Paul Winter - First In Last Out: The Post-war Organisation, Employment and Training of Royal Marines Commandos

The Post-War Organisation, Employment and Training of Royal Marines Commandos

EDITED BY PAUL WINTER

Published in Great Britain and the United States of America in 2021 by

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Copyright 2021 Paul Winter

Hardcover Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-962-9

Digital Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-963-6

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First In, Last Out is dedicated to the memory of Stan Scotty Scott (19242014), member of 3 Troop, No. 3 Commando; Chairman of the Commando Veterans Association; mentor to generations of Army Cadets; and exemplar of the Commando Spirit.

To see where we are going, we must know where we are, and to know where are, we must discover how we got here.

General Sir John Shan Hackett

The statement above by that battle-wise soldier, Shan Hackett, and repeated by the author Paul Winter at the end of his introduction, is the clue to what First In, Last Out is about. Paul Winter uses an unpublished pamphlet, Amphibious Warfare Handbook No. 10a: The Organisation, Employment and Training of Commandos, 1951 , as a starting point from which to examine where the Royal Marines are now, and how they got there. He tells us that this pamphlet, a unique example of bespoke Royal Marines Commando doctrine (intended to be read in conjunction with Amphibious Warfare Handbook No. 10b: Amphibious Raids, 1951 ), has escaped the full attention of both practitioners and scholars.

He then goes on to ask what Amphibious Warfare Handbook No. 10a consists of, when was it produced, by whom, why was it written and for whom? What was the historical context, and does it have any relevance for todays Royal Marines and the new Future Commando Force (FCF) concept?

I believe it has significant relevance. The Royal Marines today are going through a period in their existence best summed up by saying we have been here before many times. Usually because there is uncertainty and doubt among those responsible for the defence policy of the United Kingdom, and especially at the top of the naval service, about what the Royal Marines are for; indeed why they exist at all. Those who compiled Amphibious Warfare Handbook No. 10a had recently and personally taken part in the war against Germany and the Axis powers. This, in the words of Paul Winter, gave this doctrinal paper credibility largely absent in doctrine generated during prolonged periods of peace. He might have added after long periods without war against a peer enemy, as pertains today. He goes on to quote John Gooch, a military historian:

The basic problem is that military organizations can rarely replicate in times of peace the actual conditions of war. It becomes increasingly easy as the complexities, ambiguities and frictions of combat recede into the past, for militaries to develop concepts, and practices that meet the standards of peacetime efficiency rather than those of wartime effectiveness.

Furthermore, Paul Winter identifies later in his introduction that at present, rather than the exigencies of war dictating the Concept of Employment (CONEMP) for Commandos, design models constructed in peacetime may be forced upon them. These models may be based on a desire to save money, or on one particular scenario because it fits the defence mood of the time; a model that lacks flexibility and the ability to react to the actual circumstances; one constructed in the minds of those reacting to pressures other than the actual enemy threat. This is a style of thinking that was criticized by a former Commandant General Royal Marines (CGRM) who remarked; The truth is that you have to wage war as you can and not necessarily as you would like to.

Ever since the end of World War II the Royal Marines have operated in exactly the same way as that proscribed by General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley describing his own regiment, The Parachute Regiment, like the Royal Marines elite and frequently under threat of cuts and even total oblivion: It was a regiment for all seasons, or it was nothing. It must take on whatever task it is given and do its best at it. The Royal Marines likewise cannot afford the luxury of pre-selecting which tactical or operational tasks they will, or will not undertake, or the self-indulgence of placing provisos on the scale and manner of their future employment.

The example of 41 Commando RM in Korea provides a case study in the dangers of inflexibility caused by designing a force for just one role. Paul Winter reminds us that this experience spotlights the numerous potential pitfalls for the FCF, for not only does it address the dangers of mission creep, re-roling mid-campaign, deficiencies in mass, the dislocation of expectation and the critical importance of inter-operability; it also illustrates the hazards of over-specialisation and sub-optimal force configurations.

41 Commando RM, at less than half the strength of a normal RM Commando of the period, was sent to Korea to operate as a raiding force. It did so successfully, but as the US-led United Nations force pushed back the North Koreans and closed up to the border with China, there was little coastline left to raid and 41 Commando found itself out of a job. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, eventually persuaded Major-General O. P. Smith, commanding the 1st US Marine Division, to request that 41 Commando join his division in their advance north from Hungnam to the Chosin Reservoir. Having fought its way up to join the 1st US Marine Division, there followed the desperate battles at Hagaru-ri and Hell Fire Valley against the newly arrived Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, who had intervened in the war in October 1950. As a mobile reserve, 41 Commando rendered gallant service covering the withdrawal of Smiths division, fighting its way out the legendary march to the sea, in the process battling through and breaking contact with at least four Chinese divisions. The Commando was later awarded the US Presidential Citation, but from an initial strength of around 250 all ranks was now down to just 150. Plans to attach 41 Commando to the 1st US Marine Division now operating in the line as normal infantry came to naught, as the Commando was not configured for, or sufficiently strong enough to operate, in this way for despite receiving reinforcements rifle troops were a mere 45 all ranks.

41 Commando was then deployed to the Wonsan harbour area and the neighbouring islands for raiding. Here it was misemployed thanks to coalition politics, and brushes with US intelligence organisations, which treated the Commando as rivals. Despite these difficulties since their arrival in Korea, by the time 41 Commando was disbanded in February 1952, they had carried out numerous successful raids and cut the enemys communications, as well as operating as normal infantry supporting the 1st US Marine Division in the battles around Hagaru-ri and the march to the sea. But fighting in the line in the static warfare that occurred later in Korea was not a sensible option; 41 Commando was not organised and lacked the manpower to undertake such a commitment. The point is that Royal Marines trained as infantry, and organised as such, can seamlessly segue from raiding to fighting as normal infantry, and back again the proviso being if they are organised and trained as such. You do not need to have a special organisation for a 750-strong Commando of three or four rifle companies to be able to raid. Raids can be at section, troop, company, or even Commando level. Equally, you should not commit a 250-strong unit formed into some esoteric set up, and purely trained in special tasks, to normal infantry fighting.