Grehan John - Disaster in the Far East 1940-1942: the defence of Malaya, Japanese capture of Hong Kong, and the fall of Singapore

The first officer to have his despatch on operations in the Far East published was Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brook-Popham. He took up his post in Singapore on 18 November 1940, with his area of command encompassing Burma, Hong Kong as well as Malaya, and included the Far East Air Command. The Indian, Chinese and the East Indies commands remained outside his authority.

Brook-Popham was directed to avoid war with Japan and was reminded of this fact in March 1941, being informed that, Avoidance of war with Japan is basis of Far East policy and provocation must be rigidly avoided. This message was reinforced again in September of that year, this time it being stated that Our policy in the Far East is still to avoid war with Japan.

Brook-Popham was also told that the defence of the United Kingdom, the Battle of the Atlantic and the fighting in North Africa had priority over the Far East. He would simply have to make do with whatever he was given in terms of men and machines. It is interesting to note that Brook-Popham recorded that when he was pushing to bring his forces up to what he described as an irreducible minimum, he was cautioned against over-estimate of the Japanese forces.

Brook-Popham sought to give the impression that the British and Commonwealth forces were so strong that the Japanese would not dare to attack them. As the Japanese showed no fear in attacking the United States, it is evident that, however great a show of force Brook-Popham displayed, it would not have deterred them.

In writing his despatch, Brook-Popham compiled a very thorough explanation of the reasons for the success of the Japanese in the weeks before he relinquished responsibility for the Far East Command. This included an analysis of Japanese tactics and equipment and their use of psychological warfare: Chinese crackers [were used] and strange cries at night; these tricks, though laughable when one knew about them, had a certain amount of moral effect, especially on young Indian troops.

Another factor which had some effect on morale generally, Brook-Popham explained, was that, strategically, the British forces were on the defensive. All the troops were aware that it was the intention to avoid war with Japan, which meant that the initiative and especially the choice of the moment for opening hostilities rested with the enemy.

That moment came at 01.30 hours on Monday, 8 December 1941, when the Japanese started to land from ships at Kota Bharu on the eastern coast of Malaya. Two large Japanese convoys escorted by warships had been picked up by aerial reconnaissance as early as 14.00 hours on the 6th. Though it seemed fairly obvious that this was the start of the Japanese offensive, because Brook-Popham had been told not to take any provocative action (this had been re-stated as recently as 29 November, just a week before the Japanese attack) he had to wait for the Japanese to open hostilities.

Ridiculous as it may sound, Brook-Popham had to prepare in advance an Order of the Day to communicate to his troops that war had broken out. This had to be written in all the various languages of the people under his command. This also had to be distributed across the thousands of miles which comprised his command so that they could be released on the day war broke out. In order to be able to accomplish this, they had to be sent out the day before the fighting began. So the situation was that Brook-Popham had to issue orders to his troops that war had begun whilst not being permitted to take any action against the enemy.

Thus robbed of the opportunity to attack the Japanese whilst they were still at sea, Brook-Popham had to wait for the enemy to attack wherever and whenever they chose. Little wonder that the Japanese were able to overrun the British lines so rapidly.

Whilst Malaya and Singapore were the main territories Brook-Popham had to defend, he also bore responsibility for Hong Kong and he provided a report on its fall which, given the resources available for its defence, was inevitable. Initially Burma also formed part of the Far East Command but on 15 December this was handed over to the Commander-in-Chief, India. Brook-Popham also reports on the Japanese attack upon Borneo. Allied troops were still fighting in Borneo when, on 27 December 1941, Brook-Popham was relieved by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall.

A more detailed report on the Japanese attack on Hong Kong is provided in the second despatch reproduced in this volume. It was written by Major General Christopher Maltby, who, like Brook-Popham, was hampered by the reluctance of the British authorities to commit to defensive preparations which might be seen by the Japanese as provocative.

That war was inevitable seemed clear to me, Maltby declared, but it was hard to make that definite statement on the information available. As a result he was restrained by his instructions and by the civil authorities of Hong Kong from being able to implement all the defensive measures he believed were essential.

Maltby listed the reasons for this entirely unsatisfactory state of affairs as:

( a ) The general doubt that Japan would declare war against the Allied powers.

( b ) The weakness of our intelligence system.

( c ) The belief that Japan was bluffing and would continue to bluff to the last.

Coupled with this, as Maltby makes very clear, was the absence of modern aircraft, the limited amount of naval support, the absence of radar, and the paucity of antiaircraft guns.

Nevertheless, despite the obvious disadvantages which the British forces had to operate under, they put up a valiant defence. This is presented as a War Narrative which was maintained by Fortress HQ throughout the fighting and probably represents the most comprehensive account of the battle of Hong Kong ever published. Maltby was, of course, taken prisoner when Hong Kong fell, and we are fortunate that the War Narrative survived.

The man who compiled the third despatch was also imprisoned by the Japanese but unlike the information available to Maltby, many documents that would have been of value to Lieutenant General Arthur Percival were lost or destroyed following the fall of Singapore.