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General Eisenhowers Battle for Control of the Strategic Bombers in Support of Operation Overlord A Case study in Unity of Command
Michael J. Finnegan, Lt Col, USAF
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
ABSTRACT
Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States , has a one page summary of the OVERLORD campaign entitled, OVERLORD: A Classic Joint and Combined Operation. In the narrative, the author(s) referenced the OVERLORD command structure with its subordinate commands for land, air, and naval forces and (after much dispute) what we would call today operational control over US and UK strategic air forces. This paper is an examination of the parenthetical after much dispute. Moreover, it is an appreciation of the dynamics surrounding General Dwight Eisenhowers strategic leadership and his quest to achieve unity of command. Eisenhower believed unity of command was fundamental to the success of OVERLORD; he threatened resignation without it.
INTRODUCTION
On 29 November 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin attended the second plenary session of the Teheran Conference. The issue as to who was to command OVERLORD, the cross-channel invasion of France, was at the top of the agenda. Stalin demanded a name because in his mind such an appointment would solidify the American and British commitment. The favorite for the position had been General George Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff. However, Roosevelt had expressed concern that he could not sleep at night with [Marshall] out of the country. {1} Seven days later in Cairo, Roosevelt named General Dwight Eisenhower Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, for OVERLORD. {2} James Roosevelt had asked his father, the President, why he had selected Eisenhower. The President replied that Eisenhower is the best politician among the military men. He is a natural leader who can convince other men to follow him, and this is what we need in his position more than any other quality. {3}
Immediately after receiving the appointment, Eisenhower became mired in a four-month battle from December 1943 until March 1944 over his right to command the allied strategic air forces. At times it was a conflict that threatened, to undermine the coalition, a battle that tested Eisenhowers leadership and political skill. It pitted Eisenhower, guided by the principle of unity of command, against Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, who commanded by committee. The weapons in this conflict were persuasion, guile, and compromise. Like most battles, there were missed opportunities, successes, and failures. Eisenhowers objective was a unified air command, one that would enhance unity of effort and which would tie the air command structure directly to formulation of campaign strategy. {4} At stake was the synergistic application of air power to the support of OVERLORD.
This paper is an examination of this struggle. The study will first discuss the key commanders. This will set the foundation for an examination of the events contributing to creation of an effective command structure. The methodology will place chronological events within the context of the larger issues such as: the selection of Eisenhowers chief air commander; the effect of American and British cultural divergence on command; and, the impact of parochial interests within Bomber Command and United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF). Finally, the paper will address the questions as to whether the Allies achieved unity of command and whether Eisenhowers strategic leadership was effective.
THE AIR COMMANDERS
The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The true basis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theateractual unity of command depends directly upon the individuals in the field. {5} Dwight Eisenhower
The above quotation comes from a letter Eisenhower wrote Lord Louis Mountbatten on 14 September 1943. Mountbatten had just received the appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Theater and had requested time with Eisenhower to discuss some of the particulars of being a supreme Allied commander. {6} This quotation reflected the essence of Eisenhowers leadership he depended on the civility and cooperation of his commanders to solve problems. Above all Eisenhowers command climate rested on a foundation of trust he wanted his commanders to get along.
In a letter to Marshall in December 1943 Eisenhower outlined his idea of the ideal air commander. He wanted an air commander who understood air support of ground troops. {7} Based on his experience in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Eisenhower did not believe this was widely understood. He wanted men of some vision and broad understanding to do the job right. {8} Doing the job right meant having air commanders who would not squander air power on missions that did not support the invasion.
Eisenhower understood what Allied air power could bring to the critical effort. He wanted to channel maximum air power via an effective, unified air command structure. To accomplish this objective, he wanted to select a few senior individuals. Unfortunately, he did not have a choice. Fate and the Allied governments had already selected the air command lineup. The air commanders would be Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander; Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Commander, Air Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF); Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, Commander, United States Strategic Air Force (USSTAF); and, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command.
Tedder
Tedder is on good terms with Eisenhower to whom he is superior in both intelligence and energyHe is very popular with the troops on account of his consideration and unassuming appearance.
Obviously we are dealing here with one of the most eminent personalities amongst the invasion leaders.-German Intelligence Document {9}
In the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Sir Arthur Tedder had developed a reputation as an unpretentious, yet highly effective, commander of the air effort a personality trait Eisenhower admired. His first encounter with American airmen in Palestine illustrated this personality characteristic. {10}
