Major Brett Peters - Mulberry-American: The Artificial Harbor At Omaha

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Text originally published in 2011 under the same title.

Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publishers Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Authors original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern readers benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

MULBERRY AMERICAN: THE ARTIFICIAL HARBOR AT OMAHA

By

Major Brett Peters

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER

The Overlord operation is a widely studied episode in military history. Often overlooked is a little known U.S. operation designed to overcome logistical problems in the Overlord plan. For the first 90 days of combat the Overlord operation would not benefit from major ports to sustain the build-up and counter the German attempt to push the Allies back into the sea. The Allies planned, designed, and constructed two artificial harbours to overcome the lack of ports. The harbours were known by the code name, Mulberry. The components were towed across the English channel with the invasion fleet and constructed under enemy fire. Mulberry A, the A stood for American, was completed three days ahead of schedule and doubled the throughput of U.S. supplies over the Normandy beachhead. Mulberry A was destroyed by a summer gale after only three days of operation and subsequently abandoned. Effective beaching LSTs during the operation led many critics to conclude that Mulberry A supply operations had little effect on the Overlord operation. To the contrary, using modern assessment methods, it can be concluded that the Mulberry operation was effective and influenced the outcome of the cross channel attack.

The writing of this work could not have been accomplished without the endless patience of my thesis committee. The motivation the committee instilled in me was sorely needed at times and for that, I am extremely grateful. Thank you for the encouragement, input, and motivation tailored to my personality type. I have never experienced what it means to write. I have now been educated.

I cannot in good form acknowledge any other party without giving thanks to my wife and family. Without the support of my clan this work would have perished in flames many months ago. My wife and four children are eternally patient, forgiving, and understanding. Thank you for putting up with my moments and giving up more than a few weekends while Daddy could work on that paper; I owe you.

Appreciation must be extended as well to the 2011, Command and General Staff School, Staff Group 15 Delta. I had more than my fair share of encouragement from Staff Group 15 Delta; More cowbell.

ANCXFAllied Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force

CMSF(CO)Coordinator of Ministry and Service Facilities (for Combined Operations)

COHQCombined Operations Headquarters.

ComNavEuCommander U.S. Naval Forces Europe

COSSACChief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

D dayDay of invasion

LCALanding Craft Assault

LCILanding Craft (Infantry)

LCTLanding Craft (Tank)

LCVPLanding CraftVehicle, Personnel. Also known as a Higgins boat

LSDLanding Ship (Dock)

LSTLanding Ship (Tank)

MOEMeasure of Effectiveness

MOPMeasure of Performance

RERoyal Engineers.

RNRoyal Navy.

After the tragedy at Gallipoli in World War I Allied military leaders gave little credence to the concept of opposed beach assaults. The British Army prior to World War II had discounted the concept of an opposed assault as not viable and instead focused on landings on unopposed terrain. The U.S. Army acknowledged that opposed assaults may be necessary but failed to develop doctrine on beach assaults and instead chose to rely on the U.S. Marine Corps doctrine. The surprising capitulation of the French army in 1940 made an opposed amphibious assault a very real possibility as the Allies had no foothold on the mainland from which to launch any offensive against Germany. If there was to be victory over the Germans an opposed beach assault in German occupied France would be unavoidable. In preparation for just such a reality the Allies proceeded with operation Bolero in 1942. Operation Bolero was the codename for the U.S. forces build up in Great Britain. While Bolero began the massive build-up of U.S. forces, operation Sledgehammer was planned. Sledgehammer was to be an opportunistic assault into German controlled France should the German army fall into disarray due to failures in Russia. In 1943 it became apparent to the Allies that a Sledgehammer opportunity was not forthcoming and the plan was shelved. Planning for operation Sledgehammer gave way to what was called operation Roundup, which later became operation Overlord. {1}

The Allied invasion of Normandy remains one of the most fascinating operations in military history. No student of history can ignore the grandeur, individual stories of heroism, and terror that the beach assault at Normandy embodies. It is easy to focus on the heroic aspects of the Normandy invasion and the sacrifices made, but what cannot be overlooked is that the invasion could not have taken place had one major limitation not been solved. Overlord planners had difficulty working through the problem of how to sufficiently supply the invading forces.

The answer was to build an artificial sheltered harbour in England, tow it across the English Channel and install it under fire as the D Day invasion took place.

The decision to embark on such a massive and expensive operation both in material and manpower was not taken lightly. Construction of the artificial harbours, codenamed Mulberry, was the only apparent answer to problems experienced in earlier amphibious operations. It was imperative that the errors made in assaults prior to Overlord not be repeated at Normandy. Errors and miscalculations at Dieppe, North Africa, Sicily, and Anzio were taken into account in brutally honest after action reports. These after action reports were not are ignored by Overlord planners. If the same errors made in smaller operations were made at Normandy the results could not be so readily overcome in an operation of such magnitude.

The most significant lesson was the calamity at Dieppe 19 August 1942. In the commando raid at Dieppe Allied forces failed in an attempt to take a French port in a direct assault. The operation at Dieppe ended with appalling casualties to British and Canadian commandos, and Army Rangers. The Dieppe raid demonstrated to planners the very real likelihood that a direct assault from the sea would not be possible without unspeakable casualties, if the assault were possible at all.