A
DETAILED ACCOUNT
OF THE
BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ
BY
THE AUSTRIAN MAJOR-GENERAL
STUTTERHEIM
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
BY
MAJOR PINE COFFIN
ASSISTANT QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL TO THE BRITISH ARMY
This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING
Text originally published in 1807 under the same title.
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Publishers Note
Although in most cases we have retained the Authors original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern readers benefit.
A
DETAILED ACCOUNT
OF THE
BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ,
BY THE
AUSTRIAN MAJOR-GENERAL,
STUTTERHEIM.
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
BY
MAJOR PINE COFFIN,
ASSISTANT QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL TO THE BRITISHARMY.
Tout cela, prouve, quil y a beaucoup dhommes, capables de faire manuvrer quinze a ving mille hommes, et quil en est peu, qui puissent tirer tout le par possible, dune arme de quatre-vingt mille hommes.
Note par un officier Franais.
TO THE PUBLIC
The fatal consequences that resulted from the battle of Austerlitz, to the cause of Europe, and of humanity, render it an object of too deep an interest with the statesman and the soldier to make an apology requisite for introducing to the public, what may be considered as the Austrian official account of that action. It is hardly probable, that, under a government so constituted as that of Austria, a general officer would have ventured to publish the particulars of an action, in which he himself bore a conspicuous part, (at least with his name attached to it) unless he felt himself sanctioned by the highest authority in so doing.
However that may be, the work bears evident internal marks of authenticity, while the events daily passing under our eyes, with such dazzling, and unprecedented rapidity, give an additional interest to the cause which has been productive of such direful effects.
Scarcely have twelve months elapsed since this disastrous battle was fought, and already have we seen new dynasties created, and the proudest empires levelled in the dust.
We have seen one of the most powerful monarchies of Europe, whether it be considered as to its military resources, or its well replenished treasury; as to its well disciplined army, or the glorious recollection of its past achievements: we have seen the armies of Prussia, which were wont to be considered as the patterns of military excellence, dissipated and annihilated, like chaff before the wind, by the well-trained legions of the modern Alexander.
The present state of Europe affords ample scope to the reflections of the statesman. For, though the soldier may account for the loss of a battle, by reasoning on what was done, and what was left undone, the subjugation of states is to be looked for in causes far remote from the scene of action. These are times which not only require superiority of intellect in those who govern, but the conviction on, the part of the governed , that they are not mere spectators of the fray; that it is not a mere squabble for power; but that the happiness of each individual, that the preservation of all he holds most dear, in short, that the liberties of his country are at stake, and depend upon the issue of the contest.
Has this been, or could it be , the feeling of those nations of the Continent we have seen overrun?
In the answer to this simple question, we may perhaps find the real cause of all the disasters of the coalition, and subject of much contemplation for ourselves. The cloud which has been long gathering over Europe has begun to burst; we have seen the storm fall where least expected, and bury whole empires, and their people, in one common ruin. When the demon of destruction is abroad, let us not be unmindful of ourselves. Are we better prepared than our neighbours? Have we more skilful generals, or less intriguing politicians? I fear not. It is then only to the people we can look, in the day of trial; and I trust there is yet enough left of the genuine spirit of the constitution, and of the native valour of Britons, to make every man fed his country is worth contending for. The moment that ceases to be the case, our independence as a nation is virtually gone ; and, though our empire may drag on a precarious existence for few years, it will fall, inevitably fall, at no distant period.
I have been inadvertently led into a train of reflection, which some persons may think not quite compatible with the character of a soldier. Against this opinion, I beg leave to enter my protest. I have always considered the superiority of the French troops over those of the continent, as the result of their individual intelligence; arising in a great degree from the habit of every Frenchman, to discuss whatever topic comes under his notice; and it is quite unnecessary for me to remark, that the powers of the mind only I themselves in proportion as they are called into action. Let us hear no more then of soldiers being mere machines. The absurdity of the doctrine is too palpable to need refutation.
I ought perhaps to assign some reason for having undertaken a labour, to which I may appear so very unequal. It was to relieve my mind from constantly dwelling on a subject of disappointment, which still weighs but too heavily on my spirits; and which I hoped to alleviate, though it cannot be removed by occupation. Personal vanity had no share whatever in it, and if I have not concealed my name, it has been because I hoped to disarm the severity of criticism by avowing it. Much will not be expected from one, who embraced the profession of arms at a very early period, and whose ambition, from a child, has been military and. Not literary reputation. All that I can flatter myself with having succeeded in, is, the rendering the sense of the author, in terms plain and intelligible. For elegance of style, and flowing periods, the public may look to a Hutchinson, but not to soldiers in general.
JOHN PINE COFFIN.
P.S. It was my original intention to have annexed a good map to this work, on which, the reader might be enabled satisfactorily to follow the operations with his eye;but having in vain ransacked the shops of London, without being able to procure a map of Moravia on a scale sufficiently large to make it of any use; and, in fact, without finding any that was better than Chauchards, which is woefully deficient, both in the names of villages, and in geographical accuracy; I have been induced to publish the Battle of Austerlitz without this advantage. My principal motive for so doing has been the persuasion, that a bad map could be of very little use; and that it would enhance the expense to such a degree, as to place the work beyond the reach of many military men; while others may be already in possession of as good, or better information than I could furnish them with. To those, however, who do not already possess a map of Moravia, I would recommend that published by Covens and Mortier, at Amsterdam; not as the best possible map, but as the least defective I have seen. But, I have great doubts whether this is to be procured in England.
