Stille - Malaya and Singapore 1941-42: the fall of Britains empire in the East

First published in Great Britain in 2016 by Osprey Publishing,

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ISBN: 978-1-4728-1122-6 (PB)

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Editorial by Ilios Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com)

Maps by Bounford.com

3D birds-eye views by The Black Spot

Battlescene illustrations by Peter Dennis

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Author

Mark E. Stille (Commander, United States Navy, retired) received his BA in History from the University of Maryland and also holds an MA from the Naval War College. He has worked in the intelligence community for 35 years including tours on the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff and on US Navy ships. He is currently a senior analyst working in the Washington DC area. He is the author of numerous Osprey titles, focusing on naval history in the Pacific.

Illustrator

Peter Dennis was born in 1950. Inspired by contemporary magazines such as Look and Learn he studied illustration at Liverpool Art College. Peter has since contributed to hundreds of books, predominantly on historical subjects, including many Osprey titles. A keen wargamer and modelmaker, he is based in Nottinghamshire, UK.

ARTISTS NOTE

Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries should be addressed to:

Peter Dennis, Fieldhead, The Park, Mansfield, Notts, NG18 2AT, UK magieh@ntlworld.com

The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter.

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INTRODUCTION

THE RISE OF SINGAPORE

Coming out of World War I, the British Government marked Japan as a future potential threat to the British Empire and its interests in the Far East. Since the size of the Royal Navy was much reduced after the war, it was not large enough to commit powerful forces to the Far East on a permanent basis. This led to the strategy that called for the British to send a powerful fleet to the Far East in times of crisis. To execute this strategy, a large naval base would have to be available.

The Admiralty considered several possibilities for such a base. Among the choices were Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore. Hong Kong was ruled out because it was too close to Japan and could not be properly defended; Australia, particularly Sydney, was ideal from several perspectives, but was simply too far from the interests that it was supposed to be protecting. The only remaining option was Singapore. It was ideally located at the strategic chokepoint from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean and was far enough from the nearest Japanese bases to offer it strategic depth from attack. Most of all, it was immediately accessible to the areas needing defence.

The British government announced its decision to build a new naval base at Singapore in 1921. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its associated agreements increased the importance of Singapore since the construction of additional naval bases was prohibited. The treaty reduced the size of the Royal Navy and made it unlikely that it would be big enough to meet requirements in both Europe and the Far East. Part of the 1922 agreements was a treaty to restrict the construction of fortifications near Japan. However, this excluded Singapore, which now became the most visible symbol of British might in the Far East.

THE BRITISH DEFENCE DILEMMA

The rise of Japanese militarism resulted in the seizure and annexation of Manchuria by Japan in 193132. In 1934, Japan renounced the Washington agreements. This was followed by the invasion of China in July 1937. Concurrent with Japanese expansion in China, tensions in Europe dramatically rose. In 1938, Germany pressured Czechoslovakia for territorial concessions in the Sudetenland. The British policy of appeasement meant war was averted, but it was soon apparent that continued German demands would lead to war. Great Britain began to re-arm.

Work continued on the Singapore naval base. It was officially opened in February 1938, though not actually completed. As war loomed in Europe, the British plan to deploy a large fleet to Singapore during a crisis began to look even more hollow. In July 1939, the period required to deploy a large force to Singapore was extended to 90 days from the 70 days set in March 1938. Until the arrival of the fleet, Singapore would have to hold out with whatever means were available.

When war did come in September 1939, only Germany entered the conflict. Italy and Japan remained on the sidelines, but still had to be watched. The period for getting a fleet to the Far East was extended to 180 days. The British situation worsened when France fell to the Germans in June 1940, which prompted the entry of Italy into the war that same month. The British had already decided that the Mediterranean would have priority over the Far East and, of course, both were secondary to the security of Great Britain itself, which was under the threat of invasion. The worsening situation forced the British to suspend their plan to send a large fleet to the Far East in a crisis.

When war came between Great Britain and Japan it would be centred on Singapore and Malaya. This was the strategic centre of gravity for the British in the Far East. The two areas held not just the naval base and a number of airbases, but were strategically positioned to dominate Southeast Asia. Although the British were stretched to the limit by the war, they still believed that Singapore could be defended. Even though it was third in priority for allocation of forces, behind the defence of Great Britain and the Mediterranean, much had been done to bolster the fortress defences. According to British calculations, it was unlikely that the Japanese Army, still tied down by the conflict in China, would be bold enough and have the logistical capabilities to attempt to launch an attack on the heart of British power in the Far East. Therefore, depending on the state of the conflict in northern Europe and the Mediterranean, the British would still have adequate time to reinforce the fortress. However, no British plan foresaw the direction the war would take in 194041. The British had suffered defeat after defeat, and were being pressed to maintain the security of the sea lanes in the Atlantic, defend the home islands from attack, and protect their key position in Egypt. This undermined any real hope of providing significant reinforcement to the Far East when the Japanese attacked.