Gary J. Ohls - American Amphibious Warfare: The Roots of Tradition to 1865

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

2017 by Gary J. Ohls

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Ohls, Gary J., author.

Title: American amphibious warfare: the roots of tradition to 1865 / Gary J. Ohls.

Description: Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017043129 (print) | LCCN 2017043639 (ebook) | ISBN 9781682470909 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Amphibious warfareHistory18th century. | Amphibious warfareHistory19th century. | United StatesHistory, Military18th century. | United StatesHistory, Military19th century. | Amphibious warfareCase studies.

Classification: LCC U261 (ebook) | LCC U261 .O35 2017 (print) | DDC 335.4/6097309034dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017043129

Maps created by Starlene Seargeant.

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 179 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

First printing

Among the many people who assisted in creating this book, I am particularly indebted to Dr. Gene Allen Smith of Texas Christian University and Dr. James Bradford of Texas A&M University. They provided professional and scholarly oversight and support throughout the long, intermittent writing and editing process. I am grateful to Dr. John Hattendorf of the U.S. Naval War College, who supported my efforts to complete an early draft and provided professional guidance and personal friendship over many years. Dr. Donald Stoker of the Naval War Colleges Monterey Program provided cheerful prodding to keep me motivated to see the project through to completion. Of course, there are other friends and colleagues too numerous to mention, who helped in various ways and to whom I owe a debt of thanks.

I would like to offer my gratitude to the staffs at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, the U.S. Marine Corps Research Center, the Marine Corps History Division, the National Archives and Records Administration, the Naval War College Archives, the Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval Historical Center, the Mary Couts Burnett Library at Texas Christian University, and the Monterey Public Library, Monterey, California. At these centers I always found cheerful professionals able and eager to assist in my research.

ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED TO AN ESPECIALLY HIGH LEVEL OF proficiency by the United States until the twentieth century, the art of amphibious warfare has deep roots in early American military and naval tradition. The seven major battles studied in this book demonstrate how this amphibious tradition developed while analyzing its place in the strategic mosaic of each period. Through a case study approach, the operational and strategic significance of each amphibious action is analyzed and its impact on the development of our nation assessed. Of course, amphibious warfare does not begin in early America but goes back as far as recorded history. For example, amphibious operations constituted an important element of the Peloponnesian Wars, and Thucydides provides descriptions of important landings throughout his classical account of that conflict. In fact, one of the most significant triumphs of Athens over Spartaa victory of sea power over land powerresulted from the amphibious landing on the island of Sphacteria in 425 BC.

The Spartan defeat at Sphacteria shocked the entire Hellenic world and forced Sparta to seek an end of the war and return of its prisoners, all to no avail. Conversely, Athens failed amphibious expeditions to Sicily and subsequent attack on Syracuse during 415413 BC rank among her most disastrous defeats. Syracuses effective resistance to the Athenian invasion introduces the question of defense against landing operations as an important element of amphibious warfare. This aspect is particularly significant in studying early American wars where British forces possessed an offensive amphibious capability and the United States usually found itself on the defensive.

Two of the greatest commanders of ancient warfareAlexander the Great and Julius Caesarused amphibious warfare effectively when operational circumstances dictated. In Alexanders case, that great general found himself unable to conquer the Phoenician city of Tyre with only his army in 332 BC. Assembling a fleet of some 220 vessels at Sidon, he attacked and scattered the naval force defending the citys seaboard flank. He then conducted an amphibious assault that breached Tyres walls and conquered the city, complete with great destruction and slaughter. This victory caused Alexanders prime adversary, Darius Codomannus, to offer a generous peace to the Macedonian commander, which he quickly rejected and continued his conquest of Egypt and the Persian Empire.