The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
1978 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 1978
Paperback edition 1994
Printed in the United States of America
98 97 96 95 94 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
ISBN 978-0-226-01536-1 (e-book)
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Emile Durkheim on institutional analysis
(Heritage of sociology)
Includes index.
1. SociologyMethodology. 2. Durkheim, Emile, 18581917. 3. Solidarity. 4. Social institutions. I. Traugott, Mark.
HM24.E49 301 77-25105
ISBN 0-226-17330-5 (cloth)
ISBN 0-226-17371-2 (paper)
A Note on the Translations
In general, the task of translating Durkheims French is quite straightforward. His thought is thoroughly disciplined and arguments flow logically from one point to the next. Durkheim employs a rather standard vocabulary and phraseology, and his style remains consistent even over three decades of intellectual development. While it is quite true that the quality of his prose varies among the works collected in this volume are notably poor in this respectthe lapses occur primarily in texts which have been reconstructed from notes or from drafts never intended for publication.
More typically, Durkheims style makes up in conciseness for what it lacks in flourish. The writing, like the man himself, exudes sobriety and intensity of purpose. The most common difficulty encountered in rendering Durkheims prose into English is to temper its sometimes disconcerting stiffness.
Contributors of footnotes to the articles are identified by initials. Those marked E.D. are Durkheims own. I have left his elliptical references, often to sources now long out of print, as they appeared in the original, except to indicate those few cases where texts which Durkheim discusses at length now exist in English translation. Those initialed M.M. are the comments which Marcel Mauss appended to the manuscripts that he edited and published after Durkheims death. Footnotes initialed M.T. are my own.
I have also adopted a convention used frequently by Durkheim himself, that of inserting in the text, enclosed within parentheses, key foreign-language words or phrases. Especially where my translation is highly interpretive, where Durkheim gives to an expression an idiosyncratic twist, and where no exact English equivalent exists or quite conveys the full sense of the French, I have called the fact to the readers attention in this manner.
Two of the terms which received this treatment deserve further clarification because each is central to the understanding of several of the essays collected in this volume. The first is the phrase la science sociale. When Durkheim employs the plural, les sciences sociales, his meaning is nearly identical to the English cognate, the social sciences. In the singular, however, the term is usually synonymous with la sociologie, and, indeed, Durkheim, at least in his earliest publications, employs the two expressions interchangeably. This usage is more easily understood when we recall that Durkheims vision of sociology was of a synthetic academic enterprise which would ultimately span the full range of contemporary social sciences by raising their findings to a higher level of generalization than was possible so long as they remained in isolation. When applied in this way, the term bears the almost explicitly Comtian implication that sociology is the social science.
The second expression which merits special mention is the French word conscience. The term figures prominently in his work, especially through the concept of conscience collective on which he relied heavily in his earlier writings. It has long been a subject of debate not merely because of the difficulty of translation but also because its inherent ambiguity contributes to its pivotal significance in the development of Durkheims thought. Here I wish only to consider the issue it has raised for me as translator and to explain and justify the course I have adopted.
The crux of the problem is that the French language makes do with one word where English uses two. Conscience has been rendered by Durkheims English translators as either conscience or consciousness. It is true that the French word corresponds to both these English equivalents. At the same time, it could be said that the French term corresponds to neither of them, and that to select one over the other deprives the translation of some of the essential connotations of the original.
The English word consciousness properly conveys the cognitive element of conscience. Given a forced choice between the two English equivalents, I believe consciousness to be more frequently the correct translation of Durkheims meaning. But consciousness lacks the often equally important emphasis on the normative dimension of conscience.
Conscience, in its current English usage, does convey this normative sense, but all too strongly. In this post-Freudian era, it immediately conjures up images of the constraining inner voice of the super-ego. Such an association, however, runs sharply counter to Durkheims primary purpose. While Freud clearly recognized the social origins of the super-ego, and while Durkheim just as clearly acknowledged that societys moral order had to be thoroughly internalized by properly socialized individuals, the colloquial meaning of conscience has come to be largely psychologists in its application. Durkheim, on the contrary, used conscience to underscore the sense in which a transcendent, externally imposed normative order is the precondition for the individual conscience as such.
The most satisfactory rendering of conscience, in almost all instances, would, I believe, be the phrase moral consciousness. However, not wishing to add to the complexities and confusions which already surround its translation, and since neither simple term would be everywhere appropriate, I have chosen to be inconsistent, employing either conscience or consciousness as the context of Durkheims thought seemed to demand.
Finally, a word of caution is in order because of the inclusion of several book reviews among the pieces collected here. Durkheims style was didactic in the extreme. In composing reviews, it was his habit to provide a lengthy paraphrase of the books main arguments before passing on to his own analytical comments. Unless this synopsis, which was often presented in the declarative voice of the person being reviewed, is clearly differentiated from Durkheims own critical remarks (usually but not always or wholly confined to a brief concluding section), the reader risks the most serious misapprehension of Durkheims true position. The possibility for error is heightened by the fact that Durkheim tended to develop in the early part of the review precisely those ideas he intended to attack most vigorously at the end. To help avoid this sort of confusion I have, where appropriate, inserted extra space at the point at which Durkheim changes voices and begins his personal commentary.