John Lemos - A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will

Nature and Normativity

Biology, Teleology, and Meaning

Mark Okrent

Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism

In Defense of Belief in the Natural World

Tomoji Shogenji

Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity

Patrick Bondy

From Rules to Meanings

New Essays on Inferentialism

Edited by Ondej Beran, Vojtch Kolman, and Ladislav Kore

Toleration and Freedom from Harm

Liberalism Reconceived

Andrew Jason Cohen

Voicing Dissent

The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public

Edited by Casey Rebecca Johnson

New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory

Edited by Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus, and Denis Perrin

A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will

John Lemos

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com

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