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Randolph Clarke - Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

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Randolph Clarke Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
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This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.

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Randolph Clarke - Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Randolph Clarke
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

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Clarke Randolph Associate Professor of Philosophy University of Georgia - photo 1
Clarke, Randolph Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Georgia
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Publication date 2003 (this edition)
Print ISBN-10: 0-19-515987-X
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-515987-5
doi:10.1093/019515987X.001.0001
Abstract: Libertarian accounts of free will face objections that the indeterminism they require would leave behavior random, inexplicable, and beyond agents' control. This book examines three main types of libertarian viewsnoncausal, event-causal, and agent-causalto see how well they can meet such challenges. Noncausal accounts are found not to offer satisfactory views of action and reason-explanation. Event-causal and agent-causal accounts are defended against a number of objections. But if both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, then there is no adequate account of free will.
Keywords: action,agent-causation,causation,control,determinism,explanation,free will,incompatibilism,indeterminism,libertarianism,moral responsibility,reason-explanation
libertarian accounts of free will
end p.i
end p.ii
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Picture 2
2003
end p.iii
Picture 3

Oxford New York
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Copyright 2003 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
www.oup.com
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Clarke, Randolph K.
Libertarian accounts of free will / Radolph Clarke.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-19-515987-X
1. Free will and determinism. I. Title.
BJ1461 .C53 2003
123.5dc21 2002038178
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
end p.iv
For my father, Calvin, and to the memory of my mother, Ruth
end p.v
end p.vi
Acknowledgments
The initial draft of this book was written between the summers of 2000 and 2001, during which time I was supported by a fellowship from the George A. and Eliza Gardner Howard Foundation. I am grateful to the foundation for its assistance and to the University of Georgia for allowing me to spend the year writing. Some earlier work from which I have drawn was supported by grants from the University of Georgia Research Foundation and the Center for Humanities and Arts. My thanks to these institutions.
Portions of the following publications (with some revision) appear here: "Contrastive Rational Explanation of Free Choice," Philosophical Quarterly ). I am grateful to the publishers and to Robert Kane, who edited the Oxford volume, for permission to use this material.
Over the years I have gained much from discussion and correspondence about action and free will with a number of people. I regret that it is not possible to convey my thanks to the late David Lewis. I do thank Robert Audi, Paul Benacerraf, Michael Bratman, Robert Burton, Sarah Buss, Charles Cross, Stefaan Cuypers, Richard Double, Laura Ekstrom, Harry Frankfurt, Carl Ginet, Ishtiyaque Haji, Gilbert Harman, E. J. Lowe, Tomis Kapitan, Storrs McCall, Hugh McCann, Thomas McKay, Michael McKenna, Thomas Pink, David Robb, Alex Rosenberg, William Rowe, T. M. Scanlon, Saul Smilansky, Galen Strawson, Eleonore Stump, Kadri Vihvelin, Bruce Waller, Gary Watson, David Widerker, George Wilson, Susan Wolf, Gideon
end p.vii
Yaffe, and Michael Zimmerman. I am particularly indebted to John Fischer, Robert Kane, Alfred Mele, Timothy O'Connor, and Derk Pereboom for their contributions to many stimulating exchanges.
John Carroll, John Dupr, Alfred Freddoso, Paul Humphreys, Lawrence Lombard, and Michael Tooley generously responded to queries about specific topics treated here. Yuri Balashov and Charles Cross provided invaluable advice on several points concerning causation and physics. I am grateful to the students in my seminar on metaphysics, fall 2001, for helping me improve the formulation of some of my views.
Several people read and commented on parts of the manuscript. Thanks to Nomy Arpaly, Yuri Balashov, Charles Cross, John Fischer, Carl Ginet, Meghan Griffith, John Heil, Robert Kane, E. J. Lowe, Timothy O'Connor, Thomas Pink, Steven Rieber, David Robb, William Rowe, and Daniel Speak. Ishtiyaque Haji and Alfred Mele provided thoughtful comments on the entire manuscript, as did Derk Pereboom, who refereed it for Oxford University Press. The responses enabled me to make this a much better book than it would otherwise have been.
I owe a special debt of gratitude to John Heil, for much encouragement and philosophical inspiration. And last but not least, thanks to Esm and Elena, for more than I can say.
end p.viii
Contents
Introduction
Incompatibilism
1.1
The Value of Free Will
1.2
Minimal Incompatibilism
1.3
Narrow and Broad Incompatibilism
Active Control and Causation
2.1
Rational Self-Determination
2.2
Noncausal Libertarian Accounts
2.2.1 Reason-Based Active Control
2.2.2 The Exercise of Active Control
2.2.3 Reason-Explanation
2.3
Causal Libertarian Accounts
Event-Causal Accounts and the Problem of Explanation
3.1
Some Objections Concerning Explanation, and Their Significance
3.2
Indeterminism and Causation
3.3
Indeterminism and Rational Explanation
3.3.1 Causal Explanation
3.3.2 Acting for a Reason
3.4
Indeterminism and Contrastive Rational Explanation
3.4.1 An Account of Contrastive Causal Explanation
3.4.2 Contrastive Rational Explanation
3.4.3 Contrastive Explanatory Relevance
3.4.4 A Second View
end p.ix
3.5
Some Additions to the Unadorned View
3.5.1 Self-Subsuming Decisions
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