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Conqueror and Administrator: Civil and Military Actions of Marshal Louis-Gabriel Suchet in the Spanish Province of Aragon, 1808-1813.
By
Major Jean-Philippe Rollet, French Troupes de Marine.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
Executive Summary
Thesis: During the Peninsular War in Spain from 1808 to 1813, Marshal Suchet not only successfully fought the Spanish Guerillas but he also skilfully administrated the province of Aragon. He made it a relatively safe and prosperous place for his troops, while the rest of Spain became a nightmarish quagmire for the French occupiers.
Discussion: In early 1808, Napoleon, under the pretext of a dispute between the Spanish King Charles IV and his son Ferdinand, invaded Spain. His troops were at first greeted as liberators by the populace, who wanted to be rid of King Charles Prime Minister Manuel de Godoy. As it became clearer that Napoleons intentions were to take control of the Spanish kingdom and to crown his own brother, Joseph, as King, the people of Spain revolted. This marked the nascence of the guerrillas which would become, in addition to the British expeditionary corps of Lord Wellington, the French armys worst enemy. Nationalistic and religious fanaticism from the Spanish insurgents responded to the cultural misunderstanding and the violent repression by the French.
Appointed the governor of the insurgency-troubled province of Aragon after he had seized its main cities, Marshal Suchet skilfully adopted a balanced policy mixing strong military action and economic reforms to regenerate the local economy. He also adopted political measures aimed at restoring the appearance of a Spanish sovereignty. At the operational level, Suchet restored the discipline of III Corps and developed a network of strong places that ensured a French armed presence throughout the region while relying on highly mobile autonomous units to chase the guerrillas in their strongholds. An astute economist, he succeeded in developing the local economy, while also establishing a mutual beneficial relationship between his troops and the populace. Politically and culturally aware of the Spanish situation, he utilized the specificities of the Aragonese people to thwart the influence of the guerrilla leaders. He eventually established a flexible policy based on a mix of benevolence and coercion. During his administration, Aragon remained a relatively safe place, with a sustainable economy and, above all, one where the French soldiers and the population could mix and establish contacts.
Conclusion: In the overall French defeat of the war in Spain, Louis Gabriel Suchet set the example of an open-minded military leader. Although the Peninsular War remains one of the worst episodes of the Napoleonic era, his administration of Aragon was a success amidst overall failure. Given the recent experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it is of high importance for military leaders to read about Marshal Suchet. A precursor in stabilization operations, he faced conditions mostly similar to the ones NATO troops are, and will be, facing in the coming years. He responded to this form of conflict with an open mind and the diverse elements of national power.
PREFACE
At a time when stabilization operations have arguably become the most problematic part of 21 st century conflicts, many western armies look for answers in their recent past experiences. In that regard, the decolonization wars offer interesting paradigms which are all the more appealing as they offer tactical procedures applicable to contemporary small wars. However, seldom do military leaders look back at conflicts of other eras, which often are more similar to what our armed forces are facing today.
Similarly, inter-agency cooperation has now become a recurring theme. It is looked at as a kind of holy Grail, insofar as everybody foresees the alleged miracles it is likely to achieve. A caveat, however, should be noted: most military actors on the ground doubt it will ever be found. This poses the question of how to concentrate the benefits of interagency effects with only military agents being on the ground.
Guerilla warfare has often been despised by professional soldiers who, by trade, are more inclined to fight conventional conflicts. The French Peninsular War in Spain, from 1808 to 1814, was no exception. Facing an elusive Spanish guerilla foe, the majority of the French officers responded to ideologically inspired violence by violent retaliatory actions. Misunderstanding the mix of religious and nationalistic hatred inspiring the Spanish people, they often applied purely military and coercive solutions. Such an approach turned out to be inefficient and often escalated the opposition against them. Some officers, however, had a better understanding of the dynamics of the guerilla. They intuitively understood that, for the occupying force, the only way to maintain a fragile peace was to interact with the populace in a long term effort to win the hearts, or at least the minds.
One of them, an atypical officer in many regards, obtained outstanding results by using every instruments of governmental power at his own level of responsibility. Marshal Louis Gabriel Suchet was simultaneously an imaginative warfighter, a skillful administrator, and a cunning politician. He knew he could not expect any other support from his government, hence he had to develop a policy based on his personal expertise and assessment of the situation. This study intends to show how Marshal Suchet built a comprehensive understanding of the insurgency, and how he responded to it as a military administrator rather than as a pure military operational leader. This paper is, therefore, a modest contribution to the debate on interagency operations. The conclusion is that properly trained military leaders can be self-sufficient when it comes to fighting insurgencies using the entire scope of instruments of power, not just the military option of force.
Available sources consist for the most part of primary sources, among which are Suchet and Wellingtons own memoirs. Understandably, these sources often present the risk of being driven by the desire of their authors to justify their own action or to discredit their enemys achievements. However, there seems to be a consensus on the efficiency of Suchets administration of Aragon. The secondary sources fall into the contemporary writers, who analyzed the Spanish campaign in the late 19 th century, and modern authors who reviewed the campaign with an attempt to draw conclusions applicable to the current conflicts. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the patient and benevolent guidance provided by Doctor Donald Bittner, who mentored me throughout the work and provided critical instructions. I am also indebted to Mrs. Louella OHerlihy-Yorke, who had the patience to correct my written English and who made it intelligible. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Maud, and my children, Jean-Baptiste, Anne-Galle, Pierre-Antoine and Franois-Xavier, for letting me take on already restricted family time to write this paper.
