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Text originally published in 1997 under the same title.
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Transport Helicopters: The Achilles Heel of Maneuver Warfare
by
Major Joel P. Kane, United States Marine Corps
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Thesis: The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) cannot effectively conduct operational level maneuver against a medium to high intensity threat with its current mix of assault transport helicopters.
Discussion: FMFM 1 describes the Marine Corps' doctrine on warfighting. Using the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the Marines hope to conduct maneuver warfare in the littorals of the globe. This paper reviews the concept of maneuver warfare and examines the ability of current Marine transport helicopter assets to support this concept. The paper also looks at the threat which faces today's helicopter borne forces and the future potential of Heliborne forces to support the concept of maneuver against the threat. Historical examples are cited to illuminate the threat and reiterate the logistical sustainment requirements inherent in maneuver warfare.
Conclusions: The future of Marine Corps rotary wing aviation is not bright. Even support of rear area operations on a linear battlefield is questionable after the year 2005. The Marine Corps cannot conduct operational level maneuver warfare (as advertised in FMFM 1) with its current and projected inventory of transport rotor craft.
Introduction
Marine Corps' publication FMFM 1 describes Marine Corps doctrine on warfighting. In very broad terms, chapter 4 of Warfighting attempts to identify the challenges and realities of the modern battlefield. Marine Corps' doctrine attempts to exploit the time-competitive rhythm of war, generating and exploiting superior tempo and velocity in an uncertain, chaotic, fluid environment. {1} The Marine Corps employs a combined arms team to generate the combat power needed to succeed in this environment. This combined arms team is the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).The largest deployable MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The MEF is normally employed as a maneuver element for a larger Joint Task Force (JTF).
Like the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps selected maneuver warfare as its warfighting philosophy. In theory, the MEF Commander could be a JTF Commander and could conduct operational level maneuver with his MEF and any other assigned forces. Unfortunately, the MEF can not effectively conduct operational maneuver against a medium to high intensity threat with its current mix of assault transport helicopters. Simply stated, the Marine Corps transport helicopter fleet is not capable of supporting maneuver warfare as envisioned in FMFM 1 or Forward... From the Sea. Based upon the current Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) and the current Marine Aviation Plan, our transport helicopters will remain the Achilles Heel of maneuver warfare in the 21st Century.
This paper will review operational level maneuver and will examine our current transport helicopter fleet and the ability of these helicopters to support maneuver warfare. It will also review the threats which faced helicopter maneuver forces in the latter half of this century. The purpose of this historical examination is to establish the premise that heliborne forces could not and did not conduct classic operational level maneuver because of the threats they faced. In light of this (premise), current maneuver doctrine will not change the fact that history has shown helicopters to be impotent against a formidable air threat. This paper will also examine the current threat to our rotary winged fleet and the ability of our current transport helicopters to counter these threats in a maneuver warfare scenario.
What is Operational Maneuver?
JCS Pub.1-02 defines maneuver as:
Maneuver - (DoD, NATO) ... Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. {2}
Therefore, operational maneuver is the movement of operational level (sized) forces to gain a position of advantage over the enemy. The term operational is used here as a reference to the level of war (vice strategic or tactical). The Marine Corps considers the MEF as its smallest operational unit while the Army considers a Corps as its base operational unit. FM100-15 defines a Corps as the largest tactical unit in the U.S. Army and as the link between the operational and tactical level of war. {3}
The Operational Commander conducts or orchestrates operational maneuver in order to position his forces to overwhelm the enemy. Napoleon was a master of operational maneuver:
Historians often find the supreme model for maneuver warfare in the campaigns of Napoleon, and with good reason. The endless combinations and recombinations by which he employed his corps d'armee , alternately disbursing them in order to carry out operational movements and bringing them together to confront the enemy, has never been equaled. {4}
The modern Marine Expeditionary Force has not (to date) been employed as an independent maneuver force in a major regional conflict. {5} While global warfare is not envisioned in the current national military strategy of the United States, those who argue that the Marine Corps can conduct operational level maneuver simply do not appreciate the magnitude of the term operational. Moreover, under the current two Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) strategy, the Marine Corps will undoubtedly function as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF). In any of the envisioned MRC's, a MEF would be a maneuver element for the JTF Commander (the operational level commander). Therefore, the preponderance of maneuver undertaken by the MEF will occur at the t actical level (division and below).
Historically, operational maneuver has always involved army or corps sized units. One need only examine Operation Barbarossa, Germany's Campaign in Russia during 1941, to get an appreciation for the size of the forces involved. This operation had three army groups (117 divisions) in action. Army Group North (Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb) had 26 divisions, including three armored and three motorized divisions. Army Group Center (Field Marshal Fedor von Bock) had 50 divisions, including nine armored and six motorized divisions. Army Group South (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) had 41 divisions, including five armored and three motorized divisions. These totals do not include 16 divisions held in reserve at the beginning of the operation!
