Ganguly Sumit - How Rivalries End

In this appendix, we first focus briefly on listing a number of factors that have been mentioned as important to conflict de-escalation processes. Afterward, we quickly move on to the consideration of fourteen models that are relevant to rivalry de-escalation and termination. These models include Rosati 1994 and Welch 2005 on foreign policy restructuring; Checkel 1998 and Legro 2005 on ideational shifts in foreign policy; Diehl and Goertz 2000, Maoz and Mor 2002, and Cox 2010 on rivalry onset and termination; Rock 1989, T. Armstrong 1993, and Kupchan 2010 on rapprochement; Lebow 1995, Pervin 1997, and Orme 2004 on adversarial de-escalation and accommodation; and Womack 2006 on asymmetrical politics. We find that all of these models appear to be looking at similar explanations, but they privilege different combinations of factors more than others. At the same time, these models stress similar sets of variables that produce a surprising amount of overlap in the existing literature.

Students of conflict resolution maintain that the de-escalation of protracted conflicts ultimately depends on conducive background conditions that encourage adversaries to believe in settlement. Shifts in these background conditions create moments of opportunities or ripeness when peacemaking efforts are likely to have favorable outcomes. provides a list of some of the many factors that scholars have linked to the de-escalation process. It shows that de-escalation may arise from domestic conditions, international contexts, and the relations between the adversaries (Kriesberg 1991).

Past research also indicates, however, that there is no simple direct relationship between any of these factors and the termination of protracted conflict across many domains (Licklider 1993: 303). All of these variables have different sorts of impacts under different circumstances. Hence, we have no single pattern or theory of conflict resolution. In addition, Licklider (1993: 303304) argues that conflict resolution more likely reflects a set of processes in which certain critical choice points emerge. Decisions at these points lead to alternative strategies of conflict termination. But, which situations (factors or combination of factors) present critical choice points and why is left unclear.

Table A.1. Conditions That Bring about De-escalation in Protracted Conflicts

In an effort to pare down every argument that is potentially relevant to our understanding of rivalry termination, we focus on fourteen previous models of conflict de-escalation that overlap with features in our expectancy revision model. We begin with Rosati's (1994) more general model for foreign policy restructuring.

Rosati assumes that societies at any given point in time contain competing domestic forces that work toward and against reinforcing the status quo (Boulding 1970). Which groups gain the upper hand and in what circumstances accounts for any changes that may occur. Rosati's model concentrates on the interactions among state institutions, society, and their environment, which have an impact on the development of strategies and policies. State bureaucracies are viewed as inert institutions that move only when pushed hard to do so (Allison 1971; Halperin 1974). Meanwhile, decision makers, who preside over state policy formulation, are disinclined to alter the belief systems that underpin their choice of strategies (Holsti 1967; Jervis 1976). Mass publics also tend to be conservative because they are more comfortable with the status quo than with the uncertainties of change. Thus, vested interests and tradition pose obstacles to potential changes and leaders who advocate for such change. Concomitantly, the international environment also presents a number of built-in constraints on domestic policy shifts, including alliances, commercial relationships, legal commitments, and norms. Continuity rather than discontinuity more often characterizes the development of foreign policies and strategies (Rosenau 1981; Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1988; Hermann 1990; Volgy and Schwarz 1994).

Nonetheless, societal and environmental alterations occur and the question then becomes whether states and leaders modify their foreign policies to adapt to these new circumstances. If they choose to avoid altering existing policies, then leaders and their governments risk the increasing probability that their policies will fail, which in turn will expand the criticism from groups that advocate for foreign policy change. Domestic or international crises also open up the opportunity for such change as defenders of the status quo are overwhelmed by pressures both at home and abroad for a reorientation. In sum, foreign policy failures expose the liabilities and inappropriateness of existing strategies, shake conventional belief systems, upend government personnel supporting the status quo, and bring forth new personnel committed to different foreign policy approaches.

Rosati quotes Nisbet (1969: 282) to summarize the nature of this crisis-induced dynamic: A given way of behaving tends to persist as long as circumstances permit. Thenthe way of behaving ceases to be possible as the result of some intrusion, some difficulty which is the consequence of event or impact, and a period of crisis ensues.

Hence, crises create the necessary space for policy innovators and their innovations. However, there is no guarantee that such crises will lead to change. If catalysts produce positive outcomes, then leaders and governments are likely to reinforce policy continuities. If, however, crises are perceived to have negative consequences, then they are more likely to generate the quest for new policiesand the more severe the impact of negative events, the greater is the potential for foreign policy reorientation.

Based on this perspective, foreign policy restructuring tends to be fairly abrupt and episodic (Krasner 1984). Without crises, incremental change is the likely consequence. Only when the intersection of ongoing societal and environmental shifts and traditional policies combine with critical events that lead to the defeat of status quo defenders do we expect to observe a significant redirection of foreign policy. If, however, status quo defenders maintain their political control, then they are likely to support only minor or moderate alterations in foreign policy.