Thomas L. Pangle - The Key Texts of Political Philosophy: An Introduction

What is political philosophy? Why is its study important? And why should political philosophy be introduced as it is in this volume through a sustained encounter with a very few old books, whose authors lived in civic cultures profoundly unlike our own? Why do we not begin from books and thinkers of our own time? How will we get at the problems that are most important for us today through reading long-dead authors? Are not the important issues of politics those that are pressing, urgent, the burning issues of the day? What is in these old books that could be more significant?

The answer is simple. The books that we will be studying embody humanitys most powerful attempts to grapple with the truly fundamental and enduring questions about human existence. What are the ultimate ends or purposes of our lives, as individuals and as political communities? What constitutes human fulfillment and flourishing? Can security, health, prosperity, and entertainment be all that our existence is for? Or must not these goods be understood as, at best, a foundation and means or opportunity, for higher activities and concerns? To speak of the higher is to speak of that which has and bestows dignity ; what is it that gives our existence dignity? What is it that makes this particular life-form a human life deserving of special respect or even reverence? What makes us different in rank from the other animals, so that we feel that we are free to eat and to enslave them, but not our fellow humans?

We express our respect for humanity by speaking of human rights. Respect for human rights is a major dimension of what we call justice, or righteousness. What is the full meaning of justice ? Most obviously, we discern two massive aspects: Justice means distributing to each and every person what is fairly due; including but going beyond the former justice means caring for the common good of society as a whole. On what basis does justice, in both these senses, make a claim on us, as individuals, such that we feel obliged (and we think that others ought to feel obliged) to respect and to care for justice, even or especially when this entails substantial personal cost sometimes even the ultimate sacrifice of ones life? Is not this distinctly human capacity, for deliberately subordinating ones personal good to what one believes to be right, a major dimension of what dignifies human life, as a life that is more than that of a very clever animal? Is justice not a virtue an admirable quality of character, a defining trait of a truly good person and of a healthy soul? But does being just, then, involve not so much self-denial as, instead, self-enhancement: Is being just not a crucial component of ones own truly greatest personal good? Or is there not a puzzle here, at the heart of our conception of the value of justice a puzzle as to the sense in which justice is good, and for whom it is good? Does not a similar puzzle lurk in our conception of the value of other moral virtues, such as courage and generosity or charity? Do not these virtues entail selflessness or self-transcendence, while yet simultaneously being essential to self-realization in full dignity? What exactly does each of these moral virtues entail, and how are they related to one another and to justice? To what extent should the civic common good entail the communal cultivation of these moral virtues?