Zhe Wu - Process Operational Safety and Cybersecurity: A Feedback Control Approach (Advances in Industrial Control)

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Traditionally, the operational safety of chemical processes has been addressed through process design considerations and through a hierarchical, independent design of control and safety systems. By developing safety systems including alarms, emergency shutdown, and further emergency response systems to be activated when control systems fail to operate chemical processes in a normal operating region, process operational safety has been improved to prevent incidents that can lead to property damage, human injuries, and environmental impact. However, the consistent accidents throughout chemical process plant history (including several high-profile disasters in the last decade) have motivated researchers to design control systems that explicitly account for process operational safety considerations. In particular, a new design of control systems such as model predictive controllers (MPC) that incorporates safety considerations and can be coordinated with safety systems has the potential to significantly improve process operational safety and avoid unnecessary triggering of alarm systems. However, the rigorous design of safety-based control systems poses new challenges that cannot be addressed with traditional process control methods, including, for example, proving simultaneous closed-loop stability and safety. On the other hand, cybersecurity has become increasingly important in chemical process industries in recent years as cyber-attacks that have grown in sophistication and frequency have become another leading cause of process safety incidents. While the traditional methods of handling cyber-attacks in control systems still rely partly on human analysis and mainly fall into the area of fault diagnosis, the intelligence of cyber-attacks and their accessibility to control system information have recently motivated researchers to develop cyber-attack detection and resilient operation control strategies to address directly cybersecurity concerns.