Matthew Benns - The Men Who Killed Qantas

Qantas never crashes

Rain Man

He was wrong

Macarthur Job, air-crash investigator

T HE Q ANTAS B OEING 747-438 aircraft had begun its descent from 35,000 feet and was still 70 kilometres from Bangkoks Don Muang airport when the captain pointed out the buildup of cumulonimbus cloud ahead. His comment would later be one of many picked up on the cockpit voice recorder and examined by investigators as they pieced together what went wrong on Qantas Flight 1 on 23 September 1999.

The flight crew of QF1, with 391 passengers on board, had transferred to the Bangkok Approach frequency and had been told there was heavy rain at the airport. At the planes controls, the first officer suggested to the captain they could hold off to the south if the rain looked bad during the approach. Well-respected Qantas training officer Captain Jack Fried

But it wasnt. At Bangkok a torrential thunderstorm had reduced visibility to 1,500 metres and sluiced the ungrooved runway with a potentially fatal sheen of water. This, combined with cost-cutting measures and a number of poor management decisions within Qantas over previous years, had set the scene for disaster for the airlines signature Sydney to London flight.

In the cockpit the three flight crew had completed the approach checklist. Sitting behind the captain in the second observers seat and watching the drama unfold was the second officers wife. In keeping with standard procedure, the crew changed radio frequency to Bangkok Arrivals as they descended to 2,500 feet. Three minutes ahead of them the crew on board the Rome-bound Qantas Flight 15 noted a cluster of well-defined storm cells over the airport as they too prepared to land. Three minutes and 20 seconds ahead of the Rome flight, a Thai Airbus 330 was on the final approach to the rain-slicked runway. It touched down without incident, but as it howled to a standstill, a special weather observation at the airport noted the visual range on the runway the distance the pilot can still see the runway markings was down to 750 metres. The arrivals controller did not pass on this information to the crew of QF1.

On the flight deck of QF1 things were getting busy. The Royal Australian Air Force-trained second officer tuned in to the Qantas frequency and listened to a conversation between the Qantas ground engineer and the company agent. The engineer said it was raining quite heavily. The second officer, secure in the knowledge that the other pilots knew it was raining heavily, did not pass on the information. Ahead of them QF15 was on its final approach. At 700 feet above the ground it started raining. At 500 feet the rain became so heavy the Rome-bound crew could no longer see the runway lights. At 250 feet the pilot pulled out, powering up the engines and taking the plane around for another attempt.

QF1 had not reached its final approach point and was not tuned in to the tower radio frequency, so heard none of the conversations between QF15 and the tower. The crew had no idea that just ahead of them their fellow Australians had decided conditions were too difficult to risk a landing. Instead, they extended the landing gear and the 36-year-old first officer disengaged the autopilot. The control tower informed them: Caution runway wet and braking action reported by Airbus three three is good. The crew assumed the Thai Airbus had been immediately in front of them and that this was the most up-to-date information available. They completed their landing checklist, confirming the speedbrakes were armed and selecting flaps 25 for landing.

At this point no one on the plane had any idea that they were just minutes from disaster. The 16 cabin crew and 391 passengers were strapped into their seats and preparing for a routine night landing at just before 11 pm local time. But in the cockpit the first signs that all was not well were beginning to appear. Flying in the plane manually, the first officer commented to his colleagues that the jet doesnt want to slow down. Sitting next to him, 49-year-old Captain Fried noted that, at 307 kilometres per hour, the approach was above the 285 kph target speed but was decreasing and was within the company limits. They could see the runway lights ahead of them. He felt the situation was under control. The jet descended into light rain and at 350 feet the first officer called for the windscreen wipers to be turned on. But as the plane dropped to 200 feet the rain got heavier. The runway lights appeared only briefly as the wipers passed over the windscreen before the torrential downpour obscured them again. Anxious, the first and second officers exclaimed that it was the heaviest rain they had ever experienced on approach to landing. The aircraft had also drifted above the Instrument Landing System glideslope that guides an aircraft onto the tarmac. Youre getting high now, Captain Fried warned the first officer.