First published 2018
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Machuca, Diego E., editor.
Title: Moral skepticism : new essays / edited by Diego E. Machuca.
Description: 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2017. | Series:
Routledge studies in ethics and moral theory ; 42 | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017036046 | ISBN 9781138645868
(hardback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Ethics, Modern21st century. | Skepticism.
Classification: LCC BJ320 .M667 2017 | DDC 170dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017036046
ISBN: 978-1-138-64586-8 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-62786-1 (ebk)
Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
David Copp is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Davis. He is the author of Morality, Normativity, and Society (Oxford University Press, 1995) and Morality in a Natural World (Cambridge University Press, 2007), and he has edited several anthologies, including The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford University Press, 2006). He is editor of a monograph series with Oxford University Press called Oxford Moral Theory. He has published and lectured widely on topics in moral and political philosophy.
Terry Horgan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He works in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and metaethics. He is the co-author of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (Bradford/MIT Press, 1996), Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (MIT Press, 2008), and The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2011). He has also co-edited Metaethics After Moore (Oxford University Press, 2006).
Richard Joyce is Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington. He works principally in metaethics and moral psychology. He is the author of The Myth of Morality (Cambridge University Press, 2001), The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006), and Essays in Moral Skepticism (Oxford University Press, 2016). He is editor of the Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy (Routledge, 2017) and has also co-edited A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackies Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010) and Cooperation and Its Evolution (MIT Press, 2013).
Hallvard Lillehammer is Professor of Philosophy in the School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy at Birkbeck, University of London. He is the author of Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity (Palgrave, 2007), and the co-editor of Real Metaphysics (Routledge, 2003) and Ramseys Legacy (Oxford University Press, 2005).
Diego E. Machuca is Associate Researcher in Philosophy at CONICET (Argentina) and co-editor of the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism . His research focuses on skepticism in ancient philosophy, epistemology, and metaethics. He has edited Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy (Springer, 2011), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism (Brill, 2011), and Disagreement and Skepticism (Routledge, 2013). He has also co-edited Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present (Bloomsbury, 2018) and Les raisons du doute: tudes sur le scepticisme antique (Classiques Garnier, 2018).
Bart Streumer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. His main research interest is metaethics. He is the author of Unbelievable Errors (Oxford University Press, 2017) and the editor of Irrealism in Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014). His articles have appeared in such journals as Australasian Journal of Philosophy , Journal of Moral Philosophy , Philosophical Studies , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , and The Journal of Philosophy .
Folke Tersman is Professor of Philosophy at Uppsala University (Sweden). He works mainly in metaethics and is the author of Moral Disagreement (Cambridge University Press, 2007). His recent publications include Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere ( Erkenntnis 79, 2014), Explaining the Reliability of Moral Beliefs (in U. Leibowitz and N. Sinclair (eds.), Ethics and Explanation , Oxford University Press, 2016), and Debunking and Disagreement ( Nos , forthcoming).
Christine Tiefensee is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. She specializes in metaethics and broader questions of normativity. Her current research concerns inferentialist approaches to metaethics, relaxed moral realism, and the normativity of rationality. Recent publications include Inferentialist Metaethics, Bifurcations and Ontological Commitment ( Philosophical Studies 173, 2016).
Mark Timmons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona and editor of Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics . His research interests include Kants ethics, metaethics and moral phenomenology, and moral epistemology. He is the author of Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism (Oxford University Press, 1998) and Significance and System: Essays on Kants Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2017). He has also co-edited Metaethics After Moore (Oxford University Press, 2006).
Mark van Roojen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. His main work is in ethics, metaethics, and political philosophy, but his philosophical interests are wider yet. He is the author of Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 2015). His most widely read papers discuss noncognitivism, moral rationalism, moral psychology, normative epistemology, and normative semantics.
Aaron Zimmerman is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His research is focused on the intersection between thought, language, and reason. He is the author of Moral Epistemology (Routledge, 2010) and Belief: A Pragmatic Picture (Oxford University Press, 2017). His articles have appeared in such journals as Hume Studies , Philosophical Studies , Synthese , and The Philosophical Quarterly .
abolitionism, moral n9
agnosticism,
authority, categorical
cognitivism n1
colors, Hilberts theory of
concepts: and essences
conservationism, moral n9, n12
constructivism, moral
Cornell Realism
creeping minimalism
debunking argument: evolutionary
defeaters
disagreement, argument from n10
disgust
eliminativism, moral )
emotions
epistemic peer n10
error theory: about all normative judgments
evolution, argument from, see
evolutionary biology n1
experience, moral
experimental philosophy n6
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