Bertjan Verbeek - Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader

This book puts forward three major claims. First, decision-making in Great Britain during the Suez crisis of 1956 was concentrated in the hands of a small group of policy-makers, who met in different organizational settings. Throughout the crisis the group would sometimes meet as part of the full Cabinet. At different instances, it would gather as the so-called Egypt Committee. On other occasions different members of the group would convene informally. Second, the deliberations of this small group of policy-makers failed to meet important procedural criteria of high quality decision-making. This failure contributed to what in the literature generally is considered a policy fiasco: the Anglo-French bombing of Egypt and invasion of the area of the Suez Canal in October-November 1956. Small group dynamics, including the leadership style of Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, constitute the major explanation of the group's poor performance. Moreover, parts of the contents of the group's decisions are related to its common perspective on Anglo-American relations regarding the Middle East and to the Prime Minister's individual beliefs regarding the conduct of international affairs. Third, the institutional setting of the British political system is conducive to promoting the impact of small groups and their leader on decision-making, especially in crisis situations. The hierarchy between Prime Minister, Senior Ministers, Junior Ministers, and backbenchers threatens the quality of decision-making, within the full Cabinet as well as in special bodies like the Egypt Committee.