Major Danny M. Davis - Airborne Deep Operational Maneuver

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Text originally published in 1989 under the same title.

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AIRBORNE DEEP OPERATIONAL MANEUVER: EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS FOR THE USE OF AIRBORNE FORCES IN MODERN CAMPAIGNS

BY

MAJ DANNY M. DAVIS, USA.

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER

The purpose of this paper is to answer two questions. The first question is: Is it feasible to use airborne forces to penetrate enemy airspace and to conduct a vertical envelopment to effect deep operational maneuver? If it is feasible, what are the employment options available for the use of such an airborne force in the conduct of a modern military campaign? To examine these questions, the paper begins with some definitions to provide a common frame of reference. The use of airborne forces in World War II is next examined to determine if the use of airborne forces to effect deep operational maneuver is historically feasible. Next, the contemporary threat is discussed as it is relevant to the employment of airborne forces in a modern context. Next, the feasibility of the use of airborne forces with some limitations to conduct deep operational maneuver is established in the context of the maneuver, firepower, and protection aspects of the combat power model. Next, the theory of deep operations and the use of airborne forces to conduct these kinds of deep maneuvers is examined in the theories of Clausewitz, Jomini, Tukhachevskiy, Triandafillov, and Simpkin. Next, six employment options for the use of airborne forces to conduct deep operations in a modern context are deduced. They are: (1) an airborne force can be used to create a second front within a theater of operations; (2) an airborne force can be used to operationally contain an enemy force targeted for destruction within a theater of operations; (3) an airborne force can be used to seize a bridgehead-equivalent for anticipated operational pauses in a campaign within a theater of operations; (4) an airborne force can conduct coups de main against high value targets within a theater of operations; (5) an airborne force can conduct light operations in a theater of operations to disrupt and disorganize the enemys rear facilities and networks and have a cumulative operational impact; and (6) an airborne force can conduct expeditionary operations to achieve political, strategic, and operational aims. Finally, the paper briefly examines the future implications for equipping an airborne force and planning airborne deep operational maneuver.

With the renewed emphasis on the operational level of war in the Armys FM 100-5, the discussion of operational maneuver and operational depth has taken on new urgency. In addition, given the strategic environment, the political context, and the global scope and multiple nature of the threat against the United States, the American policy-makers have found that they increasingly need a rapidly deployable force to deter hostile action against our interests. This force must be strategically mobile and must be flexible enough to be employed in a low-, mid-, or high-intensity environment. Further, this force must be capable of conducting operational maneuver within a theater of operations. It seems that an airborne division might be an ideal force to effect such maneuver to operational depths. Indeed, when General Kurt Student was forming and training airborne units for use in World War II, he said that he saw [his] task [to be] developing the parachute and air-landing troops gradually into an instrument of operational, even battle deciding significance. {1} Some of the airborne operations of World War II appear to validate General Students high hopes.

If there exist examples of airborne maneuver to operational depths in the World War II environment, it would seem that such maneuvers should still be viable. However, the strategic environment, the nature of the threat, and the trends of modern technology have altered the context in which airborne maneuver must be conducted. So the questions become: is airborne maneuver still feasible and, if so, under what conditions is it still feasible?

If airborne maneuver is still feasible, the questions become: what are the theoretical principles for the conduct of deep operations and how does airborne maneuver fit into that existing body of theory?

If airborne maneuver is still feasible and is supported by sound, logical military theory, then one should be able to deduce some doctrinal employment options for the use of airborne forces to maneuver to operational depths.

Finally, where there is a gap between theory and practice, one should be able to deduce implications for doctrine, force development, and training. But, before any of these questions can be addressed, the terms of the discourse must be established.

Clausewitz said that maneuver creates an effect out of nothing by using the mistakes into which the enemy can be lured... It is in fact a play of balanced forces whose aim is to bring about favorable conditions for success and then to use them to gain an advantage over the enemy. {2} For Jomini, maneuver in the art of war consisted of bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force. {3} Further, decisive points were decisive because the characteristics of the terrain on which they were located conferred a distinct advantage relative to an enemy within the theater of operations (geographic decisive points) or because of their temporary relation to moving enemy forces (accidental points of maneuver). {4}

FM 100-5 defines maneuver as the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage. {5} Further, operational maneuver seeks a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign. It attempts to gain advantage of position before battle and to exploit tactical successes to achieve operational results. {6}

All of these definitions imply that operational maneuver is relational to an enemy force, and it occurs in a theater of operations. Maneuver implies movement using terrain and/or fires. Further, operational maneuver implies maneuver that has operational or decisive results.

This raises the question of what is operational? Again FM 100-5 defines operational art as the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. {7} This definition implies that the term operational connotes a larger scope in the dimensions of time, space, and forces. Operational art entails a longer time period, a larger space, and generally larger forces than tactics does. However, the key is the result , the intended effect, the object of the action. If an action furthers the attainment of a strategic goal, then it is operational.