Kenneth A Myers - NATO the Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic, and Military Setting

edited by Kenneth A. Myers

The survival of NATO as a viable alliance is currently challenged by a shift in the strategic balance of power, as well as by global events and contingencies that extend far beyond NATO's boundaries. In the face of these challenges, existing institutional mechanisms are proving inadequate to respond effectively.

The distinguished contributors to this volume draw on their vast political and diplomatic experience to identify and analyze the problems confronting NATO for the remainder of the twentieth century. They make clear the need for a trans-Atlantic communication network among policymakers, scholars, and othersa network that will allow an ongoing process of analysis and assessment of NATO's strategic, economic, and political problems, along with the identification of appropriate reactions.

Dr. Myers is director of European studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

The Changing Political, Economic, and Military Setting

edited by
Kenneth A. Myers

First published 1980 by Westview Press

Published 2018 by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright 1980 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notice:
Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 80-10677

ISBN 13: 978-0-367-01923-5 (hbk)

The future of the Atlantic Alliance was the subject of a major international conference convened in Brussels, Belgium, September 1-3, 1979, under the auspices of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, and the Atlantic Treaty Association. Under the chairmanship of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Henri Simonet, foreign minister of Belgium, a group of distinguished scholars and national leaders came together to identify and analyze the problems NATO will confront during the remainder of the twentieth century and to strengthen the network of transatlantic communication that will help the alliance meet future challenges.

During the three days of meetings, conference delegates met both in plenary session and in three panels. Panel I addressed NATO's military and strategic problems and was moderated by former Assistant to the President for National Security Lt. General Brent Scowcroft. Panel II, chaired by Sir Andrew Shonfield of the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, considered NATO's political and economic difficulties. Leadership and organizational problems were the focus of discussions in Panel III, moderated by Dr. Christoph Bertram, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

The papers in this volume are those prepared as background material for the conference. The initial section contains the major addresses; subsequent sections contain the papers prepared for Panels, I, II, and III. Three major issues emerged as a focal point of the papers:

When the papers in this volume were prepared, the alliance was in troubled waters. The subsequent crises in Afghanistan and Iran have produced a full-fledged storm that threatens to become the most serious crisis the alliance partners have yet faced. The alliance confronting the challenges of Iran and Afghanistan has survived longer than almost any other grouping of sovereign states. With the United States at its core and Western Europe on one wingbalanced to a certain extent by Japan on the otherthe alliance has been based on a common commitment to democracy and on a shared cultural heritage rather than merely reflecting a military marriage of convenience. As sovereign states, the NATO members have understandably differed with each other on occasion. But the current problemsraised at the conference and given greater saliency by events in Afghanistan and Iran are more fundamental and serious than those of past years; they reflect not only major economic and military changes in the relationships between east and west and north and south, but also in the relationships among the allies. The rules of the alliance game and the roles of the allies are less well defined than in the past, while the problems and vulnerabilities have become more differentiated.

Although recent transatlantic dialogues have tended to stress the indivisibility of deterrence and defense, the alliance debate has been punctuated of late by the question of whether or not dtente is divisible, whether or not European and American interests remain identical, and whether or not cooperation is still possible. Of course, European and American interests are not identical in every respect, nor is it always necessary or advisable for Europe to adjust automatically to each new policy declaration from Washington. But the fundamental interests between Europe and the United States in our mutual security are as congruous as it is possible for those of sovereign nations to be. Europe does have a vital interest in seeing to it that the policies adopted by Washington make sense and succeed. Certainly tensions are heightened by the different views that various national capitals bring to European and global problems. The worldwide interests of the United States reflect the role of the United States as a global superpower; allied, regional powers display commensurately more limited interests. Yet the recognition of the major redistribution of power in the world has not begotten a desire for a major redistribution of responsibilities, at least within the alliance.

There can be no redivision of labor without at least some common interpretation, some common assessment of the situation. Without such an assessment, the alliance will continue to suffer from what Henry Kissinger has called "the bane of so much of the Atlantic debate":