Guido Gainotti - Emotions and the Right Side of the Brain

In our daily life we are submerged by messages, coming from media and publicity that use the term emotions in relation to different situations, such as cars, money, travels, exhibitions, football, clothing and chocolate, to promise us new and exciting experiences. This undifferentiated and misleading use of the word emotions has forced researchers to give a more precise definition of this term, identifying the semantic traits that define and distinguish it from other similar words. There is not, however, a general consensus among scholars about the definition of this word and the boundaries of the concept of emotions are rather vague and indistinct.

Most authors agree that emotions are rather complex and stereotyped behavioural schemata, characterised by particular types of subjective experience and by an increased activation of the vegetative system. However, there is much less agreement over which behavioural schemata to include in this area and how to demarcate emotions from other behavioural patterns belonging to contiguous but different areas. For instance, two terms such as anger and love, commonly considered as typical examples of emotions in the context of the current meaning of this word, have a different status for theorists of emotions, because anger is commonly considered one of the basic emotions, whereas love is not included in this area. A rough but effective method of differentiating between these more or less similar behavioural patterns could be to identify reference axes and in relation to them to distinguish the schemata that are part of the area of emotions from those that are not. A first reference axis could be the complexity and level of phylogenetic development of the behavioural schema in question. This axis could extend from the stage of simple reflexes to that of cognitive behaviour. On this axis, the emotions would be located at an intermediate level of complexity. On one side they would be differentiated by reflex behaviours (such as sneezing or flinching), which are very simple, primitive and innate behavioural schemata and, on the other side, by cognitive behaviours, with respect to which they are distinguished by lesser complexity due to their automatic (rather than intentional) nature and to the fact that they are anchored to relatively fixed response patterns.

A second reference axis might be based on the duration of the behavioural schema in question. This axis could range from very brief reactions, which are typically triggered by external events (as are the reflex responses we have just mentioned) to long-lasting behavioural schemata, which are stable over time and are not provoked by external stimuli. According to Ekman () acknowledged the close familiarity between emotions, affect and personality traits and agreed that affect is closely related to emotions, but refers to more enduring and less reactive states.