Kean Thomas - The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

THE 9/11
COMMISSION
REPORT

THE 9/11
COMMISSION
REPORT

Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States

OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT EDITION

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ISBN 978-0-16-089180-9

Philip Zelikow, Executive Director

Christopher A. Kojm, Deputy Executive Director

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

Joanne M. Accolla

Staff Assistant

Alexis Albion

Professional Staff Member

Scott H. Allan, Jr.

Counsel

John A. Azzarello

Counsel

Caroline Barnes

Professional Staff Member

Warren Bass

Professional Staff Member

Ann M. Bennett

Information Control Officer

Mark S. Bittinger

Professional Staff Member

Madeleine Blot

Counsel

Antwion M. Blount

Systems Engineer

Sam Brinkley

Professional Staff Member

Geoffrey Scott Brown

Research Assistant

Daniel Byman

Professional Staff Member

Dianna Campagna

Manager of Operations

Samuel M.W. Caspersen

Counsel

Melissa A. Coffey

Staff Assistant

Lance Cole

Consultant

Marquittia L. Coleman

Staff Assistant

Marco A. Cordero

Professional Staff Member

Rajesh De

Counsel

George W. Delgrosso

Investigator

Gerald L. Dillingham

Professional Staff Member

Thomas E. Dowling

Professional Staff Member

Steven M. Dunne

Deputy General Counsel

Thomas R. Eldridge

Counsel

Alice Falk

Editor

John J. Farmer, Jr.

Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Alvin S. Felzenberg

Deputy for Communications

Lorry M. Fenner

Professional Staff Member

Susan Ginsburg

Senior Counsel & Team Leader

T. Graham Giusti

Security Officer

Nicole Marie Grandrimo

Professional Staff Member

Douglas N. Greenburg

Counsel

Barbara A. Grewe

Senior Counsel, Special Projects

Elinore Flynn Hartz

Family Liaison

Leonard R. Hawley

Professional Staff Member

L. Christine Healey

Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Karen Heitkotter

Executive Secretary

Walter T. Hempel II

Professional Staff Member

C. Michael Hurley

Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Dana J. Hyde

Counsel

John W. Ivicic

Security Officer

Michael N. Jacobson

Counsel

Hunter W. Jamerson

Intern

Bonnie D. Jenkins

Counsel

Reginald F. Johnson

Staff Assistant

R.William Johnstone

Professional Staff Member

Stephanie L. Kaplan

Special Assistant & Managing Editor

Miles L. Kara, Sr.

Professional Staff Member

Janice L. Kephart

Counsel

Hyon Kim

Counsel

Katarzyna Kozaczuk

Financial Assistant

Gordon Nathaniel Lederman

Counsel

Daniel J. Leopold

Staff Assistant

Sarah Webb Linden

Professional Staff Member

Douglas J. MacEachin

Professional Staff Member & Team Leader

Ernest R. May

Senior Adviser

Joseph McBride

Intern

James Miller

Professional Staff Member

Kelly Moore

Professional Staff Member

Charles M. Pereira

Professional Staff Member

John Raidt

Professional Staff Member

John Roth

Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Peter Rundlet

Counsel

Lloyd D. Salvetti

Professional Staff Member

Kevin J. Scheid

Professional Staff Member & Team Leader

Kevin Shaeffer

Professional Staff Member

Tracy J. Shycoff

Deputy for Administration & Finance

Dietrich L. Snell

Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Jonathan DeWees Stull

Communications Assistant

Lisa Marie Sullivan

Staff Assistant

Quinn John Tamm, Jr.

Professional Staff Member

Catharine S.Taylor

Staff Assistant

Yoel Tobin

Counsel

Emily Landis Walker

Professional Staff Member & Family Liaison

Garth Wermter

Senior IT Consultant

Serena B.Wille

Counsel

Peter Yerkes

Public Affairs Assistant

W E PRESENT THE NARRATIVE of this report and the recommendations that flow from it to the President of the United States, the United States Congress, and the American people for their consideration. Ten Commissionersfive Republicans and five Democrats chosen by elected leaders from our nations capital at a time of great partisan divisionhave come together to present this report without dissent.

We have come together with a unity of purpose because our nation demands it. September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States. The nation was unprepared. How did this happen, and how can we avoid such tragedy again?

To answer these questions, the Congress and the President created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002).

Our mandate was sweeping. The law directed us to investigate facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including those relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, diplomacy, immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the Commission.

In pursuing our mandate, we have reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries. This included nearly every senior official from the current and previous administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in our mandate.

We have sought to be independent, impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan. From the outset, we have been committed to share as much of our investigation as we can with the American people. To that end, we held 19 days of hearings and took public testimony from 160 witnesses.

Our aim has not been to assign individual blame. Our aim has been to provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned.

We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal. The enemy rallies broad support in the Arab and Muslim world by demanding redress of political grievances, but its hostility toward us and our values is limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world of religious and political pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It makes no distinction between military and civilian targets. Collateral damage is not in its lexicon.

We learned that the institutions charged with protecting our borders, civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave this threat could be, and did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter or defeat it. We learned of fault lines within our governmentbetween foreign and domestic intelligence, and between and within agencies. We learned of the pervasive problems of managing and sharing information across a large and unwieldy government that had been built in a different era to confront different dangers.