Kagan - The Archidamian War

The Archidamian War

DONALD KAGAN

Cornell University Press

ITHACA AND LONDON

For Myrna

Preface

This book is a sequel to The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and is part of a general history of that war which will require another volume or two to complete. The subject has not been treated on a large scale since the turn of the century; the important scholarship that has intervened and the continued interest in the war amply justify an attempt at a new history.

The present volume deals with the first ten years, the Archidamian War. That struggle, beginning in 431, deserves a volume of its own, for to contemporaries it appeared to be a war complete in itself. Only hindsight and the special perception of Thucydides placed it, together with the diplomatic maneuverings of the Peace of Nicias in 421 and with the events from the resumption of hostility after the Sicilian expedition to the surrender of Athens in 404, as a single war of twenty-seven years and separated it from the war between the Peloponnesians and Athenians of 461445. The Archidamian War, moreover, was the war planned by the Peloponnesian and Athenian strategists, and so the one that tested their skill and prescience. Because the conditions and character of the war could be foreseen, as far as such things are ever predictable, it is possible to make some judgment of the wisdom of each policy and the effectiveness of its execution. The main purpose of this volume, however, is to attempt a general history of the Greek states in their conduct of the war that does justice to military, political, diplomatic, and economic developments and shows how closely they were related.

My views about the use of ancient sources other than Thucydides, the interpretation of the speeches in Thucydides, and the problem of the composition of his history remain those I set forth in the Preface to The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Since these matters remain controversial, I have argued for my opinion at appropriate places in this volume.

I have chosen to organize the book annalistically, as Thucydides organizes his. This method has shortcomings, for which Thucydides has been reproached. It leads to the artificial division of continuing events and prevents their most effective presentation; it may lead to repetition or confusion. I have consciously run these risks in an attempt to avoid the paralyzing force of hindsight, to present the events in the contexts in which they appear to the participants. I hope in that way to emphasize the choices open to them and their lack of any sense of predestination. I hope the gain in immediacy and reality will offset the loss in fluidity and grace.

Most readers will quickly recognize my debt to three great German historians, Georg Busolt, K. J. Beloch, and Eduard Meyer, and of these my debt to the wise, sober, and judicious Busolt is the heaviest. Among the scores of modern historians who have helped to shape my knowledge and understanding of the period, I must single out for special mention A. W. Gomme and the continuators of his splendid commentary on Thucydides, A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover; also Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, whose fine edition of the Greek inscriptions has done so much for historians, and B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, whose publication of The Athenian Tribute Lists initiated an era in the study of Greek history.

I am grateful to B. M. W. Knox and to Ronald P. Legon for reading the manuscript and for their encouragement. Thanks are due also to the two anonymous publishers readers, who made many valuable suggestions and helped to eliminate a number of errors. I also want to thank Janalyn Gibb for typing the manuscript and John Hale for helping to prepare the maps. Finally, I wish to express my thanks to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to Yale University for providing me with time to complete this volume.

D ONALD K AGAN

New Haven, Connecticut

Contents

Maps

Abbreviations and Short Titles

1. Plans and Resources

In the spring of 431 a band of more than three hundred Thebans, under cover of darkness, launched a surprise attack on the neighboring city of Plataea. Because Thebes was an ally of Sparta and the Plataeans were allied to Athens, this action was an open breach of the Thirty Years Peace of 445. So began the great Peloponnesian War, which lasted, with several interruptions, for twenty-seven years. Since ancient times the first ten years of the great war, concluded by the Peace of Nicias in 421, have been regarded as a unit and called, after the name of the Spartan king who led its early campaigns, the Archidamian War.

Examination of the Archidamian War as a unit apart from the events that followed is useful and revealing. Although many surprises took place in the decade of its course, the war was fought essentially within the framework established by those who embarked on it. Departures from the original strategies were necessary, but none compared with the great changes that followed the Peace of Nicias. The sending of an Athenian army into the heart of the Peloponnese in 418, the invasion of Sicily, the shift of the center of warfare from the mainland to the Aegean and the Hellespont, all were unforeseen by the men who began the war. They could not have anticipated what happened after 421, when conditions and personnel presented a completely new situation. Although most of the events of the Archidamian War itself do not in retrospect seem entirely surprising, it is interesting for us to ask how well the several states and their leaders anticipated the course of action. How promising were the strategies followed by each side? Did the Athenians and Spartans estimation of the situation in 431 justify their decisions to run the risks of war?