Reilly - The Failure of Governance in Bell, California

The Failure of Governance
in Bell, California

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham Boulder New York London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Reilly, Thom, 1960- author.

Title: The failure of governance in Bell, California : big-time corruption in

a small town / Thomas F. Reilly.

Description: Lanham : Lexington Books, [2016] | Includes bibliographical

references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016010028 (print) | LCCN 2016016874 (ebook) | ISBN

9781498512121 (cloth : alk. paper) | 9781498512138 (Electronic)

Subjects: LCSH: Bell (Calif.)--Politics and government. | Political

corruption--California--Bell--History--21st century.

Classification: LCC JS593.B735 R45 2016 (print) | LCC JS593.B735 (ebook) |

DDC 320.9794/93--dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016010028

TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

In memory of Charlie

If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 51

The scandal that erupted in the small town of Bell, California, in 2010 was that rare local government crisis that for a time goes beyond a merely regional story to impact the national consciousness. Big-city scandals often go national, and small-city incidents can. But what was so special about Bell?

First, it was about something simple to understand: dollars, big dollarsspecifically, outrageous compensation to a small number of officials. City Administrator Robert Rizzo, his assistant Angela Spaccia, the police chief, administrative services director, general services director, and a few others were enjoying salaries two to four times the normal rate, ranging from approximately $250,000 to over $700,000. City Councilmembers were making more than $100,000 in a city whose population size legally entitled them to annual pay of less than $5,000.

Second, these massive sums enjoyed by public servants were in stark contrast to Bells dismal economic circumstances, which included extensive poverty, high taxes, and high unemployment. Bells former leaderships attitude was nicely illustrated by a former mayor who responded to community anger by saying, In a troubled city, the city council should get paid a little more.

Third, former city officials immediate reaction to revelations of the scandal expanded the outrage. If thats a (salary) number people choke on, the city manager said, maybe Im in the wrong business. I could go into private business and make that money. This council has compensated me for the job Ive done. The residents clearly could expect no relief from their leaders.

The scandal extended well beyond excessive salaries of eight officials. It also featured a questionable employee loan program; unauthorized contributions to pension programs; excessive fees and taxes charged to local businesses; sweetheart deals made to acquire property; and a $100,000,000 bonding program that paid millions to favored contractors for projects with little return to the city.

Today, six years after this story first broke in the Los Angeles Times, closure has largely been accomplished. Our law firm volunteered to represent a local group pro bono in promoting a 2011 recall, which resulted in all the councilmembers being replaced. Happily, within four years, all these claims were resolved and the city had $25,000,000 in the bank.

So, on one level, Bell has had its fifteen minutes of infamy. The so-called Bell 8 have been punished, two Los Angeles Times reporters won the Pulitzer Prize, and the country has gone on to other crises. But this is the point for academic review to reflect on whether there is a larger meaning or lesson here for those of us who care about public service.

Throughout these years of strife, it has been a pleasure getting to know the author of this work, Dr. Thom Reilly. He has closely followed the scandal and its aftermath, whose meanings we have frequently discussed. Some questions may never be answered. To me, the most mysterious is whether Rizzo was mastermind or puppet. In the criminal proceedings, one side portrayed Rizzo as the mastermind and Spaccia the loyal follower; the other claimed that Rizzo was not smart enough to be the mastermind and that the schemes did not develop until Spaccia arrived on the scene.

It is perhaps the most puzzling human question to emerge from the scandal. Dr. Reilly provides interesting insights on this question, and lets the participants speak for themselves without ultimately answering it. Frankly, after all the depositions and testimony, I dont know who really could give a satisfactory answer.

Dr. Reillys book instead ultimately focuses on important issues of public administration and policyhow should a government control itself? He identifies key factors contributing to the scandal, and focuses particularly on what Bell might tell us about the council-manager form of government. While this model emerged as a reform of the strong mayor (machine/political) approach, Dr. Reilly concludes that in fact there is no evidence to confirm that there are systemic differences in the two systems in how they respond to powerful constituencies, levels of citizen participation, quality of services, or operational effectiveness. He suggests that the adaptive city has evolved with elements of both systems, and that Bells situation may best be explained by concepts of political monopoly, geographic contagion, the corrupting effects of fiscal systems that enable revenue extraction, and a professional public-sector ethics lens.

Dr. Reilly concludes that the Rizzo/Spaccia scheme led to a form of collective corruption. The key factors that should have prevented this are (a) community participation through voting and direct participation in government; (b) electoral process; (c) vulnerability of the manager and key directors to removal; (d) the role of the top legal official in assuring proper and legal process; (e) regular audits and reporting of financial information; (f) transparency and access of public to information and civic involvement of organizations; and (g) periodic public internal assessment of organizational performance.

To this, I would add that anything that goes on over a number of years creates the opportunity for people who should be asking questions to get comfortable and become excessively deferential to long-serving managers. While long-serving employees are not more susceptible to corruption than short-serving ones, long-serving ones do not earn the right to be free from examination.