NAPOLEON
AND THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES
A HISTORY OF THE FRANCO-AUSTRIAN CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF THE DANUBE IN 1809
B Y
F. L ORRAINE P ETRE O.B.E.
WITH EIGHT ILLUSTRATIONS AND FIVE SHEETS OF MAPS AND PLANS
This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING
Text originally published in 1904 under the same title.
Pickle Partners Publishing 2011, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.
Publishers Note
Although in most cases we have retained the Authors original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern readers benefit.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
THE campaign which forms the subject of this volume is one which has received scant notice in England, and has been a good deal misunderstood. The misunderstanding has been mainly due to Napoleon's successful misrepresentation of the earlier part as one of his greatest and most successful efforts. The publication of the full correspondence of the time in Colonel Saski's Campagne de 1809, and General Bonnal's criticism in his Manoeuvre de Landshut, effectually show that the Emperor was guilty of lapses which did not occur in 1805 or 1806. Besides these works, there are many excellent accounts of older date in French, which have been consulted by the author. The most notable are Pelet's history of the campaign, and Koch's Memoirs of Massna.
The campaign is of special interest as being the only one, except the Austrian retreat from Italy in 1797, in which Napoleon was personally opposed to his ablest continental opponent.
The publication, under the patronage of the Archduke Charles' family, of Colonel von Angeli's Erzherzog Karl als Feldherr, and of the collected writings of the Archduke, has thrown much light on the Austrian side. The history commenced by Binder von Krieglstein ("B. K." in the notes), a Prussian officer, and completed by a brother officer, deals with French, Austrian, Bavarian, and Wurtemberg sources of information. There are several recent Austrian works, especially that of Mayerhofer von Vedropolje, which are of great value in the study of the campaign.
Of the maps attached to this volume, No. IV. is a reproduction of part of the Bavarian Staff map. So is the inset to No. III., whilst the rest of that map is based upon the same foundation. I have gratefully to acknowledge the courtesy of the Topographical Department of the General Staff at Munich in allowing me thus to use their map. Most of the other maps are based, either on the great atlas of the Memorial du dpt de la Guerre, or, in the case of No. V., on the Atlas of Koch's Memoirs of Massna. Most of the drawing and reduction has been done for me by my son, Mr R. L. Petre, an officer of the South Wales Borderers. All but two of the illustrations are, as in the case of my two former works, reproductions from pictures in the collection of Mr A. M. Broadley, of The Knapp, Bridport, who has courteously allowed them to be used. The view of the Danube at Saal, showing the defile through which Davout's baggage column passed on the 19th April 1809, and that of the headquarters at Rohr, are two out of a number taken by myself during a tour in September 1907.
F. L. P.
Contents
ILLUSTRATIONS
THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES
*THE DANUBE AT SAAL
*THE POST HOUSE AT ROHR
GENERAL MOUTON
FRANCIS I., EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA
THE BATTLE OF ESSLING
MARSHAL OUDINOT
GENERAL LASALLE
MAPS AND PLANS AT END OF VOLUME.
GENERAL MAP OF CENTRAL EUROPE.
THE VALLEY OF THE DANUBE FROM RATISBON TO KOMORN. PLANS FOR BATTLES OF EBELSBRRG, RAAB, AND ZNAIM.
MAP FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF ECKMHL.
ENLARGED (BAVARIAN STAFF) MAP OF NEIGHBOURHOOD OF ABENSBERG.
COUNTRY ROUND THANN AND ECKMHL (BAVARIAN STAFF MAP).
PLAN FOR BATTLES OF ESSLING AND WAGRAM.
* From photographs by the author.
The remaining illustrations are reproduced, by permission, from the collection of A. M. Broadley, Esq .
CHAPTER I
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR
WITH the signature of the Treaty of Tilsit and the secret clauses attached to it, Napoleon seemed to be, at last, the arbiter of the destinies of all Europe, from the Pyrenees to the Niemen, and from the Baltic to Sicily. He had crushed and dismembered Prussia, who, for the present, was no longer worthy of his consideration. In Germany every state which was not under his direct rule was either under that of his puppets, or else was his ally, willing or unwilling, with the sole exception of Austria, who had deemed it wise, in 1806 and 1807, not again to measure swords with the imperial armies which had so recently inflicted on her a disastrous defeat.
Italy was completely controlled by Napoleon through his stepson Eugne Beauharnais, Viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy, and his brother Joseph, soon to be succeeded by Murat, as King of Naples.
Holland was nominally the kingdom of another brother; Westphalia, comprising Prussia's former possessions west of the Elbe, and the territories of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, was in the hands of Jerome, a puppet even more amenable than Louis. Saxony, now increased by the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, was the latest addition to the Rhenish Confederation, into which Napoleon had now swept all the minor German States, of which Bavaria was the most important.
Denmark was the bone of contention between Napoleon and England, and her fleet was shortly to pass into the hands of the latter. Neither she nor Sweden was held of much account by the chief contracting parties at Tilsit; for both were to be compelled to close their ports against England if the latter did not fall in with the views of Napoleon, and if Sweden made difficulties, Denmark was to be made to declare war on her.
In Eastern Europe, Russia had been worsted in the late contest, but she was in a very different position from unfortunate Prussia. At Eylau the Russian army had inflicted a check on the Emperor's victorious career, though it is true that without the arrival, in the nick of time, of Lestocq's Prussians, Bennigsen would probably have been disastrously defeated. Heilsberg had been another partial check for the French, though the memory of it was wiped out by Napoleon's great victory, a few days later, at Friedland. Still, even Friedland bore no resemblance to Jena in the complete rout of the beaten side. Therefore, at the Tilsit negotiations, whilst the Prussian monarch and the queen, who was worth many such as her husband, were treated by the conqueror with contempt and insult, the Tsar was received very differently. He was flattered and cajoled by one whose personal fascination, when he chose to use it, rarely failed to gain over even those most prejudiced against him. Alexander made no secret of his own prompt surrender, or of his regret for his former prejudices.
