other improvements.

Part of the Introduction was part of my John Dewey Lecture at the Eastern Division meeting of the APA, January, 2017; the lecture has since appeared, under the prescient title On Evidence in Philosophy, in the Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 91 (2017): 10217.

is based primarily on Moores Antiskeptical Strategies, in S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay (eds.), Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 8499. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

is largely excerpted from Moore Against the New Skeptics, Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 3553.

is a revised version of A Particularly Compelling Refutation of Eliminative Materialism, in D.M. Johnson and C.E. Erneling (eds.), Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 197205. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

is an expanded version of Free Will and the Burden of Proof, in Anthony OHear (ed.), Minds and Persons (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 53, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 10722.

Much of is excerpted from Giving Dualism its Due, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009): 55163.

Some paragraphs in are lifted from On Two Main Themes in Guttings What Philosophers Know, Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2013): 11220, and one from Bealer on the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge, Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 14350.

is based on Epistemology and the Role of Intuitions, in S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (London: Routledge, 2011): 81322.

contains a few paragraphs from Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again), Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2012): 520.