National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United - The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Philip Zelikow, Executive Director

Christopher A. Kojm, Deputy Executive Director

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

Joanne M. Accolla
Staff Assistant

Alexis Albion
Professional Staff Member

Scott H. Allan, Jr.
Counsel

John A. Azzarello
Counsel

Caroline Barnes
Professional Staff Member

Warren Bass
Professional Staff Member

Ann M. Bennett
Information Control Officer

Mark S. Bittinger
Professional Staff Member

Madeleine Blot
Counsel

Antwion M. Blount
Systems Engineer

Sam Brinkley
Professional Staff Member

Geoffrey Scott Brown
Research Assistant

Daniel Byman
Professional Staff Member

Dianna Campagna
Manager of Operations

Samuel M.W. Caspersen
Counsel

Melissa A. Coffey
Staff Assistant

Lance Cole
Consultant

Marquittia L. Coleman
Staff Assistant

Marco A. Cordero
Professional Staff Member

Rajesh De
Counsel

George W. Delgrosso
Investigator

Gerald L. Dillingham
Professional Staff Member

Thomas E. Dowling
Professional Staff Member

Steven M. Dunne
Deputy General Counsel

Thomas R. Eldridge
Counsel

Alice Falk
Editor

John J. Farmer, Jr.
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Alvin S. Felzenberg
Deputy for Communications

Lorry M. Fenner
Professional Staff Member

Susan Ginsburg
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

T. Graham Giusti
Security Officer

Nicole Marie Grandrimo
Professional Staff Member

Douglas N. Greenburg
Counsel

Barbara A. Grewe
Senior Counsel, Special Projects

Elinore Flynn Hartz
Family Liaison

Leonard R. Hawley
Professional Staff Member

L. Christine Healey
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Karen Heitkotter
Executive Secretary

Walter T. Hempel II
Professional Staff Member

C. Michael Hurley
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Dana J. Hyde
Counsel

John W. Ivicic
Security Officer

Michael N. Jacobson
Counsel

Hunter W. Jamerson
Intern

Bonnie D. Jenkins
Counsel

Reginald F. Johnson
Staff Assistant

R. William Johnstone
Professional Staff Member

Stephanie L. Kaplan
Special Assistant & Managing Editor

Miles L. Kara, Sr.
Professional Staff Member

Janice L. Kephart
Counsel

Hyon Kim
Counsel

Katarzyna Kozaczuk
Financial Assistant

Gordon Nathaniel Lederman
Counsel

Daniel J. Leopold
Staff Assistant

Sarah Webb Linden
Professional Staff Member

Douglas J. MacEachin
Professional Staff Member & Team Leader

Ernest R. May
Senior Adviser

Joseph McBride
Intern

James Miller
Professional Staff Member

Kelly Moore
Professional Staff Member

Charles M. Pereira
Professional Staff Member

John Raidt
Professional Staff Member

John Roth
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Peter Rundlet
Counsel

Lloyd D. Salvetti
Professional Staff Member

Kevin J. Scheid
Professional Staff Member & Team Leader

Kevin Shaeffer
Professional Staff Member

Tracy J. Shycoff
Deputy for Administration & Finance

Dietrich L. Snell
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Jonathan DeWees Stull
Communications Assistant

Lisa Marie Sullivan
Staff Assistant

Quinn John Tamm, Jr.
Professional Staff Member

Catharine S. Taylor
Staff Assistant

Yoel Tobin
Counsel

Emily Landis Walker
Professional Staff Member & Family Liaison

Garth Wermter
Senior IT Consultant

Serena B. Wille
Counsel

Peter Yerkes
Public Affairs Assistant

W E PRESENT THE NARRATIVE of this report and the recommendations that flow from it to the President of the United States, the United States Congress, and the American people for their consideration. Ten Commissionersfive Republicans and five Democrats chosen by elected leaders from our nations capital at a time of great partisan divisionhave come together to present this report without dissent.

We have come together with a unity of purpose because our nation demands it. September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States. The nation was unprepared. How did this happen, and how can we avoid such tragedy again?

To answer these questions, the Congress and the President created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002).

Our mandate was sweeping. The law directed us to investigate facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including those relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, diplomacy, immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the Commission.

In pursuing our mandate, we have reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries. This included nearly every senior official from the current and previous administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in our mandate.

We have sought to be independent, impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan. From the outset, we have been committed to share as much of our investigation as we can with the American people. To that end, we held 19 days of hearings and took public testimony from 160 witnesses.

Our aim has not been to assign individual blame. Our aim has been to provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned.

We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal. The enemy rallies broad support in the Arab and Muslim world by demanding redress of political grievances, but its hostility toward us and our values is limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world of religious and political pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It makes no distinction between military and civilian targets. Collateral damage is not in its lexicon.

We learned that the institutions charged with protecting our borders, civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave this threat could be, and did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter or defeat it. We learned of fault lines within our governmentbetween foreign and domestic intelligence, and between and within agencies. We learned of the pervasive problems of managing and sharing information across a large and unwieldy government that had been built in a different era to confront different dangers.

At the outset of our work, we said we were looking backward in order to look forward. We hope that the terrible losses chronicled in this report can create something positivean America that is safer, stronger, and wiser. That September day, we came together as a nation. The test before us is to sustain that unity of purpose and meet the challenges now confronting us.