Mark A. Heller - The Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Between Old Thinking and New

JCSS Study no. 18

Mark A. Heller

First published 1991 by Westview Press, Inc.

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Copyright 1991 by Tel Aviv University, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heller, Mark.
The dynamics of Soviet policy in the Middle East / Mark A. Heller.
p. cm. -- (JCSS study; no. 18)
ISBN 0-8133-1415-1
1. Middle East--Foreign relations--Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union--Foreign relations--Middle East. 3. Soviet Union--Foreign relations--1985-1991. I. Title. II. Series.
DS63.2.S65D96 1992
327.47056--dc20

92-27567
CIP

ISBN 13: 978-0-367-29141-9 (hbk)

The Center for Strategic Studies was established at Tel Aviv University at the end of 1977. In 1983 it was named the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in honor of Mr. and Mrs. Mel Jaffee. The objective of the Center is to contribute to the expansion of knowledge on strategic subjects and to promote public understanding of and pluralistic thought on matters of national and international security.

The Center relates to the concept of strategy in its broadest meaning, namely, the complex of processes involved in the identification, mobilization and application of resources in peace and war, in order to solidify and strengthen national and international security.

Chairman : Melvin Jaffee

Immediate Past Chairman : Joseph H. Strelitz (deceased)

Robert H. Arnow, Arnold Y. Aronoff, Newton D. Becker, Jack Berlin, Henry Borenstein, Edgar M. Bronfman, Simon Chilewich, Bertram J. Cohn, Stewart M. Colton, Lester Crown, Joseph K. Eichenbaum, Danielle and Shimon Erem, Allan Fainbarg, Dr. Gerald Falwell, Jacob Feldman, Arnold D. Feuerstein, David Furman, Guilford Glazer, Burton E. Glazov, Eugene M. Grant, Vernon Green, Martin J. Gross, Michael M.H. Gross, Irving B. Harris, Betty and Sol Jaffee, Philip M. Klutznick, Judy and Joel Knapp, Fred Kotek, Raymond Kulek, Max L. Kunianski, Mark Lambert, Rose Lederer, Fred W. Lessing, Morris L. Levinson, Edward Levy, Peter A. Magowan, Judd D. Malkin, Hermann Merkin, Stephen Meadow, Monte MonAster, Max Perlman, Milton J. Petrie, Gary P. Ratner, Raphael Recanati, Meshulam Riklis, Morris Rodman, Elihu Rose, Malcolm M. Rosenberg, Irving Schneider, George Shrut, Marvin Simon, Ruth Sinaiko, Ed Stein, Herb Stein, Walter P. Stern, Dr. Robert J. Stoller, Leonard R. Strelitz, James Warren, David Warsaw, Jack D. Weiler, Marvin . Weiss, Emanuel A. Winston, Bert Wolstein, Paul Yanowicz

The text of this study was essentially completed at the end of 1990 and slightly updated in the spring of 1991 to reflect the course of the Gulf War. Soviet behavior before and during the fighting confirmed both the basic thrust of changing Middle Eastern policy implicit in new thinking and the impact of the remaining impediments to its thoroughgoing implementation.

The most serious of these impediments was the resistance of conservative forces, whose world-view, self-image and institutional interests were threatened by new thinking in domestic as well as foreign and national security policy, of which the Middle East was but one component. This inseparable link between the domestic and foreign dimensions of new thinking was dramatically illustrated during the abortive coup d'etat of August 1991 which was publicly welcomed (apart from unrepentant communists) only by Iraq, Libya and elements of the PLO precisely those foreign actors who had once benefited so much from Soviet old thinking. The failure of the putsch finally cleared away this obstacle and made it possible to accelerate the movement of Soviet policy along the path logically dictated by the requirements of restructuring, which had already been apparent for several years.

The restoration of ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations with Israel in October 1991 was not itself a result of the failed coup, since it coincided with Israel's decision to attend an international peace conference and therefore conformed with longstanding Soviet policy. But other actions after August, including the long-delayed implementation of a civil aviation agreement calling for direct flights and the hosting of Israeli visitors at previously-closed military facilities, indicated that all Soviet inhibitions about cultivating close ties with Israel had disappeared. Indeed, so completely had traditional patterns been overturned that Israelis seemed no less favorably disposed than Arabs to Soviet participation in the peace conference, and perhaps even more so.

The irony, of course, is that by this time, Soviet involvement could not denote coequal status with the United States and was scarcely relevant for any of the other protagonists, because the failed coup had also accelerated the ongoing decline of Soviet influence abroad and the disintegrating power of the central government at home. During Mikhail Gorbachev's brief visit to the Madrid peace conference in October 1991, few journalists were interested in his views on the Arab-Israeli peace process; most wanted to know whether he still wielded any authority over the fractious and self-assertive republics at home. Indeed, his presence at the conference seemed mostly a matter of noblesse oblige, a gesture by President Bush to a man who had set in motion momentous changes which then passed him by. For the foreseeable future, the great imponderable was not the course of Soviet Middle Eastern policy, but whether the Soviet Union, beset by seemingly insurmountable domestic problems, would continue to exist at all.

In preparing this study, I benefited greatly from discussions with scholars and government officials in Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States. I am also grateful to my colleagues at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and to two anonymous reviewers for their comments and criticisms of earlier drafts of the text. For any errors of fact or interpretation, I remain solely responsible.

M.A.H.
November 1,
1991

Since the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, the Soviet Union has been undergoing a transformation of revolutionary proportions. The major impetus for this change was a crisis of the Soviet system, reflected in protracted economic stagnation. However, the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev has recognized that the successful restructuring of the economy depends, not only on political democratization at home, but also on the end of ruinously expensive arms races and the mobilization of economic and technical assistance from abroad, and these, in turn, require the relaxation of international tensions. Accordingly, the Soviets have elaborated a set of principles new political thinking to guide foreign policy. Militarized, ideologized competition with the forces of imperialism has been abandoned in favor of cooperation in the peaceful resolution of disputes. New political thinking has meant that the Soviet Union no longer views the Third World as an arena for a zero-sum superpower competition for influence and presence. Rather than seeking sterile political or ideological gains at American expense, it now seeks to eliminate friction with the United States stemming from Third World commitments and to commercialize and universalize its foreign relations, regardless of ideological considerations.