Harkins - British Battlecruisers of World War 1: Operational Log July 1914 - June 1915

British Battlecruisers of World War 1

Operational Log

July 1914 June 1915

Hugh Harkins

Copyright 2013 Hugh Harkins

All rights reserved.

ISBN: 1-903630-24-X

ISBN-13: 978-1-903630-24-2

British Battlecruisers of World War 1

Operational Log

July 1914 June 1915

A CENTURION BOOK

Hugh Harkins 2013

ISBN 10: 1-903630-24-X

ISBN 13: 978-1-903630-24-2

First Published in the United Kingdom 2013

The Author is identified as the copyright holder of this work under sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988

Published by Centurion Publishing, Glasgow, United Kingdom, G65 9YE

Cover design Centurion Publishing & Createspace

Page layout, concept and design Centurion Publishing

The traditional start of chapter on the recto side only has been intentionally disregarded; chapters starting on either the recto or verso side as required in the interests of the environment

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or photocopied, recorded or otherwise without the written permission of the publishers

Dedicated to the Memory of my Nibbler

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this volume is to provide a detailed log of the operations of the Royal Navy Battle Cruisers and associated units from July 1914 until the end of June 1915. During this time the Battle Cruisers were engaged with elements of the German Fleet on a number of occasions; most notably in the Battle of the Heligoland Bight in August 1914, The Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914 and The Battle of the Dogger Bank in January 1915. Only in the Dogger Bank action did the opposing forces Battle Cruisers engage in battle which resulted in a material and strategic defeat for the German High Seas Fleet, albeit at the cost on one British Battle Cruiser severely damaged.

In the Heligoland Bight action on 28 August 1914, the British Battle Cruisers provided support to light forces engaging German Light forces. The result was a defeat for the German Fleet, which now concentrated on strengthening the defenses of the area.

The Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914 was a pivotal moment for the advocates of the Battle Cruiser concept. Battle Cruisers successfully engaged and defeated enemy Armoured Cruisers and Light Cruisers; the very role for which they had been designed.

Intended as an operational history of the employment of the British Battle Cruisers, it is not the intention of this volume to go into the details of the rights or wrongs of the Battle Cruiser concept. It will suffice for the purposes of this volume to state that the designs emerged as an evolution or replacement of the Armoured Cruiser. Not tied to any single role, the new Battle Cruisers were capable of operating as independent units hunting down enemy Cruisers, as in the Falklands battle, or in larger scale operations with the Battle Fleet; scouting ahead with the potential to operate as a fast wing of the Battle Fleet in a fleet action. For this latter role, later in the war, the British Battle Cruisers in particular proved unsound in design, tactics or a combination of both.

During the first year of the War, British Battle Cruisers would be employed in all of the above roles.

The Battle cruisers and the Road to War

Towards the end of the 19 th Century and into the first few years of the 20 th Century, the two power standard that the Royal Navy was being prepared for was in most circles considered to be war with France and Russia in an Alliance. With the Entente this seemed far less likely, but new enemies were emerging with Germany and the United States of America both vying for second place in the naval powers league, a position which France was fast relinquishing. History has shown that Germany took the number two sea power position, with the United States taking third place. For Britain, a real problem would emerge with a German-United States Alliance. It was evident within the British establishment that evanescent quarrels with the United States were likely in the future, and that a parricidal war with the United States could not be ruled out as that young nation had many territorial ambitions; some of which would inevitably bring her into conflict with the British Empire if she were to act on them, not least her long standing plans to invade and subjugate the self-Governing Dominion of Canada.

Japan was a fast rising naval power in the Far East, but she had an alliance with Great Britain, which would have a constraining effect on any ambitions the United States may have harboured about becoming involved in a confrontation between Britain and any other major power. However, it was Lord Fishers belief, not without foundation, that of the three largest naval powers following Britain; France, Germany and the United States, that any combination of two of these powers would hesitate to attack Britain, such was Britains naval supremacy in the first years of the new Century. He went on to state that if any combination of two of these powers had attacked Britain, then they would have been defeated by British Naval Power without the assistance of our Japanese allies. That said, while confident in British naval supremacy at that time, Fishers writings make it clear that he was aware that the future of that supremacy would be under threat by the growing naval strength of other naval powers on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the first few years of the 20 th Century a revolution was taking place in design of Capital Ships leading to the December 1906 launch of HMS Dreadnought , the first of the new all-big-gun Capital ships, which would be colloquially known from that time onwards as Dreadnoughts.

A memorandum Admiralty Work and Progress issued by the then First Lord, Lord Cawder on 30 November 1905 stated At the present time strategic requirements necessitate an output of four large armoured ships annually. An announcement in Parliament in July 1906 stated that only three Battleships (Cawders large armoured ships) were to be included in the then current program. Among the reasons cited for withdrawal from the planned four Battleships was that there had been a temporary halt in Battleships construction on the Continent of Europe following the advent of HMS Dreadnought , the first all-big-gun Battleship, and the planned Invincible Class all-big-gun Armoured Cruisers (these vessels had not yet been designated Battlecruisers). Foreign navies had been forced to reevaluate their construction programs to compete with the revolutionary new type of Battleship, which was not only much heavier armed, but in most areas better armoured and faster than the existing status quo vessels which would soon have the indignation of being labeled Pre-Dreadnought Battleships.