Kerstin Fisk - Preventive force: drones, targeted killing, and the transformation of contemporary warfare

Edited by Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer M. Ramos

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS

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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Fisk, Kerstin, editor of compilation. | Ramos, Jennifer M., editor of compilation.

Title: Preventive force : drones, targeted killing, and the transformation of contemporary warfare / edited by Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer M. Ramos.

Other titles: Drones, targeted killing, and the transformation of contemporary warfare

Description: New York : New York University Press, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016001633 | ISBN 9781479857531 (hbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781479857654 (pbk. : alk. paper)

Subjects: LCSH: Drone aircraftMoral and ethical aspects. | Drone aircraftGovernment policyUnited States. | Preemptive attack (Military science) | Targeted killingGovernment policy. | TerrorismPrevention. | Air warfareGovernment policyWestern countries. | United StatesMilitary policy. | War (International law)

Classification: LCC UG1242.D7 P75 2016 | DDC 355.4dc23

LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016001633

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Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer M. Ramos

Jennifer Taw

Miroslav Nincic

Thomas M. Nichols

Stephan Sonnenberg

David Glazier

Daphne Eviatar

C. Christine Fair

Avery Plaw and Joo Franco Reis

John Emery and Daniel R. Brunstetter

Ben Jones and John M. Parrish

Deen Chatterjee

Jennifer M. Ramos and Kerstin Fisk

In spring 2014, the Bellarmine College of Liberal Arts at Loyola Marymount University sponsored a conference on preventive force and drone technology. The chapters herein reflect the substance of those conversations, and we are grateful to the authors for their contributions to both the conference and the volume. In addition, we were pleased to have the support of Dean Mike OSullivan and Associate Dean Jeffrey Wilson. Our colleagues within the Political Science Department were also supportive, particularly our chair, Richard Fox. It is safe to say that without his initial prodding, we would not have had the wonderful experience of the conference, nor this compilation of essays. We would also like to thank others who were instrumental in facilitating the conference: David Glazier, John Radson, Michelle Larson, President Dave Burcham, Jerry Green, Robert Williams, Justin Connelly, Peter Warren, Tom Plate, and Robert Greenwald. And we send a special shout-out to our students: Talin Bagdassarian, Alexia Barbaro, Loana Benjamin, Rubyann Park, Chris Eaton, Jeffrey Michels, Alfredo Hernandez, and Hannah Gioia.

As for the manuscript, we are grateful to Caelyn Cobb at New York University Press for her consistent attention and encouragement throughout this process. We dedicate this book to Kerstins grandfather, Roman, and Jennifers brother, Nate.

3.1 Very Important U.S. Foreign Policy Goals, 1991

3.2 Very Important U.S. Foreign Policy Goals, 2002

3.3 Attitudinal Correlates of the Iraq War, 20032010

3.4 Why Bush Went to War, 2005 and 2006

3.5 Public Support for Preventive War, 20032006

3.6 Partisanship and the Iraq War

2.1 Types of Threat and Criteria for Preventive Response

2.2 Preventive Action: Costs, Benefits, and Alternative Actions

3.1 Domestic Responses to Initiation of Two Iraq Wars

3.2 Expectations Regarding War Outcomes

3.3 When the United States Is Justified in Overthrowing Foreign Governments

3.4 Iraq War as Mistake

3.5 Partisanship and Preventive War

3.6 The Iraq War and Congressional Election Issues

3.7 The Iraq War and Presidential Election Issues

11.1 Comparison of the Criteria Governing the Use of Force

Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer M. Ramos

Preventive force is a security strategy defined along a continuum. While the scale of preventive force varies, the strategic aim is the same: to thwart the development of possible future threats from suspected ill-willed actors. At one end of the spectrum are extreme forms of preventive force, including preventive nuclear strikes and preventive wars. The 2003 war in Iraq is one such example of a preventive war: the United States went to war based on concerns that Saddam Hussein was attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, which were considered threatening to the future security of the United States. Closer to the other end of the spectrum are smaller-scale applications of preventive force, including drone strikes Although preventive targeted killings entail a relatively more limited use of force compared to war, the dramatic expansion of the drone program is consistent with the United States enduring commitment to preventive action.

There is much to debate with regard to the security ramifications of preventive force, as well as its political, legal, and ethical implications. For instance, does using force before a threat fully materializes complicate future security? Are the perceived benefits worth the potential costs? Some worry that expanding the customary understanding of a rightful response to a potential threat paves the way for other statesallies and adversaries aliketo follow the United States lead in using force preventively (Fisk and Ramos 2014). As noted throughout this volume, there are also increasing concerns that preventive targeted killing will not only become a trend for other states in the international system, but For example, some claim that drones in particular may make preventive attacks against non-imminent threats easier, and thus create an escalation risk insofar as they may lower the bar to enter a conflict (Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on U.S. Drone Policy, 2014, 31).

We focus in particular on drones because they represent seemingly ideal weapons in the war on terrorism: relatively low-cost, low-risk tools with disproportionately large benefits, especially for states that face liberal complaisance (Schweller 1992, 243). When faced with a non-imminent but likely lethal threat, liberal complaisance often leaves states militarily unprepared for defensive action, much less large-scale preventive action (Schweller 1992, 244). While there are other types of limited preventive force, including special operations and cyber-attacks, we concentrate on drone strikes not only because of the timeliness of the issue, but also because of the ethical, legal, and strategic considerations these strikes embody. We believe the international community is at a turning point in what it deems acceptable regarding the use of lethal force. And this has implications not only for fighting terrorism, but also for how states deal with other types of adversaries, including other state leaders and political challengers. An estimated nine states (including the United States, Israel, Britain, Iran, and China) have developed armed drone technology as of this writing, and this number is expected to grow in the near term (New America Foundation 2015a). Compounding this trend is the recent news of the Obama administrations policy change to allow armed dronesrather than unarmed dronesto be sold to Americas allies (Ryan 2015). It has therefore become increasingly important to contemplate the costs and benefits of even smaller-scale uses of preventive force in both material and normative terms, and in relation to broader effects on the overall stability of the international system.