Major Thomas A. Bruno USMC - Ignoring the Obvious: Combined Arms and Fire and Maneuver Tactics Prior to World War I

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IGNORINGTHEOBVIOUS:COMBINEDARMSAND

FIRE&MANEUVERTACTICSPRIORTOWORLD

WARI

by

MajorThomasA.Bruno,UnitedStatesMarineCorps

TABLEOFCONTENTS

Contents

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Thesis

Fairly or unfairly, the stalemate on the First World Wars Western Front is often

attributedtotheintellectualstagnationoftheerasmilitaryofficers.Thispapertracesthe

development(orabsenceofdevelopment)ofcombinedarmsand fire&maneuvertactics

anddoctrineintheperiodpriortoWWI,focusingontheRusso-JapaneseWar.

Discussion

The Western armies that entered the Great War seemingly ignored many of the hard

learned lessons and observations of pre-war conflicts. Though World War I armies were

later credited with developing revolutionary wartime tactical-level advances, many

scholarsclaimthatthisphaseoftacticalevolutionfollowedanearlierperiodofintellectual

stagnationthatresultedinthestalemateonthewarsWesternFront.Thisstalemate,they

claim, could have been avoided by heeding the admonitions of pre-war conflicts and

incorporatingtheburgeoningeffectsoftechnologyintomilitarytacticsanddoctrine.Some

goevenfurtherandfaultthemilitaryleadershipwithincompetenceandfoolishnessfornot

adaptingtotherequirementsofmodernwar.

TheRusso-JapaneseWarshowedthenecessityforcombinedarmstechniquesand fire

andmaneuvertacticsonthemodernbattlefield.Specifically,thewarshowedtheneedfor:

(1)theadoptionofdispersed,irregular(non-linear)formations;(2)theemploymentof fire

andmaneuvertechniquesandsmallunit-tactics,including baseoffiretechniques;(3)the

transitiontoindirect-fireartillerysupporttoensurethesurvivabilityofthebatteries,and;

(4) the necessity for combined arms tactics to increase the survivability of assaulting

infantryandcompensateforthedispersionofinfantryfirepower.

However,deeplyingrainedconcernsoverthelossofcontrolonthebattlefieldandfaith

intheabilityofmoraletoovercomefirepowerpreventedthefullrealizationofadvanced

combined arms techniques and fire and maneuver tactics. Instead, the lessons of the

Russo-JapaneseWarweredisregardedorminimized.

Conclusions

Military leaders did not ignore the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War. In fact, the

ramifications of increased firepower and rudimentary techniques of fire and maneuver

tactics were addressed in most nations pre-World War I doctrine. Unfortunately, these

concepts were not fully developed or practiced due to a failure to recognize a change to

thefundamentalnatureofwarfareitself.Massivefirepowernecessitatedanewsystemof

warfare. To effect this type of transformation, the entire military cultureequipment,

doctrine, organization, and leadership would have to evolve. Lamentably, the hard

earned lessons of the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars had not prompted such a

reformation.ItwouldtakethecataclysmoftheFirstWorldWartoactasacatalystforthis

transformation.

Insummary,mostmilitaryofficersrecognizedthelethalityofmodernweaponryprior

to the First World War but consciously decided that offensive spirit and morale could

overwhelmfirepower.

bulletsquicklywritenewtactics. LieutenantGeneralWilhelmBalck,1922

Our long garrison life has spoiled us, and effeminacy and desire for and love of pleasure, have weakened our militaryvirtues.TheentirenationmustpassthroughtheSchoolofMisfortune,andweshalleitherdieinthecrises,ora better condition will be created, after we have suffered bitter misery, and after our bones have decayed. Field MarshalvonGneisenau,1806

Iamnotatallinterestedinthatsillynonsenseyouhaveshownme.Crawlingaround,takingcover,camouflageand

indirect-fire:Idontunderstandthesethingsanddontcareadime.Idliketoseeadashingregiment,galopping[sic]

ontothebattlefield,takinguppositionsandfiringquickly! FieldMarshalCarlTersztyanskydeNados,1911

I.INTRODUCTION

ThehorrorsoftheFirstWorldWarthemachineguns,trenchtactics,barbedwireandpoundingartillerycame

asaghastlysurprisetothegenerals.Yettheyshould,andcould,haveknownbetter.In1904JapanandRussiahadgone towarfordominanceoftheEast.Journalistsandmilitaryattacheshadmademeticulousobservations,butthelessonsof thisdramaticconflictweredismissedasirrelevant.

NearlyeveryhistoricalstudyoftheFirstWorldWarcontainsacommentaryalludingto

the effects of increased firepower and technology on the nature of warfare. In 1922,

GermanGeneralWilhelmBalckwrote,Bulletsquicklywritenewtactics. However,

mosthistoricalanalysesofWorldWarIwouldhavethereaderbelievethatthepre-warera

did not bear out his adage. The Western armies that entered the Great War seemingly

ignored many of the hard-learned lessons and observations of pre-war conflicts. Though

World War I armies were later credited with developing revolutionary wartime tactical

level advances many scholars claim that this phase of tactical evolution followed an earlierperiodofintellectualstagnationthatresultedinthestalemateonthewarsWestern

Front.Thisstalemate,theyclaim,couldhavebeenavoidedbyheedingtheadmonitionsof

pre-war conflicts and incorporating the burgeoning effects of technology into military

tactics and doctrine. Some go even further and fault the military leadership with

incompetenceandfoolishnessfornotadaptingtotherequirementsofmodernwar.

As early as the American Civil War (1861-1865) several indicators warned that the

natureofwarfarewaschangingduetothedevelopmentsofnewtechnology.TheWarsof

German Unification (1864-71) especially the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71),

confirmedthatthefaceofwarfarehadtransformedsufficientlytorequirenewtacticsand

doctrine.Thoughsomereformswereimplemented,thefundamentalsofNapoleonicbattle

werestillcommonlypracticedLater,lessonsderivedfromtheAnglo-BoerWar(1899

1902) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), caused several military organizations to enact

further reforms. These later conflicts demonstrated the devastating effect of increased

firepower.Bothwarswitnessedtheevolutionofdecentralizedsmall-unitinfantrytactics,

rudimentary fire and maneuver methods, and basic combined arms techniqueswith

small groups of soldiers led by junior officers and NCOs, advancing in irregular