G. Doug Davis and Michael O. Slobodchikoff - Cultural Imperialism and the Decline of the Liberal Order: Russian and Western Soft Power in Eastern Europe

LEXINGTON BOOKS

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ISBN 978-1-4985-8586-6 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-1-4985-8587-3 (electronic)

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To our wives, Marinella and Tatyana,

whose presence makes each of us whole.

Writing a book is an incredibly difficult undertaking and is impossible without the help of many people and institutions. We are very grateful for the help of the Faculty Development Committee at Troy University, which provided funding for Dr. Davis in the form of a research grant. This grant led to the chapter on Poland. We are also thankful to the Faculty Development Committee for providing funding to present conference papers at the International Studies Association annual conferences. These conference papers and the feedback that we received from discussants and other colleagues at these gatherings were vital to making this book possible.

We are also very grateful to our colleagues in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the United States for providing feedback, discussion, and aid in the process of writing this book. We appreciate all of the suggestions, comments, and criticism that we have received along the way. We are also thankful for the research assistance provided by Ms. Alicia Rodriguez Castillo and Mr. Christian Knight.

The publishing process is a very difficult one. We appreciate the help and guidance of both Joseph Parry and Bryndee Ryan at Lexington Books for their aid in making this project a reality. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers who have read this book and provided valuable feedback, making it stronger.

Finally, wed like to thank our families for their patience, advice, and support during this process. They have made tremendous sacrifices for this project, and we would like them to know how much we appreciate them. Words dont have the capacity to express our gratitude to them.

The study of power is fundamental within international relations and scholars have long been interested in the relative power between states. Traditionally, most analysis has focused on economic or military prowess that can be harnessed and used to compel other countries to act in accordance with the interests of strong states. While the Treaty of Westphalia recognized state sovereignty, anarchy continued to exist at the global level. Classical realist and neorealist scholars recognized the lack of any authority in the international realm and the resultant lawlessness (Fearon 1995; Grieco 1988; Morgenthau 1948; Walt 2002; Waltz 1979); their insight shows how this chaos generates competition between countries. States must maximize their military and economic might to enhance their defense since no other partner can guarantee their survival in the international system. One problem is that as states military capacity increases, the security of other countries simultaneously weakens and this consequent vulnerability causes a security dilemma. and predicts that states will emphasize and expand their power at others expense, thus reducing the potential for cooperation as most international issues lead to a zero-sum gain where there are winners and losers to every international agreement. States following this paradigm will maximize their military and economic power at all times to enhance their strategic advantage over potential rivals.

In contrast to classical and neorealist academics, hegemonic stability scholars argue that while global anarchy exists, the historical record shows that it can be overcome. A hegemonic state can establish rules and get other countries to comply and abide by its rubrics. The dominant power creates an international order with clearly defined roles for all other states in the system and this works to solve the security dilemma as the hegemon declines over time due to the costs of maintaining the system (Kennedy 1989 and Gilpin 1981). If any one state violates the rules and the imposed order, the hegemon has the power to correct the errant behavior. States understand their roles and the structure provides benefits to them on condition that they operate according to the established norms. Specifically, scholars such as Kindleberger (1973, 1995) and Gilpin (1983), argue that the power of a hegemonic state creates both global stability and operative rules of interactions that reflect the preferences of the dominant country. The hegemons goal, therefore, is to maximize its power so that it can fashion its own global order, which in turn determines the rules of behavior for all other states within the system. A hegemonic state will institutionalize a system of rules and institutions that preserve and advance its goals and values. However, a hegemonic state cannot create a global order without enough power and influence to be able to both convince other states of the validity of such an order and the ability to enforce the rules of the global order.